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Staff ANALYSTS
* In
service; writes anonymously. FOR YOUR INFORMATION Background
article on Waziristan, Pakistan* *With our compliments April 2006 Archive Articles
in archives include: - Iran Air Force vs US airpower |
Volume
10, Number 1 April
4, 2012 Comment on Indian
Army promotion policies and senior officers Hamid Hussain Vice Chief of
Staff (VCOAS) Appointments: In some cases COAS designate is appointed as
VCOAS while at other times another senior officer. Some
argue that senior most Lt. General and COAS designate should be appointed
VCOAS so that COAS can work with him making a smooth transition when former
takes over the reins of the army. Others argue that VCOAS is a
responsible position and officer with at least a year or two remaining in his
service should be appointed regardless of the succession of COAS. Last few
VCOAS appointments show that both paths have been taken. Deepak Kapoor was appointed VCOAS before taking over as COAS but
next four appointments; Lt. Generals ML Naidu (5 Rajput), Nobel Thamburaj, PC Bhardwaj and Shri Krishna Sinha (8 Gorkha Rifles) didn’t consider
COAS designate. Various factors especially retirement age of 60 and
seniority are main considerations. - Promotion
policy changes: In India, army recommends about senior promotions &
postings but MOD bureaucrats keep army on a very tight leash. They do
not allow senior officers to interact directly with
politicians that causes a lot of heartburn among senior brass but has
a beneficial effect of keeping army away from political intrigues. The effects of such intrigues on police cadres has been
nothing less than disastrous. In case of India, the right of
officer to challenge his rejection of promotion and even posting results in
long legal battles. Officer can send representation to army
headquarters followed by statutory complaint to MOD and then ultimately to
civilian courts. On positive side the officer has avenues to address
his grievances (in contrast to Pakistan where Chief’s decision is final) but
it has a negative fallout also as long drawn court battles, selective leaks
about rival’s confidential reports results in fissures within officer ranks,
accusations and counter accusations creating a very unhealthy
environment. In my view, Army Tribunal should
be the only avenue for such measures and to make it a level playing field a
mix of serving & retired army officers and retired high court judges
should be appointed its members. Fear of legal battles results in promotion
strictly on seniority base disregarding all other factors. - VK Singh
Backgrounder: Singh is from a military family and like many proud Rajputs several generations served with
distinction. He is a Rajput from rural Haryana. His grandfather Mukhram Singh served in British Indian army as Viceroy
Commissioned Officer (VCO). His father Colonel Jagat
Singh was from 14 Rajput Regiment. Several uncles and cousins served/serving
in Indian army. Now fourth generation of the family is serving in
Indian army. His son in law is also a Colonel. He is an upright
officer well respected for his professionalism and clean track
record. Good record at US Army War College at Carlisle and at
Fort Benning. Not a blemish during his long
career (only one accusation that as Corps Commander in Ambala
he ordered construction of an expensive club house for the golf
course). Unfortunately, in my opinion he
should have talked directly and frankly with defense minister about his date
of birth issue and once convinced that government will not change it, he
should have left the issue alone but this is my two cent worth opinion.
This would have served the institution better and allowed him a free hand
without any controversy to tackle corruption in the army that he is so
concerned about. - Lieutenant
General Bikram Singh Backgrounder: Sikh Light
Infantry (I think 6 SLI) officer. Good,
professional officer but considered aggressive and very ambitious throughout
his career. Sometimes could be overbearing and intolerable due to his
aggressiveness. Such officers step on many toes during their
careers. Graduate of US Army War College at Carlisle. Served as
Deputy UN Force Commander in Congo. His deputy in Congo was a Pakistani
officer now head of Special Services Group (SSG). Done good job in
Congo but again his ambitions (trying to convey that he is a Force Commander material ) may have resulted in some rubbing. No
major red flags with the exception of two: First in Congo, probably his own
battalion fathered some children. No problem if it was consensual; big
deal if it was rape. I’m not aware of any
negative outcome from any inquiry from this episode. Second, a silly
allegation that his daughter-in-law is Pakistani. To my
knowledge, she is a US citizen of mixed heritage; father an Afghan and mother
from one of the Central Asian stans. In this day and age of globalization, one can not ask relatives to give up their
citizenships. In my view this is quite absurd
and not worth discussing. - Court Martial
President of Sukhna Land Sam: In January 2011, the
General Court Martial (GCM) consisting of five Lieutenant Generals and headed
by Lieutenant General IP Singh convicted former 33rd Corps
Commander Lt. General PK Rath on three counts; issuing NOC, signing MOU with the
builder and not informing higher authorities i.e. his Amy Commander. Rath was cleared of the more grievous charge of intent to
defraud the army. In June 2011, Eastern Army Commander Lt. General Bikram Singh reconvened GCM to reconsider the acquittal
on the last large charge. To my knowledge, GCM
maintained its previous decision. - Promotion
System Changes: Promotion to senior ranks is a competitive process in every
army. Annual Confidential Report (ACR) is a crucial element and
subjective comments by immediate superiors can have both negative and
positive impact. Point system looking at all aspects of career is used to
decrease the influence of subjective comments on officer’s promotion.
In 2009, General Deepak Kapoor introduced two
changes; first was bifurcation of senior officer (Brigadier and above) cadre
into command & staff and staff only. An officer above Brigadier
rank would be promoted to one of the cadres. This essentially created
two classes resulting in much resentment as officer promoted for staff only
cadre would never command a troop formation essentially taking him out of the
race of crucial postings. Second change was decreasing the impact of
subjective assessments in ACR and increasing consideration of standard points
in ACR. VK Singh tried to reverse the policy and got into fight with
MOD (latter’s argument is that major changes can not be made every time a new chief take
charge). There is still some confusion as MOD has referred the matter
to Law Ministry for their opinion (again due to fear of protracted court
battles from affected officers) while on the other hand to my knowledge army
has promoted all officers to both command & staff positions essentially
discarding previous policy of two cadres. ‘We cannot afford to confine Army appointments to
persons who have excited no hostile comment in their careers …. This is a time to try men of force and vision and not to be
exclusively confined to those who are judged thoroughly safe by conventional
standards’. Prime Minister Winston Churchill to Sir
John Dill, Chief of Imperial General Staff, 1940 Volume
9, Number 1 April
14, 2010 Iran Comments by Tom Cooper USS Stark was not attacked by a Dassault Mirage F.1EQ fighter-bomber, but - actually - by
a Dassault Falcon 50 biz-jet, modified through
addition of a radome and entire avionics set of
Mirage F.1EQ-5, plus two underwing hardpoints for AM.39 Exocet
anti-ship missiles. Nick-named "Susanna" in IrAF service, this plane was originally intended as a
training aid for future Iraqi Mirage pilots, and thus contained not only an
entire cockpit of the Mirage F.1 but also an additional fuel tank inside
its cabin. Now, as well known, USS Stark was
hit by two Exocets, one of which failed to
detonate. "Standard" Mirage F.1EQ-5 could carry two of these
big missiles as well, but was very sluggish and slow once airborne. Flying it
over 300km away from base proved extremely tiresome for pilots. Susanna could
do so without any particular problems. Why is this important, actually? Well, following the end of
the war with Iran, in 1988, the Iraqis continued adding upgrades to Susanna,
including a capability to carry yet more fuel - this time inside a standard
RP.35 drop tank, mounted under the centreline. With
this, the plane had not only the range to reach, for example, Mumbai when
operating out of Shoibiyah AB (former "RAF Shaiba", near Basrah), but
also enough range to reach its intended operational zone, namely the
"Eastern Mediterranean" - and that along a circuitous route (via
Turkey, for example). BTW, according to a letter from
the then Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Secretary General UN, from
September 1991, together with three other Falcon 50s, Susanna was
"evacuated" to Iran. The plane was never seen again ever
since... Whether or not the crew of USS
Stark received indications of being painted by "Mirage's" (i.e.
Susanna's) Cyrano IV-M radar is a matter of much dispute. The probable reason
is that the Cyrano-IVM had no "lock-on" mode, but was generally used
in "track-while-scan" mode, emitting signals very similar
to any "early warning" radar. Frankly speaking, ECM and
ESM systems then in use generally tended not to rise
any alarms when "painted" by such radars, but only when detecting
emissions in lock-on mode. That meant that the crews of
targeted (war)ships could not say they have been
targeted, even if appropriately equipped. Now, I sincerely doubt we'll ever learn whether a solution for this problem
was found in any kind of publicly-available media source. But, I think
that one might want to bear in mind that at least one of anti-ship missiles
currently in Iranian service is EO-homing - which means it emits no
radar emissions at all. Regarding whether somebody might
get close to USN warships or not in the case of a "real war":
recently "aired" reports from within specific circles of
the USN indicate something like the existence of so-called
"no-go" zones for USN warships along the Chinese - and Iranian
coasts. These are places USN warships should avoid going to
even in the times of peace - because they are too dangerous for them. Surely enough, warships at high
seas are anything but easy to detect - regardless of their, generally, huge
RCS (except in the case of latest, "stealth" warships). And, surely
enough, not a single case is known in which anybody detected and tracked a
carrier battle group on the high seas in a combat situation since 1945.
However, nowadays one needs no expensive and precious manned reconnaissance
assets (like RF-4Es or [E]C-130 Khoofash
operated by the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force) to do the job. Countries
like Iran operate hundreds of recce UAVs, and these can do the job of finding
and tracking USN warships inside the Persian Gulf (for example) as well. Considering the vast array of different types of
anti-ship missiles in Iranian arsenal, most of which have a far better range
than the Exocets of the 1980s, plus the fact that
the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy operates three Kilo-Class attack
submarines, the units of the USN's 5th Fleet are facing a very serious threat
already when moving into the Gulf of Oman. Not to talk about their
movements through the Hormuz Straits or inside the Persian Gulf. It is
therefore little surprising that the Iranians living and working in the later two areas complain their telephones literally start
ringing every time a USN warship is passing by - due to all the ECCM emitted
from the later. And that in peacetime...
Given the USN's behaviour during the Kosovo War, back in 1999, when USS T
Roosevelt (CVN-71) CVBG was held almost 1000km away from the coast of the
then Serbian-Montenegrin Federation, simply because the later had several old
and rusty attack submarines in service, the USN is obviously taking such
threats anything but lightly. Well...come to "Littoral Warfare",
USN. Regarding Misagh
MANPADs: the USN (and USMC) actually have some bad
experiences with Iranian MANPADs, and I am quite sure they do not take them
as lightly as indicated by your reaction to contemporary Iranian media
reports either. It was exactly the "mix" mentioned in the stated
report - namely that of MANPADs mounted on IRGC speedboats - that
resulted in the loss of one USMC Bell AH-1 Cobra attack helicopter and its
crew, on 18 April 1988, during the well-known US Operation "Praying
Mantis". Similarly, when the Royal Saudi
Air Force became involved in the recent war in Yemen (between the local
Government and al-Houthis), in November
2009, Saudi pilots received an order to operate above the estimated
maximum ceiling of supposed MANPADs reported as in al-Houthi possession, alone because of corresponding US
intelligence reports. Surely, the later subsequently proved entirely wrong
(i.e. al-Houthis did not receive any Misaghs or any other MANPADs), but this situation
indicates that the threat from these weapons is not taken lightly even
by pilots of such advanced fighter-bombers like Tornado IDS or F-15S... Overall, there is no doubt
that the Iranian media reports about "new and amazing" developments
within the Iranian defence sector can be taken
lightly. There is much bragging, and mistaken or
chaotic translations - because most of the journalists in
question have absolutely no clue about military affairs (as if this
would be the first time we are facing such a situation?). However, the
Iranian military cannot be taken lightly - if for no other reason, then
because it's not manned by the Iranian
journalists. Volume
8, Number 1 February
13, 2009 Swat, Pakistan North West Frontier Province A letter from Hamid, forwarded by Major A.H. Amin (Retired) Following is a piece sent to me by a former mid level
intelligence official of Pakistan army with first hand
information & experience about handling the issues discussed in the
piece. My comments are in italics. The
problem is complex and there are no easy answers or quick solutions. I do not claim to be privy to any special information or
have any solution. My perspective is based on my
interaction with ordinary Pakistanis & Afghans especially Pushtuns and many Pakistan army officers and limited only
to military aspect. Military aspect is only 20 percent but an important
one and the rest 80 percent is social. This is just part of an
ongoing dialogue because these events pose a serious threat to Pakistan's
interests and specifically the future of Pushtuns. 'Consider
not only present but future discords … If one
waits until they are at hand, the medicine is no longer in time as the malady
has become incurable.'
Machiavelli In the spring of 1994
Mullah Omer started his Taliban movement with less than 50 Madarassa students and after the capture of Kandahar, the
second largest city of Afghanistan, students, in thousands from Pakistani
Madrassas rushed to join the new force and by December 1994 he had a force of
12000 talibs– a new phenomena
had emerged in the Pashtun society, madrassa students and Mullahs were ruling
the pashtuns with the barrel of gun.
In Pashtun society no clear role is defined for religious functionaries in
the social system. The Government officials posted in these areas and
the Maliks/Khans are considered leaders, who get
legitimacy from the state authority while religious functionaries are given a
limited role dealing with some religious rituals. (This is correct
summary of traditional role of clerics and their rising power.) Religious
leaders are not satisfied and content with this role, as they have always
wanted a more prominent role in the decision making. Throughout the
history of Pashtuns major uprising were led by religious leaders like Pir Rosh an, Powinda Mullah, Faqir of Ipi, Sartor Mullah and
many others. (This is only partly correct. These examples are
correct but they represent only a fraction of expeditions/uprisings in Pushtun territories in the last two hundred years.
In majority of cases especially in cases of Pushtun
on Pushtun violence, leadership has been squarely
in the hands of traditional leaders. In addition, each incidence was more local in nature and we can not
put them in the same basket. Faqir of Ipi fought against Pakistan as fiercely as he did against
British.) They had leadership as long as the war/jihad was on, but
the moment the conflict was over, the leadership again reverted to the Maliks and Khans. The present talabinization is not just a movement for enforcement of Sharia,the mullahs want power, authority and a defined
role in the decision making in the social system of Pashtun society (They
have crashed into the party demanding their share and who would not if he had
the gun and a firm belief that his hand was God's own hand doing God's work.)
Events and
political happenings in Afghanistan have always had some impact on NWFP in
general and FATA in particular. Durand line divided many tribes, and
out of the seven tribal agencies, 6 have divided tribes – with people of same
tribe living on both sides of the Durand line. They cross the border
freely and in British time they had easement rights which
enabled them to travel across the border without any documents. (This is
correct but since increased centralization of Afghanistan & Pakistan in
late 19th and early 20th century, the role of central
governments gradually increased. Tribal areas were never able to
threaten the established order in both countries. Disintegration of
Afghanistan in 1980s & 90s set in motion a dangerous phenomenon and we
are now seeing the results of spreading of that process to contiguous areas.
The most unfortunate part is that most Pakistanis are not aware of the
involvement of their governments in Afghan affairs. Everything was
swept under the Jihad carpet and the phenomenon was never seriously studied
even by those who were actively involved in it. Most Pakistani never
heard the narratives of others including Afghans. Examples from my own personal
experience may help to give some context; I
interviewed an ISI colonel who had worked for years dealing with southern
Afghanistan. His knowledge about his area of operation and the
population simply shocked me. He was simply
handing money to Afghan proxies and thinking he was the master. Those
of us who grew up in Peshawar in 1980s knew very well that Afghan rebels were
routinely executing school teachers. When asked they replied that their
mullahs have told them that they were teaching communism in schools. So
teachers became apostates and eligible for summary execution. It
started with female teachers and then expanded to males. ISI directly
supported bombings in Kabul University stating that as communism was taught
there therefore 'educational institutions were a fair game'. Exiled Afghan intellectuals and who held different views were
assassinated in Pakistan by its proxies. I'm
not saying that Pakistan ordered their killings but its proxies which it
could control were doing it on its soil so they share some
responsibility. When Khost was captured by
rebels, it was designated conquered territory by clerics and therefore
eligible for treatment as 'booty'. In case of a school, there was
dispute about what to do with benches and chairs. A prompt fatwa solved
the matter quickly when all furniture was chopped and distributed as 'booty'
among the so called mujahids to be used as
firewood. Pakistanis are shocked now when it is
happening in their own country but don't know that
their government's direct support to elements doing these things more than
two decades ago to someone else has something to do with it. The
purpose is not to denounce the whole policy or start blame game but facts
need to be acknowledged to find a better course now. It is too fashionable in
Pakistan to criticize America for all their ills and every civilian and
uniformed scoundrel has walked free and has never been asked to answer for
their acts of omission and commission which resulted in deaths of hundred of thousands of Afghans.) Swat is
neither a tribal area nor is it bordering Afghanistan, so the question
arises, how come it has become a strong hold of
extremist elements who have virtually taken over the area. Being a
fertile area it always attracted invaders. Till
the 10th century most of the population were followers of Buddhism
and were very peaceful and docile people. In the 16th
century the Yousafzai tribe captured the
valley. The area was divided between various sub-tribes. There
was no central system of administration. The tribes resolved their own
disputes. In each tribe a system of "Wesh"
existed wherein residents of every village were shifted every 5-7 years to
another village except for Syeds and Kasabgars. The Gujjars
and Kohistanis of Swat had no land ownership.
Except for few years of central rule, this tribal system continued till 1917, after which different tribes elected a central
leader and Swat emerged as an independent state. In 1926, the British
accepted the state of Swat and the ruler was coffered with the title of Waali-e-Swat. He formed his own central
administrative system with two types of courts functioning in the State.
Courts headed by the religious scholars, known as Qazi
Courts, and Judicial Courts, headed by the area Tehsildars.
The Qazi Courts dealt with cases of divorce,
inheritance and some other minor cases involving sharia, while all other
disputes were referred to the Tehsildar. The
appellate forum was that of a Hakim, and a final appeal could be made to the Waali. All this process took only one month. In
those times the social problems were also not very complex so generally, the
population was getting free and speedy justice. The Wali had a very effective administrative mechanism for
the implementation of his laws known as "Riwajnamas"
(Good summary of evolution of Swat but the question is whether it has any
relevance to present scenario? We can learn some positive lessons but
obviously can not turn the clock back.) Dir and Bajaur were annexed to
Pakistan in 1960, while Swat was merged in Pakistan in 1969. In 1975, these
former independent states were declared as Provincially Administered Tribal
Areas (PATA). District Administration and Police were placed in these areas which were given status of districts. However, the
judicial system was based on Jirgas and executive
authority of the District Magistrates. In 1992, on a petition of lawyers, the
PATA regulations were abolished by the courts. No alternative system was
evolved and put in place to replace the previous system, so there was a
judicial void which created unrest in the general
public. (I'm glad that you pointed to an
important event and you are the first person who understood the importance of
this fact. This is the dirty little known secret in Pakistan
which even well informed people don't know. Systems in place no
matter how imperfect evolved over one hundred years and any ill thought
action to overhaul them without serious home work is going to bring the whole
edifice down. If any one needs any proof, he
should look at Swat which literally melted away in
front of our eyes in less than two years. Those who are advocating abolishing
FCR need some soul searching. No one is suggesting that existing systems are
perfect but they worked pretty good in the past and
are far better than anarchy. It is fashionable in newly independent countries
to criticize colonial enterprises but I was
surprised in my numerous interactions with Pushtuns
that they have a great respect for British rulers. Several of my
friends from tribal areas consider British political officers far superior to
any which independent Pakistan has produced.
Contributions of officers like George Rooskepple
& Robert Warburton to Pushtun society are far
superior to any Pakistani official.) In
November 1994, a general uprising took place in former Malakand
Division on the call of Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e- Mohammdi (TNSM). Violence erupted during the
movement and the mob took control of 6 Districts. New rules for traffic were
introduced and all kinds of transport were forced to move on the right side
of the road, left being un-Islamic. This resulted in numerous road accidents.
Men were made to wear watches on right hand. A sitting MPA of the PPP, the
then ruling party, was killed. It took the law enforcement agencies
more than a month to dislodge the militants and to regain control of these
areas. TNSM was formed by Sufi Mohammad in 1988. He himself is a
simple peaceful person who does not preach violence except for Jihad against
the Non Muslims. However, he does not have
the leadership qualities and capabilities to control large movements. In the
1994 movement, besides the TNSM, car-lifters, timber mafia, kissans having disputes with Khans, loan defaulters,
smugglers and many other anti-social elements penetrated, and took over
control of the movement and resorted to violence. As
a result of this movement the provincial government was pressurized
and a Nizam-e-Adal was
introduced in the Malakand Division in December
1994. The religious elements of TNSM established peaceful camps which continued till August 1995 for implementation
of Nizam-e-Adal
act. Qazi Courts were established in
1995. About 11 Qazis were directly enrolled
and for remaining civil courts the Judges were named as Qazis.
In 2001
Sufi Mohammad crossed over to Afghanistan to fight against the American
forces, along with thousands of volunteers who could not
fire even a single bullet and were routed and they fled, in all
directions, from Afghanistan. Sufi Mohammad was arrested in Kurram and was awarded 7 years imprisonment. (Lesson
for GHQ from this incident is that let the nature takes its course.
Local population was furious against Sufi for taking young boys to slaughter
and run back safe to Pakistan. It would have been much better to force
Sufi back to his territory and let some disgruntled local bump him and some
other TSNM leaders off when emotions were high. Instead, he was put in the
safe house in DI Khan.) The TNSM remained dormant for several years till Fazal Ullah
became active in 2006-2007. Besides
the TNSM factor, there are other actors in the prevailing Swat
situation. After the Tora Bora operations and
operation Anaconda, conducted in March 2002 by the NATO forces in Shahi Kot,Paktiya,most
of the foreigners crossed over to Pakistan and took shelter in almost all
parts of Pakistan with Jihadi, Sectarian organization and other tribal,
facilitating their movement and providing other administrative support to
them. A number of them went to Swat. (This is another
example of strategic myopia of GHQ. They seriously under-estimated the
extremist threat to Pakistan. They only looked the whole
changed strategic landscape through the prism of Afghanistan and no one can
blame them. After all it was only a handful of
American Special Forces and CIA operatives who were operating at that time in
Afghanistan. Senior brass concluded that Americans were for a
short stint and once gone, Afghanistan will again become their
playground. Even if that was the case, they should have looked at the
extremist threat independent of American factor. The decision at
highest level was only to catch foreign fighters while Taliban were given a
free pass. This later proved to be a strategic blunder the price of
which is being paid with the blood of Pakistanis;
both soldiers & civilians. This is the reason that I'm of the view that Pakistani officers should stop
reading novels of Nasim Hijazi
and start reading some serious military strategy to broaden their
horizon. May be a little bit of Shakespeare will not do harm). On
the onset of army operations in 2002, these foreigners kept on shifting their
position. Another factor may also have contributed to the situation
which is the conflict between the Kissans
and the Khans. During Bhutto era, a kissan movement
was started where the landless farmers took possession of lands
which belonged to various big landlords. Matta
Tehsil of Swat was the most affected area of this movement in Malakand Division. In 2003 Gulbadin, Taliban and Al-Qaeda reached an agreement to
fight the NATO jointly. The apparent strategy adopted was:- ·
To start guerrilla warfare against the NATO Forces and
engage them in a long war causing attrition and prolonging the conflict to
tire them out so that they are forced to leave Afghanistan-- a repeat of
jihad against Russia. ·
To create a Taliban state and system of Khilafat again in Afghanistan, as it existed before 9/11\ ·
To discredit the NATO Forces through effective
propaganda campaign by proving the war on terror a crusade launched by
infidels against Muslims and that American forces are killing innocent
unarmed Pashtun civilians. ·
To get the support of religious elements and middle
class population of both Pakistan and Afghanistan through anti-US propaganda. ·
To exploit the sentiments of ethnic Pashtuns through
code of conduct of Pashtunwali to get shelter and
support in those areas. ·
To eliminate prominent elders/ Maliks,
create terror by use of brutal force and to Talibanize
the whole tribal area so that security forces cannot
operate freely in the area. ·
To paint both Karzai and Pakistani rulers as puppets of
US. (This was the strategy of the adversary. It will be more helpful
if we review what was GHQ's strategy to face these
challenges?) In case a focused strategy is evolved
and pursued to a logical conclusion, the situation in both, FATA and Swat can
be brought to normalcy. Some steps, if taken, may improve the situation in
Swat:- ·
To develop a consensus of civil society, all political
parties, media and all segments of society and educate the general
public that Pakistan is facing a serious threat of Talibanization
and if suitable steps are not taken, the country may land into anarchy. (The
most serious impediment is the perception on part of Pushtuns
that army is in cahoots with the militants.
GHQ has not been able to convince Pushtuns that it
is not dividing militants into good ones and bad ones. In my countless
conversations with Pushtuns of different
backgrounds, majority were of the view that if army wanted to eliminate
militants, it could do it swiftly but it wanted to keep the option open for
the use of 'good militants' in Afghanistan & Kashmir on some later
date. There has been numerous stories told and retold about how police
arrested some militants or captured arms & ammunition but were told to
let them go by military authorities. Some also argue that large scale camps can not operate without official knowledge. They
are not clear whether army is unable or unwilling to tackle the problem.) ·
The proposal of Sufi Mohammad for establishment of
Appellate Court may be accepted. Since the Adal act
is already in place, the appellate court establishment is not a very serious
issue. Some TNSM elements are likely to join sufi mohammad and fazalullah may be isolated to some extent.
(In
short run, army will be needed to clear the areas. The division of
labor should be organized at tehsil level. As soon as area is cleared,
every attempt should be made to reconstruct the model of police and Frontier
Constabulary as first layer closely supported by FC. Army should be
kept in reserve to come to rescue when needed. A more close coordination
between police, constabulary, FC & army will be needed from lowest to
highest level. A battalion reserve for each tehsil backed by mobile
combined rapid reaction teams will increase coordination & morale.
Severely curtail use of air assets and artillery. The dilemma for
officers in charge of operations is that if they don't
soften up opposition with artillery they increase risk to their own soldiers
and if they use it then chances of collateral damage increase thus alienating
local population. If a decision is made to liquidate
hard line leadership then the policy has to be broad based and should be
carried out in all areas. Otherwise there is risk that to relieve
pressure on one area, militants will open other fronts to try to bog down
army. Setbacks in Swat and Bajawar may
be forcing some militant leaders to move to other areas i.e. Waziristan, Mohmand & Khyber. Forces deployed in those
areas should be working to arrange for the reception parties. Two
crucial factors which have not been seriously evaluated as
far as armed forces are concerned are ethnic & sectarian
dimensions. We need to seriously ponder what is the effect of ongoing
extremist violence on Pushtun and Shia soldiers
& officers and what are the remedies to prevent widening of existing
fault lines?) The Judicial system should be made
more effective by taking suitable steps for provision of speedy and
affordable justice. Negotiations with terrorist should
be held on two points-: · All terrorist should surrender and lay
down their arms. · Militant's leaders should give an
undertaking that they will not run a parallel administration and will
not interfere in State functions. · In case these two conditions are
accepted by the militants a general amnesty may be declared by the government
in the national interest. I have yet to see an informed and
professional discussion about the very premise of using non-state actors for
country's national security policy; the centre
piece of military's policy in the last three
decades. Lets open
some windows for fresh air and review what was achieved and what was lost
following this policy. My personal view is
that most of Pakistan's ills (Afghan mess, sectarian conflict, radicalization
of FATA, international terrorism etc.) can be directly contributed to this
strategic myopia on part of some of the senior brass. No adversary of
Pakistan could have dreamed of taking the country to such an abyss which this policy has achieved. Every
one in Pakistan is looking for 'mother of all conspiracies' but refuse
to look at their own actions. Pakistan has to off
course safeguard its interests in the region but the question is how
to do it without seriously harming the country. Pakistan has many problems and it
is up to Pakistanis to decide what is best for them. A peaceful and
prosperous Pakistan is in everybody's interest and many well
wishers of Pakistan are willing to help. We are already seeing
the disturbing signs of rise of armed militias which Machiavelli described
about a divided country quoted below; 'In a
divided country, when any man thinks himself injured, he applies to the head
of his faction, who is obliged to assist him in seeking vengeance if he is to
keep up his own reputation and interests, instead of discouraging
violence.' Machiavelli Volume
7, Number 3 July
29, 2008 A 1985 Study By The BDM Corporation Forwarded
by Mandeep Singh Bajwa Note:
for every mention of "soviet Union" in the paper, replace with
"United States": you will then be reading a paper updated for 2008. Plan To
Change the Map of India-Pakistan & Afghanistan Region (or Dismemberment
of Pakistan (1985) – proposed by BDM Corporation (Subsidiary of FORD),
Intelligence Analysts), under the New World Order. SCENARIO
OF THE FUTURE A
Soviet military presence in Afghanistan – thus positioned on the Pakistan
border – would not be so disturbing if South Asia did not have a history of
violent settlement of conflicts. The inherent belligerency between India and
Pakistan has produced three wars in less than 40 years. The details of the
disputes evolved from religious and territorial issues which have neither
disappeared nor been diminished by an arms competition that has acquired a raison
d’etre all its own. India’s
rise to the status of a regional superpower, a posture which
now rivals that of its occupier, Britain, has consistently been at the
expense of Pakistan. The In the initial confrontation between
1947-48, Pakistan did well to hold the high ground while the prize –
the value of Kashmir –went to India. The 1965 war was as indecisive as it was
costly to both. Despite lackluster showing by the Indian Army, what kudos the
Pakistan earned in terms of that performance were lost in the rematch six
years later when the Bangladesh revolt and Indian invasion resulted in a
humiliating defeat in the West and the loss of East Pakistan.
India’s test of a “peaceful” nuclear device in 1974 did not soothe the
regional rivalry. Its symbolic value for Indian
prestige stimulated a crash program by Pakistan which
in turn has caused New Delhi to take on a crusade against nuclear
proliferation. Rather than become involved as a signatory to the 1968
Non-Proliferation Treaty, India has taken on the self-anointed role of
regional enforcer. In the fall of 1984, there was growing evidence that
the Indian military had developed preemptive options and was urging an attack
on Pakistan’s developing nuclear facilities. In an
address to an army commanders’ conference only weeks
before her assassination, the late Prime Minister Indira Gandhi complained
that “Pakistan’s nuclear program has brought about a qualitative change in
our security environment.” Subsequent reports, both on the accelerated
pace of Pakistan’s nuclear development and on heightened efforts to increase
its survivability by constructing underground facilities probably means that
an Indian preemptive option may not be infinitely applicable. In any case,
the number, location, and protection of those facilities probably means that
an Indian attack could neither be as small nor surgical
as the precedent of the Israeli strike against the lone Iraqi nuclear
reactor in 1981. But
there is no shortage of excuses for war (like U.S. has demonstrated).. Earlier in 1984 the Indians were blaming Pakistan for
fomenting revolt among the Sikhs--charges noticeably absent since Indira
Gandhi’s death. Between July and October there occurred an escalating series
of border clashes with Indian patrols penetrating 60-km across the
uninhibited but disputed territory of the Siachin
Glacier, high up the Himalayan Rim. Interestingly, it was during this same
period that the cross-border raids by Kabul ground units reached their peak
in frequency and magnitude. There
has never been a paucity of conflict scenarios between India and Pakistan,
but with Soviet offensive power ensconced in the Afghan regional pivot, new
and more dangerous possibilities arise. Such scenarios are new in that they
could involve a joint or at least a coordinated Indo-Soviet effort. They are
more dangerous in the sense that combined Indo-Soviet capabilities permit
them to contemplate aggressive military actions with not only a higher pay-off than either could achieve alone, but also with
substantially-reduced risk. The
Soviets and Indians manifest a growing interest in the violation of Pakistani
air-space, which is shared consequence of engaging quite different targets.
For the Soviets, the concentrated insurgent base camps just across the border
(where air-strikes could have a more
significant effect than on dispersed and hard-t-acquire targets in
Afghanistan) must look increasingly attractive as they become frustrated with
their inability to close down the infiltration routes from the resistance
sanctuaries into Afghanistan. Whatever the immediate military valu, the collateral effect of terror upon the civilian
refugees would likely push these settlements further and further from the
border—thus decreasing the proximity of te mujahideen to a key
source of their support. Given the high percentage of
rebel arms which are of Chinese origin, the Soviets may also feel
compelled to interdict the most conspicuous route of supply – the Karakoram
Highway linking China and Pakistan. Attack
from the air is a necessity for any attempt to take out Pakistan’s budding
nuclear program. The problem for either India or Soviets in this regard is
the active resistance of Pakistan’s air force. But in this scenario, the two
countries have an incentive to act in concert. A carefully coordinated air
offensive attacking simultaneously from two different directions would
overwhelm Pakistan’s interceptors. With fighter strikes limiting the
defenders sortie rate, the bombers of Soviet strategic aviation could inflict
punishing blows against Pakistani AIRBASES. After this initial surge provided
meaningful air-superiority, Indian and Soviet forces would have an
uninterrupted ride for subsequent attacks and could concentrate against their
respective targets. In such a campaign, India, and
the USSR could achieve via joint action that which neither could
accomplish individually (at least with high confidence of success and
acceptable loss). THE
INDO-SOVIET VICE A
far more ambitious and permanent solution to the joint irritant of Pakistan
would be a combined Indo-Soviet invasion.. In its
relatively brief history, West Pakistan has never been realistically
threatened by abject dismemberment—until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
It is not evident that either the Soviet Union or India desires the
disappearance of Pakistan. However, their past behavior (Soviet support for
the Baluch uprising of the early 1970’s and the
Indian invasion of Bangladesh) certainly does not rule this out as a
possible, if unlikely, contingency. In the wake of a devastating air
offensive, a simultaneous Indo-Soviet ground assault from opposite directions
with converging axes would be unstoppable. An Indian attack
out of the Punjab toward Islamabad (a’ la 1965) coupled with a Soviet drive
out of the Khyber (utilizing absolute firepower superiority to suppress the
opposing infantry; air assault to enfilade defense strong points and
seize key terrain; and attack helicopters to retard reinforcement and
maneuver) would force the main body of the Pakistan army to fight
back-to-back. Options facing the Pakistanis would be
unacceptable—defend in place under the prospect of ever-tightening
encirclement , or withdraw south and abandon the capital and
Kashmir. A second Indian offensive—a deep armored sweep across the Sind
desert (a’ la 1971) that linked up on the Hinus
River north of Karachi with a mirrored Soviet move through the
lightly-defended Baluchi crest—would seal
Pakistan’s fate. Against
India alone. Given current force deployment, the Pakistanis have a reasonable
prospect of making a good account of themselves (accepting some territorial
loss for a lot of Indian blood in a protracted series of
attrition battles).. The same is also true concerning the Soviets,
given the terrain on the Afghan frontier and assuming substantial Pakistani
redeployment prior to take on both simultaneously, with quantitative and
qualitative inferiority on the ground and without adequate air
protection, invites defeat within weeks if not days. REAPING
THE BENEFITS! For
the aggressors, the outcome would offer enormous strategic benefit. Using the
Indus River as the primary partition of responsibility. Kabul could
re-establish its historic claim to the northwest frontier and be confident
that, however long its internal insurgency lasted, the
“miscreants” possessed neither sanctuary nor source of supply. The Soviets
could bring the “fruits of class struggle:” to a newly established People’s
Republic of Baluchistan which would, of course, ask for protection in
exchange for Soviet port access on the Indian Ocean (Gawadar). India could complete its quest for the Kashmir
and administer as an autonomous region whatever was left. Other
than short-lived economic sanctions and even briefer condemnation by
irrelevant international bodies, the risk of outside interference to
such a short, decisive campaign would come from only two significant
antagonists – China and the U.S. For
China, her proximity to this potential battle zone does not translate into
deployable power. Between Pakistan and the adjacent province of Sinkiang lies
an enormous mountain range. With only a few infantry division in this
province and an antique air force what China cannot provide prior to
hostilities will not come. With the mountain passes closed by weather, the
only militarily significant land route linking China and Pakistan is the
Karakoram Highway. An 800-km road which took 20 years to build
, its 99 bridges and 1,708 culverts make it one of the world’s most
attractive targets for air interdiction. For
the US, strategic timing, not tactical geography, is the most critical
limitation. With advanced warning, the US Air Force could redeploy enough US
assets to correct the aerial imbalance, redress some point defense
deficiencies, and establish a symbolic ground presence. But
realistically, the warning time prior to hostilities is likely to be too
short and the assets the US can deploy after the shooting starts is not
whether the Soviets and Indians would actually initiate such a
campaign, nor how they would operationally implement it—but that it is a
consequence of the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan that this
scenario is even available for conjecture. It is a contingency
which did not exist five years ago. The
most likely scenario, however, is that the Soviets—by carefully orchestrating
their military posture next door, tightening the political –strategic vice of
the Indo-Soviet bloc, and periodically allowing the counterinsurgency war to
spill over the border—will convey to the Pakistanis a heightened sense of the
danger they are in. Given an overdose of threat perception, Pakistan might
find it convenient to do the Soviets’ dirty work for them by closing down the
frontier passes, keeping the refugees from creating a unified and effective
infrastructure, and inhibiting the external flow of arms to the rebels. Afghan
armed resistance may go on for decades. That
notwithstanding, if the Soviets can militarily or politically seal off
sanctuaries in Pakistan, the intensity and effectiveness of the guerilla
activity will fall to a level, the Soviet “pacification by terror” campaign
can achieve its intended results over time. THE AMERICAN OPTION The
motile challenges to US regional policy aggravated by Soviet action in
Afghanistan offer contradictory dilemmas. Should the US provide the arms
modernization necessary to backstop Pakistan’s self confidence in the face of
growing blackmail while discouraging its proliferative ego trip for an
Islamic bomb”? Should the US prepare contingency forces for a credible
regional commitment without forward deployment; attempt to wean the Indians
from the lure of Soviet largesse while resisting their hegemonic ambitions to
“paper train” the Russians while their troops make a mess in Afghanistan? But
the most pressing policy issue is what the United States will do to help the
Afghan people. David Isby, one of the most informed
commentators on the Soviet War in Afghanistan describes the expectation of a mujahid after listening to President Reagan state
his support for the jihad over Voice of America. Being
an educated man, and knowing what the Americans had done to aid people
fighting communism in the past, he went outside to look upward for the black
C-130s he thought would be arriving with what the Afghans needed to keep
fighting. The black C-130s never arrived.
The US faces not only a policy decision but moral choice. To proclaim a
“crusade for freedom” and then offer nothing but rhetoric is not just
hypocritical—it is contemptuous of every American value. It is time to put up
or shut up. And there is no clearer litmus test than supporting the Afghan
resistance with the one armament that every observer of the war has noted
they need most—a man-portable surface-to-air missile. When the Soviet Union
feels free to arm Marxists and terrorists all over the globe with its latest
weaponry, and when the US has a massive stock of surplus Redeye missiles
(which are being replaced with the new Stinger), why does the US continue the
charade of dribbling third-party SA-7s to the Afghan Resistance?
America can make the Soviet invasion extremely costly by aiming directly at
the military assets, which most typifies the war—Soviet air power. An
unwillingness to provide that minimal assistance will foreordain the success
of the Soviet “time and terror” strategy. America’s future deterrent to
Soviet aggression in the third world will be no more credible than in
December 1979, and Afghanistan will not be a prologue but a precedent. This
article on page 103 shows two maps of Pakistan under the caption of “A
Scenario of the Future?” Top Map
- Pakistan
graphically depicting “Joint Indo-Soviet Air Offensive” ·
Preemptive attacks on Pakistan’s major airbases · Soviet
bombing of refugee camps and air assault seizure of key passes. · Indian
Strikes on Pakistani nuclear facilities · Soviet
interdiction of Karakoram Highway Bottom
Map - Pakistan graphically
depicting “Ground Campaign for the Dismemberment of Pakistan” · Creation
of independent “Peoples Republic of Baluchistan” with USSR Naval Base and
Force Deployment Treaty ·
Absorption of northwest tribal territories into Afghanistan ·
Absorption of West Kashmir into India ·
Administration of Sind /Punjab autonomous zone by India. References:
NOTE:
2. Just imagine who is occupying Afghanistan right now, and these thought came from two American Defense/Intelligence Analysts, working for BDM Corporation (a subsidiary of FORD) of MacLean, VA. Only juxtapose Soviets with the word American to relate what is going on in Afghanistan at presents and the direction of the blowing winds engulfing Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, and Iran. All these countries are surrounded by Military bases now possessed in a region called “Petrolistan.”
Complete details are posted in a 30-page PDF File posted at www.environmentaldirectory. According to University of California Professor, and president of Japan Policy Research Institute, (author of BLOWBACK and The Sorrows of Empire), U.S. now possesses more than 750 Bases around the globe to enforce the New World Order, as we have seen after September 11, 2001. 3. This quest would be incomplete without connecting the above information with a Known World Oil Reserves Map published by British Petroleum (BP) that is posted on the web at to learn where McCain acquired the “110 –year” military occupation of Iraq:
http://earthtrends.wri.org/ 4. “The United States and the Global Struggle for Minerals,” by Alfred E/ Eckes, Jr., University of Texas Press, Austin & Toronto, 1979. ISBN Box 0-292-78511-9. (pbk) 5. “RESOURCE WARS- The New Landscape of Global Conflict,” by Michael T. Klare, Owl Books Henry Holt and Company, 2001. ISBN 08050-5576-2. (pbk) 6. “OIL, POWER & EMPIRE: Iraq and the U.S. Global Agenda,” by Larry Everest, Common Courage Pres, Monroe, Maine 2004. ISBN 1-56751-246-1.(pbk) 7. “CONFESSIONS OF AN ECONOMIC HIT MAN,” by John Perkins, A Plume Book, published by Penguin Group, New York 2004. ISBN 0-452-28708-1. (pbk) 8. “Forbidden TRUTH: U.S. - Taliban Secret Oil Diplomacy and the Failed Hunt for Bin Laden, “ by Jean-Charles Brisard & Guillaume Dasquie, and published by Thunder’s Mouth Press/Nation Books, New York 2002. ISBN 1-56025-414-9. (pbk). 9. “The PENTAGON’S NEW MAP – War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century,” by Thomas P.M. Bennett, Berkeley Books, New York 2004. ISBN 0-425-20239-9. (pbk). 10. “The ISLAMIC BOMB: The Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle East, “ by Steve Weissman & Herbert Krosney, NYT/Times Books, New York 1981. ISBN 0-8129-0978-X 11. “ROGUE STATE: A Guide to the World’s Only Superpower, by William Blum, published by Common Courage Press, Monroe, Maine 2005. ISBN 1-565751-374-3. 12. "After Iraq: A report from the new Middle East - and a glimpse of its possible future," by Jeffrey Goldberg, pp cover and 68-79. published in "The ATLANTIC Magazine, January/February 2008. Cover had the map of New Middle East as envisaged by the Neocons and Zionocons. . Volume
7 Number 2 March
19, 2008 Hamid Hussain Comments on Major A.H. Amin's analysis of US policy
Pakistan/Afghanistan March 19, 2008 Editor's Introduction To Major Amin's Analysis An analytic piece by a former Pakistani armored
corps officer who is well versed with military history. He has insight
into Pakistan army mindset and has been in Afghanistan for the last few
years. He is one of few officers well versed with military history especially
of the region. In addition, he has first hand
knowledge of ground realities in Afghanistan being there for more than four
years. Hamid Hussain's
comments I have had interaction with large
number of Pakistani officers of all ranks from Lieutenant to Lieutenant
General and frankly this officer is one of few with such insight into the
region’s military history. He does not mince his
words and has a unique perspective with which many may disagree.
My comments are in italics and blue. These are exchanges between two eccentrics who have interest in
military history and based on hypothetical scenarios. He can be
counted as an expert but I’m surely a
spectator. Most official and non-official reports and briefings tend to
be polite and do not touch ‘inflammable’ topics pertaining to the conflict
but for a meaningful and informed discussion, no aspect should be a taboo. My
comments are based on my recent three week trip to the region and interaction
with people of different backgrounds with main focus
on Pushtuns. Readers should be mindful that this is
a very limited perspective and based on armchair spectators like me who have the luxury to pass judgments sitting in the
comfort of their homes. Not even hot air of the conflicts touched them or
their loved ones. Those who live through the horrors of violence will surely
have a very different take on these issues. ) Hamid Need
for a New Long Term US Strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan (It
should be clear at outset that several competing interests are involved in
terms of U.S. policy in Afghanistan. A number of government agencies
with different approach and perspective are engaged in various activities in
Afghanistan and this makes the coordination task a nightmare. Expanding role
of NATO has further complicated the task. Now there are severe limitations on
U.S. maneuvers due to heavy commitment in Iraq. Former Secretary of
State had duly warned before the Iraq war that’ this thing will suck oxygen
from everything else’ and he was right. On part of Afghans, it will be naïve
to expect that U.S. & NATO will continue the heavy lifting indefinitely
while they will have the luxury where some Afghans making money from the
foreign funding and reconstruction while another group of Afghans making
money by blowing up this infrastructure. The
solution will be dictated by Afghans and at the end of the day they have to
decide among themselves whether they will slaughter each other or decide to
live with each other. As far as the foreign factor is concerned, Afghans will
need to make their mind about choosing
sides. They have to pick one side whether to ally with U.S. or with
Taliban. They can not be just spectators and
expect that their country will simply drift forward and foreigners will have
unlimited money and patience. Having said that, it is an undeniable
fact that Afghanistan is much better in the last seven years. Good news
is usually not news but common Afghan has benefited from the changed
situation. Off course, more is needed but looking at all standards
realistically Afghanistan is better. Even if
one looks at violence and compares it with Pakistan things are not that
bad. Again, more effort is needed to avoid loss of innocent lives.
Those who oppose U.S. presence in Afghanistan have this simplistic notion
that if tomorrow U.S. leaves Afghanistan, everything will be fine.
Strategically, for U.S. the main question is whether heavy military presence
will serve their security interests or more covert and less visible presence
will be more cost effective. U.S. policy in Afghanistan for the next
decade will revolve around this question and benefits and risks equation will
depend on which path is taken.) The USA occupied Afghanistan in November
2001 and its almost more than 6 years since then and yet the United States
has failed to win the hearts and minds of a substantial part of Afghan
populace. The reason lies in abject failure of USA's economic policy .This in
turn has led to a counterproductive situation. There is nothing
inevitable in history but those who cannot identify the critical time
span in any crisis and who fail to seize it by the horns are bound to fail.
Such unfortunately has been the case with US strategy in Afghanistan. The US
president failed to find the right strategic talent for Afghanistan and thus
thrust mediocre US policy makers on Afghanistan who know, nor recognize
anything higher than their shallow mediocrity! The main thrust of USA's policy
was to construct roads and schools and clinics.
These were important but no substantial class of stakeholders which had a vested interest in success of US policy inside Afghanistan
was created. No major employment opportunities were created. No major effort
was made to encourage private enterprise. No major attempt was made to
privatize Afghanistan's main economic potential i.e. its massive custom
revenues most of which do not land in government coffers and are skimmed away
by corrupt custom officials as bribes and by smugglers as profits once Afghan
imports are re-exported i.e. smuggled to Pakistan. US approach in short was
bureaucratic, conservative and in final summing up timid! (When
confronted by a problem, we usually throw in more bodies and money and hope
that the problem will go away. In fact this creates another
bureaucratic layer further slowing down the process. British approach was for
long haul. General Abraham Roberts spent 50 years in India while his
son Fredrick Roberts 44 years which means that between father and son, ninety
four years. We are sending young kids on three to six months stints.
Almost none of them speak either Dari or Pushtu.
Result is that we are being fleeced by every one.
On top of it corrupt U.S. officials are treating these funds in a manner
which reminds me of old west ways. It
looks like a wagon loaded with cash has broken down on the main road and every body is taking money as he pleases with no sheriff
in sight. First we went to bed with warlords to find out later that it
was not good. Then we shook hand with drug lords to find four years
later that we were successful in making Afghanistan a leading exporter of
opium and bringing it on top of chart. Now we are trying to arm
tribesmen. And then surprise, we found that it was
the same guy who was wearing different hats depending on the situation.
I don’t see any coherent game plan. We are just
adjusting to changing tactical ground realities. Unfortunately, we do not
have desserts on the menu. Our choices are limited to which brand of
castor oil we want to take. To be fair, the work itself is a messy one with
no perfect solution.) Bearing Point a large US firm got
the major contract for economic reform. It hired Americans and expatriates
who would not have got any decent job in USA or even a medium level country.
In addition they hired some Afghan Americans who came to Afghanistan for a
short term period, to make a quick buck and go back to their relatively far more
comfortable permanent places on the California coast. (There
is no perfect solution to any given problem. A certain amount of
wastage/corruption is expected, however most important thing to focus on is
to make sure that this wastage does not derail the whole project where
everyone walks away with whatever he can get hold of leaving only ruin
behind. A number of Afghan-Americans who were owners of pizza places and some
used car salesmen ended up running mega projects in Afghanistan. No
wonder we are now scratching our heads what went wrong. Almost all Americans
who deal with them are polite as they have to work with them and don’t want to offend them. In reality, they are
disgusted by the petty fights about personal gains among a whole lot of
Afghans. None other than President Bush remarked that ‘you can not buy an Afghan but you can surely rent a one’ and
make no mistake we are renting a whole lot by dozens. It took central
state hundred years to create a sense of nationhood among Afghans.
Thirty years of civil war shattered the very foundation and it will be hard
work to rebuild it again. Realism and not romanticism will save Afghanistan.
Afghans will need a lot of soul searching.) The magnum bonus achievement of
US advisors was creation of AISA a government agency funded and administered
by USA and some European donors to regulate licensing and setting up of
industrial parks. Again since little private enterprise was involved with
Bearing Point is in the background and making a good buck hiring Afghans with
US or Canadian passports at relatively low salaries and some local Afghans.
The main industrial project of AISA industrial parks in Jalalabad, Kabul,
Kandahar, Herat and Mazar took six years to be
awarded and will take another one year to complete. Having said that it is
good if AISA has licensing/registration alone and Industrial Parks are
handled by a highly professional international company with full support of
the US Government and with zero percent interference from the Afghan
Government. A better
approach could have been to award the contract to a private firm on turnkey
basis with a profit incentive instead of hiring Afghans on fixed salary in AISA.This combined with a 30 or 50 year incentive to
industries to export quota free to USA , combined with a buy back
guarantee with USA with the condition that all quality standards were met
would have let to creation of industrial parks in Afghanistan by mid 2004 and by mid 2005 or
late 2005 many hundreds of industrial units would have been functioning in
Afghanistan. Thus at least permanent long term employment could have
been created for 200,000 to 500,000 Afghans. Instead the main thrust of US
economic policy was on roads ,schools and clinics
which benefited a coupe of construction companies of
foreign companies and created a low income short term employment for an
Afghan labour which could not have exceeded
300,000 at any time. Schools and clinics awarded to LBGI were in turn
sub contracted by LBGI to Afghan contractors , many
being US and European passport holders at about 25 % to 30 % of the total
cost. These contractors in turn sub contracted these to local Afghan petty
contractors at low rates.Thus hardly 10 % of the
total amount earmarked for these schools and clinics were actually spent
resulting in leaking and collapsing roofs and highly sub
standard construction. This faux pas was well covered by the
Washington Post in late 2005. It has been estimated that the
contraband non drug mafia in Afghanistan is larger than the drug mafia of Afghanistan.
In turn both the mafias have overlapping key figures involved in both the
trades. It has been estimated that some 80 % of Afghanistan's imports are
smuggled back to neighboring Pakistan where custom duties are very high. The
United States made a somewhat lukewarm effort to
re-structure the low paid and highly corrupt and inefficient Afghan customs
.Another approach could have been to award the custom collection and
enforcement task to an international private firm like Cotecna
or SGS. This way Afghan custom revenues could have
been multiplied by 400 % to 600 % and Afghan Government could have been made
financially far stronger, while also reducing its overwhelming dependence on
foreign aid. It is significant to note that many key Afghan governors on the
bordering provinces as well as some ministers are known to have a close link
with the non drug contraband mafia. (Those
who have even only rudimentary knowledge of the country well know that they
and their forefathers have been involved in this business. It is
important to note that it is not considered illegal, unethical or immoral.
They consider it as a legitimate business and fight every effort by nation
states to regulate this activity.)) During the past six years many
Afghans and many Pashtuns saw daisy cutters, Chinooks and armored cars but no
one saw the benefits of USA's advent in Afghanistan. Both the countries got a
lot of hot lead and shrapnel but no Marshall Plan other than a Marshal being
created in Afghanistan! (Each
theatre is different and no two Marshal plans can be same. Most
important factor is the social and psychological make up
of the population. In the aftermath of Second World War, two nations;
Japan and Germany took a different path. At individual level, even loss of a
single innocent human life is a tragedy and every effort should be made to
preserve human life. However, in the life of nations internal and
external factors can catapult them into the midst of a horrible storm.
Japanese and Germans are first rate fighters and they plunged the world into
a horrible carnage. Both nations came out of the conflict devastated
and defeated. However, both nations made a difficult choice at a
critical juncture of their history. They used the resources of their
conquerors judiciously and in fifty years came out as front runners among the
league of nations. Even Vietnamese after a brutal war came out with their
nation intact. In contrast, look at Palestinians and Afghans.
Palestinians unable to solve their own problem tried to hop on a different
train. They dragged every neighboring Arab country into direct conflict
and thus were able to directly contribute to
crushing defeats to Egypt, Syria and Jordan. They produced gentlemen
such as late Abdullah Azam who had nothing for his own people but was very
successful in brutalizing societies such as Egypt, Afghanistan and Pakistan
with his extremist ideologies. Afghans ended up burning up their own
house for good in the struggle to get rid of the Russians. Pakistan is now an
assembly plant of suicide bombers.) In
Afghanistan this was a case of lack of vision on part of US Government. In Pakistan which got more than 10 Billion USD in aid, the
corrupt non Pashtun dominated government spent a very nominal part of this
aid on the Pashtun areas despite the fact that this aid was meant to
basically pacify the Pashtun areas of Pakistan which are definitely the centre of gravity of Al Qaeda/Taliban.No
special export zone with the right to quota free guaranteed export reinforced
by buy back guarantees was created in the NWFP and Balochistan
provinces of Pakistan. These zones could have gone a long way in
creating employment and prosperity in the Pashtun areas and vastly reduce the
sense of alienation in the Pashtuns.The reasons for
this were more ethnic than anything and the USA made no effort to arm twist
the tin pot Musharraf regime into spending this money on the Pashtun areas of
Pakistan. The only investment that Pakistan's non Pashtun dominated
government made on the Pashtun areas was in form of Cobra helicopter
munitions, 7.62 mm bullets, 155 mm artillery etc in
pounding the Pashtun areas indiscriminately, targeting mostly non combatant’s women and children. (There
is a common perception which has never been
seriously debated which takes the view that if Washington simply pumps more
money into the region then the problem will go away. As a spectator of
Afghan civil war, I came to the conclusion and I may
be totally wrong that when there are more spoils the game becomes more brutal
and uglier. Every Afghan faction and sub-faction took money from
everyone and his cousin and turned their homeland into rubble. Without
understanding the sociology of the population in the conflict zone, one may
deduce wrong conclusions. One example may give some insight. In early
1990s, towns started to fall to Afghan rebels fighting against Soviet backed
government. Afghan rebels conquered a town in Khost
and all spoils were declared booty and distributed among various
factions. They had gathered in a school and there was quandary about
how to distribute the furniture of the school among the men. They
decided to chop all the furniture and distribute the wood to be used for
fire. It looks like time has frozen in some areas. They routinely executed
school teachers labeling them as communists. A new generation of
leaders with a different mindset emerged when every sensible Afghan was
either killed or forced to leave the country. The jungle was left for
the wolves only. You are more familiar with luxurious dwellings of
these new leaders in one of the most expensive real estate enclaves in
Kabul. In my humble view the situation
is tribal territories along Pakistan-Afghan border is more complex with a
number of players with different agendas. I fear
that rather than learning the lesson from Afghanistan, the region is
following the Afghan example.) In addition no major effort was
made to create a stock exchange or float investment bonds giving good interest which could have created a substantial class in
Afghanistan whose success and prosperity was linked to US policies in
Afghanistan. It was just a matter of a little imagination and printing bonds
with the backing and sovereign guarantee of US government for payment of
interest in USD for a period of 10 to 20 years. Unfortunately
there was no brilliant man like Nixon in the US leadership who could think of
a coup like delinking of gold standard in the early 70s.A condition could have
been imposed that in order to buy these Afghanistan Fund Bons
all companies had to register in Afghanistan thus bringing money to
Afghanistan as well as a long term class of stake holders in Afghanistan. (This
is a good idea which could have benefited the
country in the long run.) I developed
friendship with a US official in Kabul in 2005.We discussed many aspects of
US policy in Afghanistan.In the end the US officer
pessimistically concluded that his superiors were a bunch of w_t p______s .Similar ideas
were expressed by many US military officers I met in Afghanistan in the
course of military contracting in course of 4 years. (You
just got the small sample of the feeling of frustration. Patience has
never been an American virtue. I don’t think that
we will pack from Afghanistan tomorrow or after small setbacks. We will
be engaged but the methodology may change depending on the public support and
economic situation of U.S. I see future with more
covert operations rather than heavy military presence. We may decide
about this inevitable outcome in a wise way before more damage is done or we
will learn the usual way after burning a number of fingers and toes: both
ours and of others. The battle will be fought by Afghans themselves with or
without our help. I don’t know whether it will be
good or bad but I think that if violence crosses a certain threshold in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, then there is a possibility of division of
Afghanistan along Hindu Kush line. I don’t
think non-Pushtuns are in a mood for Pushtun hegemony anymore. This probably will not be
in the form of separation or emergence of new countries but it will be de facto just we are seeing in Iraq. Each
community entrenched in its own ethnic enclave with protracted fight along
contested areas. If that event comes first then in addition to increasing
intra-Pushtun violence there will be increase
pressure on the state of Pakistan. If the current cycle of violence emanating
from tribal areas continue to kill and maim people in big non-Pushtun cities such as Rawalpindi, Lahore, Karachi then
it will be naïve not to expect a backlash against Pushtuns
in general. This will estrange different ethnic communities. Only a
concerted effort by concerned citizens can prevent the schism. The problem is
that even informed people do not analyze these trends rationally. They are easily carried away by emotions and dwell on conspiracy
theories preventing a concerted effort to prevent fragmentation. They
keep looking for the hidden hands and not paying attention to their actions
and evident social, economic and political factors which
push events in a particular direction.) It may be added that the same
policy should have been followed in Pakistan ,
particularly its tribal areas creating industrial zones guaranteeing 10
to 20 years quota free exports to USA with buy back guarantee instead of
doling out many billion US Dollars to Pakistanis highly corrupt military
junta. This way employment would have been created and potential recruits of
Al Qaeda and Taliban given decent risk free long term jobs in the industrial
units established as part of this policy. (It
may work but then who could guarantee that the same Wazir
or Mahsud who would make $500 per month from
working in an industry in tribal areas will also not sell his tomatoes at $50 per kilogram to al-Qaeda up in the mountains to make some
extra change. Money is only one factor and other aspects need to be
tackled along with economic activity. I think it is
naïve to expect that the young chap who has life and death authority when he
is member of one of the extremist outfits will go back and run a tea stall on
the roadside suffering daily humiliation. These are social factors which need to be studied. I
fear more kids will follow this model and it will be of different shapes in
different parts of the country. In Karachi Muhajir
youth have joined the fascist strain of MQM and living comfortably on the
extortion from the urban areas. Rural Sindhis
are following the same path. Their preference is kidnapping for ransom. They are now quietly moving to urban areas
after learning lessons from MQM. In Darra Adam
Khel, flashy SUVs come and distribute monthly stipend to the Taliban foot
soldiers openly. This kid getting a regular salary, brandishing a brand new
AK-47, instilling some fear through his coercive capability and also gaining some respect being the enforcer of some
good is now on a different plane. He has crashed into the party and it
will not be an easy task to reverse this trend. The phenomenon needs serious
research.) No major effort was made to
regulate the visa regime. A Work Permit was issued by the Ministry of Labour for visa extension but this permit was not honored
by the Ministry of Interior when AISA issued them visa extension letters for
multiple visas in many cases thus restricting in country and out country
movement of expatriates. The Afghan Embassies particularly those in Pakistan
followed yet another highly absurd practice of granting a 15 day single entry
visa to all applicants with the condition that after they had visited
Afghanistan once and exited they could not apply for another Afghan visa till the three month period of the visa expired. Thus an
expatriate with a valid Afghan Work Permit was told that work permit had no legal
value in eyes of Afghan Embassy Staff and that they could not apply for
another visa till the three months visa validity
period expired. Afghanistan and even Pakistan may
be compared to a sort of West Germany and South Korea for USA.Any
withdrawal from Afghanistan would straight away lead to re-occupation of the
country by Taliban with an active re-entry of Russia, Iran and India on side
of non Taliban forces. The Afghan Army needs at
least 10 to 15 years to recover its military effectiveness. Thus all this
would be a 100 percent disaster for USA. (Same
argument was forwarded in case of Vietnam. The two situations are not
the same but I think strategically it will be more cost effective and may be
more productive if U.S. concentrate on covert measures to tackle the
extremist issue rather than embarking on the projects of huge military
footprints and nation building. Plenty of local players are more than willing
to rent their guns at a much lower price tag. This is strictly looking at the
menace of extremists. On bigger canvas, helping these countries build
their own societies will make the world a better place for our
children. I would prefer my children going as
exchange students or scholars to Afghanistan or Pakistan and vice
versa. This is much better than sending our kids with M-16s and in
return expecting their kids blowing themselves up. ) The only viable strategy for USA
in Afghanistan is to settle in for next two decades. Introduce a Marshall
Plan which creates employment and prosperity .Introduce public bonds with
good interest that make US presence in Afghanistan a cause of progress and
prosperity for many. Keep a watchful eye on the region. Build up the capacity
of the Afghan National Army and Police. Any withdrawal by USA would be a
cardinal strategic blunder. Something which the USA cannot
afford and an event which would constitute a Clausewitzian
culminating point of USA. (Afghanistan
and Pakistan will be saved only by Afghans and Pakistanis. Even if U.S.
comes in with good intentions it can surely help in some aspects but it is
unlikely to change the dynamic of economics, governance and conflict. Both
countries are nations in terms of definitions but a long process over the
last sixty years has widened the fault lines. Present geographic
boundaries of Afghanistan have not changed much in the last three hundred
years. Efforts in 20th century mainly coercive helped to
strengthen the central state but ethnic, tribal and political Islamic forces
have significantly weakened the foundation. A Herculean effort by wise Afghan
leadership with a grand bargain among various groups will be needed to even
to go back to the status quo of the last century. Pakistan is a new state which has struggled to cobble a nation. It
embarked on using the religion as an anchor
but it didn’t work. On one end, it opened Pandora boxes by declaring
some citizens as non-Muslim i.e. Ahmadis and on the
other end sectarian fault line widened. Bengalis were as good or as bad
Muslims as any other Pakistani but they finally rejected the Pakistani
identity and were able to achieve independence. The ethnic fault lines have widened in the last twenty years
and I don’t see any mechanism in place either at government or at civil
society level to address this crucial issue. Baluchs
are completely alienated to a point where Baluchistan university is now a no
go area for armed forces personnel of the country’s army. This was
frankly admitted none other than the
Commandant of the Staff College at Quetta. Ethnic and sectarian forces will
realign and if violence stays above a certain threshold then international
players will have no choice but to work with local players rather than
routing everything through Islamabad. That will be a bad day for
Pakistan. ) Further the USA has to reinforce
the democratic forces in Pakistan and Afghanistan while making use of
Pakistan's mercenary army which is still far cheaper
than any Western force even if their pay is tripled by US aid. At the same
time the Pakistani forces being more than 60 % non
Pashtuns have to be restrained from causing collateral damage. (I
sincerely hope and pray that I’m wrong but the seeds
of chaos sowed two decades ago are bearing fruit now. Off course, a different
methodology is needed but majority of Pakistanis think that if they simply
unilaterally withdraw from the fight against extremists everything will be
fine. It will not be an easy task to put the extremism genie back in the
bottle. This has now become truly native and even if U.S. walks away from
the scene, this devil will devour many more souls before it is exorcised.
Case of Iraq is a good example to study.) The USA has invested many
billions in Afghanistan but its priorities are not clear.Vaccillation ,
procrastination and supreme indecision remain the hallmarks of US policy in
Afghanistan. (For
a dispassionate analysis to understand better, we need to look at facts and
not carried away by emotions. Myths and romantic notions have been
passed on as history. Pushtuns have some
sterling qualities but also have their share of vices. Recently, when
sectarian clashes broke out in Parachinar, the
sectarian extremists entrenched in Waziristan became jubilant and started to
arrive in Kurram to kill the Shia ‘infidel’ which
is closer than American. Turis had to set up
ambushes at the strategic entrance points of the agency to put some fear of
God in them. The result was over 200 casualties. Majority of
Pakistanis do not have any clue what is eating away their foundations. You
need to sit with a Wazir woman to
at least get the other narrative but no one is interested in
that. I met an Afghan woman who had married a
non-Muslim. She was a young woman who had lived the horrors of civil
war for the spoils of 1990s. We just chatted casually but then she came
out with a statement which showed her pain.
She said that I married this man because he was the
first man in my life who showed ‘respect’ to me. Unlike most Pakistanis
you are well aware of the history of the region. Remember First afghan
War of 1840s; the Gilzai tribes along the border
rose against British troops not for ideology or religion. They were
happily receiving 8000 sterling pounds per year and British troops were
partying in Kabul. Many had romantic relations with Afghan women.
Then a bureaucrat wanted to save money and decided to cut the subsidy from
8000 pounds to 4000 pounds. All tribes rose and the rest is history. In
1980s, Afridis took toll from rebels passing
through their lands in the form of cash and weapons. When Afghan forces
garrisons were besieged, the same Afridis will
supply them with food and weapons off course 100 times higher than market
value. In 2008, Taliban commander of Helmand switched sides and now
serves as an advisor to U.S. ambassador to Kabul. Nothing is changed
over the centuries. This commander has not turned overnight a champion
of human or women rights or a democrat. It boils down to interest at
any given time. If tomorrow he can make a quick buck he will not hesitate
to stab in the back any Afghan or American. He may shoot at American
soldier for his night vision goggles. All this is too embarrassing for
Afghans and Pakistanis to let their children know. So the myths pass on
as history. ) ‘Courage
among civilized peoples consists in a readiness to sacrifice oneself for the
political community. G.W. Hegel’ Definition of bravery is different as far nation is
concerned. A wise Afghan once mentioned to me
that unless ‘we learn to differentiate what belongs to us and what to the
nation, we will not move forward’. I think new
model of conflict resolution and prevention is needed. Security is just one
dimension of a complex conflict paradigm. More people to people
interaction between various groups inside Pakistan, between Pakistan and
Afghanistan and between the region and U.S. will be more fruitful and less
violent and painful. This is a long drawn process with no short cuts. Volume
7 Number 1 January
28, 2008 Major
A.H. Amin (Pakistan Army, Retired) Waziristan
Vol 6 Number 5 September 4, 2007 Chris Raggio London's School Of Asian & Oriental
Studies Report On US Strike against Iran Executive Summary &
Introduction There
is considerable international discussion that the confrontation between Iran
and the international community over its nuclear programme
may change in character into a major war between Iran and either
US or Israel or both in conjunction with allies such as the United
Kingdom.
Vol 6 Number 4 August 6, 2007 Hamid Hussain Wages of Extremism --- Past, Present and Future of Lal Masjid Phenomenon [This article also appears in the Pakistan Defense Journal August
2007. Reprinted with author's permission.] Recently,
in the Pakistani capital of Islamabad, security forces launched an operation
codenamed ‘Silence’ to get rid of armed extremists holed up in Lal Masjid and its affiliated Madrassah
(religious school). This operation resulted in death of more than one
hundred entrenched in the mosque as well as about ten security
personnel. The operation was watched closely by Pakistani and
international audience. Focus was mainly on the events surrounding the stand off between extremists led by two brothers; Abdul
Aziz and Abdul Rashid. There was no attempt to look at the crisis in
the broader context. It will be a folly to look at the issue only in
terms of law and order. The incident itself may be very
local in nature but it has broader implications for the country and
the region. Rise of extremism in the region has many dimensions and its
effects will also be multifaceted. The
stand off at Lal Masjid
came as a surprise to many Pakistanis. With few exceptions, country has
no culture of serious academic analysis of deep rooted social and security
problems. In the last few years, there has been rapid expansion of
print and visual media outlets; however there has been very little effort to
inculcate a culture of serious and responsible discussion about vital
national security issues. Just like most of their western counterparts,
majority of private television stations are interested in sensational news
with gory details. Even debates about important issues boil down to shouting
matches between participants thus depriving the audience of any meaningful
and constructive dialogue. In the corridors of power, key decision makers simply stumble
from one crisis to another and major focus is only on crisis management as it
arises. There is no institutional mechanism for serious study of newly
emerging threats. Military and intelligence hierarchy has not been able
to reform itself to changing threats. Culture of highly personalized
decision making process, lack of input from different sources, strong
inhibitory environment for dissenting voices and unaccountability generates
an environment which is not conducive for a well informed decision making
process. Those
who have even rudimentary knowledge of the events of the last two decades in
the region are not surprised about the events like stand
off at Lal Masjid. This downward trend
has a long history. Pakistanis are not the only players in this drama
and therefore all the blame cannot be placed at Pakistan’s doorsteps.
It is disingenuous on part of Washington to blame everyone while completely
ignoring its own follies. Americans need to remember that
two decades ago, it was national security policy of U.S. government which was
executed by Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on the killing fields of
Afghanistan. CIA provided training in sabotage, handling of
explosive devices and urban warfare for yesterday’s holy warriors and today’s
terrorists. Special courses were run for target assassinations and how
to make lethal bicycle, camel and car bombs. CIA
also provided sophisticated communication equipment, delayed timing devices
for plastic explosives, long range sniper rifles and high precision targeting
devices for mortars. The next generation of holy warriors is now not only using
these skills against Pakistani security forces but has acquired new ones
adding Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and suicide bombers to their
arsenal. Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan and the civil war in the wake of withdrawal of Soviet
troops changed the dynamics of power in the region. Non state actors
gradually gained strength as the nation state of Afghanistan
fragmented. The ripples were felt from Pakistan stretching to Middle
East and all the way across Atlantic to U.S. A new breed of
warriors emerged from the ashes of Afghanistan which
is now shaking the very foundations of many nation states. The seeds
were sowed in 1980s when rules of warfare were completely overhauled to suit
the need of that time. All major players including Afghans, Pakistani
military and intelligence personnel, U.S. Saudi Arabia and China conveniently
ignored the brutality of their clients and proxies on the Afghan
battlefield. Everyone agreed with the principle of armed resistance
against occupying forces but in executing the policy on ground the most
brutal and inhumane tactics were employed. Afghans indiscriminately
killed civilians and indulged in activities such as skinning their
adversaries alive and sodomizing prisoners. Pakistani intelligence
personnel approved and provided logistical support for sabotage operations
even in educational institutions. Arab countries let loose their own
lunatics to descend on Afghanistan and contribute to the mayhem. The
label of communist was used liberally to eliminate school teachers, intellectuals
and educated females. The barbarity practiced on the land of Afghanistan also infected non-Afghans playing on that
field. The most bigoted and extremist fringe of Pakistani sectarian
warriors which embarked on wholesale killing of Shia in Pakistan a decade
later was schooled on the battlefields of Afghanistan. Arab extremists
flew back to their native lands to engage in barbaric acts in the name of Islam which have not even been catalogued properly let alone
analyzed. Indiscriminate killing of men, women and children in the most
horrific way in Algeria was one gory example of this saga. Careful look
at the emergence of extremism and Pakistan’s role in it should be done not as
an exercise of blame game but to understand the dangerous
trend and finding ways to curb this trend. Combination
of general discontent, Islamist discourse, deteriorating economic and
security situation and anger about some foreign policy issues are
contributing to the brew of a dangerous cocktail. Pockets of extremist
militant groups are scattered throughout the country and they can create crisis situation at any time. These groups are
rapidly expanding their area of influence. Their influence extends from
the border hinterlands of North and South Waziristan to other border areas of
Bajawar, Dir and Swat to
small and large cities and now even the state’s capital is not immune from
the rapidly escalating violence. Several small groups are taking
advantage of the situation and following the example set up by Lal Masjid. In Swat Maulvi Fazlullah
is threatening to send suicide bombers against Pakistani security
forces. In Mohmand tribal agency, a group of
about 100 armed militants took control of a shrine and mosque. Their
leader offered talks with government and then threatened to unleash suicide
bombers. It looks like that everybody is obsessed with the death
cult. Extremists of all colors and shades are now popping
everywhere. The big landscape is a general trend of piety and
observance of religious rituals by the majority of population.
Pakistani society has been a conservative society but in the last two decades
religious symbols and rituals are visible in public arena. The background
theme is ‘revival’ and ‘return to puritan ways’ linked with the ‘end of the
world’ and ‘arrival of Messiah’. A number of orthodox clerics and their
organizations as well as self taught neo-clerics
and evangelists are propagating their views in their respective mosques,
print and electronic media. The very nature of this phenomenon is
exclusive. Each cleric is entrenched in his own mosque or institution
with no interaction with others thus splintering general population into
small groups. The negative side of this phenomenon is entrenchment of
sectarian identity. Now a more younger and radical generation
influenced by the ‘salafi’ (an ultra orthodox school of thought based on Hanbali school of juristic traditions which stresses on
literal interpretation of scripture and discourages innovation) trend has
taken a step forward towards ‘takfir’
(apostasy) and painting their version on the big landscape. Their modus
operandi is a mix of cult and gang culture making it very difficult to engage
them in any meaningful way. In areas ridden with violence, this younger
leadership is pushing traditional peaceful clerics out of public arena and
using coercive measures to purify the community. Religion rather
than advancing the concepts of equality, economic and social justice and
egalitarianism has become a tool for the fragmentation of society. The
most pressing question now for Pakistani state and society is how to tackle
this phenomenon of extremism. As far as Pakistan is concerned, this
internal threat has now surpassed all external threats. One is the
immediate security aspect of the problem and the other is more long term
holistic approach to forestall Iraqification of
Pakistan. It is now clear that threat from extremists can not be completely eliminated
but measures can be taken to limit its damaging effects. Pakistan is
facing a grave crisis and there will be security, economic, political and
social fallout from the extremism menace. Outsiders can sympathize,
warn or threaten Pakistan but at the end of the day it will be the decision
of the Pakistani state and society to determine their own future. Only
Pakistanis will decide what kind of society they are willing to live
in. All critical decisions should be made in this context carefully
balancing the benefits and risks. A closer look at the emerging threat
gives a glimpse of the future discourse in the context of Pakistan.
Extremist groups are very small in numbers and majority of Pakistanis of all
ethnicities and religious denominations are moderate and are appalled at the
violent cycle. However, it is the action generated by extremist groups which send shock waves both internally and
externally. In Pushtun areas, the extremist
ideology with its doctrine of apostasy was brought by Arab fighters.
This doctrine is the foundation stone of the legitimacy of killing fellow
Muslims after they are declared apostates. Two decades ago, during
‘external Jihad’ against the Soviets, no suicide bombings were carried
out. The tables are now turned and in ‘internal Jihad’, extremists have
no qualms about using suicide bombings against all targets; civilian and
military in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Pushtun
element among the extremist groups based in tribal areas will continue to
have some loose affiliation with their kin across the border in
Afghanistan. This will keep violence graph high enough on both sides of
the border and will contribute to economic stagnation and dislocation.
In both countries, Pushtuns will come under
increasing scrutiny. Whether in Kabul or Islamabad, a poor Pushtun from the hinterlands will be viewed with
suspicion further alienating a large number and aggravating ethnic
frictions. Nationalist Pushtuns may close
ranks to provide the alternative stressing on ethnic identity and will try to
negotiate with Pakistani state and international players. Influence of
extremists is making its way into the Hindko
speaking belt of Hazara and Kohistan
resulting in instability in that traditionally peaceful area. In
northern areas, where a large number of Shia and Ismaili
community live, the nature of conflict invariably will be sectarian in
nature. In Punjab, a decade ago, extremist elements channeled their energy
towards Indian held Kashmir. Suicide bombings against Indian targets
both civilian and military did not bother anyone in Pakistan for over a
decade. Now in ‘internal Jihad’, the same methodology is being used
against Pakistani targets. In Punjab, popular piety revolving around
shrines and tombs will not be tolerated by puritans who consider such
traditions as apostasy. The rise of extremists will fan the sectarian
fires and the wages of Jihad will be more bloodshed among Muslims. A
number of groups in Pakistan are not yet in the loop of religiously motivated
violence and this include Baluch, Sindhi and Urdu
speaking known as Muhajirs. Rise of religious
militancy and weakening of national bonds will only strengthen ethnic
identity of these groups and they will use this identity while negotiating
with the state or international players. These groups will need armed wings to keep spoilers at bay
and negotiate a better bargain from the state which
is a recipe for a multidimensional internal conflict. Pakistani
state is facing a daunting challenge. On the security front, the approach
needs to be diverse and innovative depending upon the situation. The
strategy needs to take into consideration local conditions. Security
operations in tribal areas have quite different dynamics compared to urban
areas. Support of local tribes both for negotiations and punitive
measures is essential. Hardcore extremist leadership both local and
foreigner cannot be eliminated without tribal cooperation and timely
intelligence. In case of attacks of large groups of militants on
settled towns such as recent attacks in Tank (a city bordering restive tribal
agencies), show of force of combination of police and paramilitary soldiers
backed by regular troops can neutralize the threat quickly and allay the
fears of general population. In case of suicide attacks by individuals,
pouring large number of troops to the scene does not serve any meaningful
purpose and wastes resources. Quick response of police to maintain law
and order and handle transfer of casualties at the scene will serve the
purpose and may be a better and cost effective approach. In fighting
extremism, lot of things can be achieved quietly and more efficiently without
too much of collateral damage. More attention should be paid to the
subtle approach and covert measures to neutralize the leadership of extremist
groups. In
foreseeable future, it is clear that army will be
used frequently for support of civilian law enforcement agencies. Army should be used as a last resort and not as first option
in case of a crisis. Army’s General Head Quarter (GHQ) has to do some
homework to analyze internal threat and how to handle it.
So far, everybody has been simply waiting for the crisis and when it occurs,
bodies are simply thrown at it with the hope that something good will come
out of it. Regular troops are not trained to handle small groups of
people entrenched in urban areas nor to manage a scene of a suicide
bombing. In addition, regular army troops have a long logistical tail
and movement is usually slow and costly. In view of these limitations,
government has been using Special Services Group (SSG); the elite commando
units of Pakistan army. These are highly trained soldiers and can be
effective in such situation. However, they are a highly prized
commodity and can not be replaced easily. It
takes a long time to select the best soldiers and officers and then train
them in special tasks. SSG has been stretched to its limits as they are
involved in operations in Waziristan and Baluchistan. A separate
anti-terrorist battalion of SSG named Zarrar has
been trained for special tasks and was used in ‘Operation Silence’. The
commanding officer Lieutenant Colonel Haroon –ul-Islam, Captain Salman Butt and many soldiers gave the
ultimate sacrifice in the operation. Several others were injured.
These officers kept the tradition of Pakistan army by leading their men from
the front. The sad fact is that homegrown Jihadis
were never able to lay their hands on Indian Special Forces but were able to
kill a number of Pakistani elite soldiers without any moral qualms. A
new special unit called Anti Terrorism Force (ATF)
is being used in some internal security cases. Expansion and strengthening of
this force with a mix of new police recruits and retired army soldiers and
officers may decrease reliance on SSG. There is a need of more
coordination between civilian and military intelligence and security
entities. Use of army in internal security duties is always a tricky
situation. In case of use of religion by extremist groups makes the
task more complicated. Most of the rank and file
of army is recruited from conservative districts of North West Frontier
Province (N.W.F.P.) and Punjab. The bulk of recruits are from rural
areas, however soldiers are more educated nowadays. They are not living
in isolation and they are exposed to outside world and different
opinions. They are watching the same media and reading the same
newspapers. Confusion among general population affects soldiers and
sympathy shown by a segment of population for extremists can have an impact
on the morale of soldiers. GHQ needs to look at the educational and
psychological aspect of preparing soldiers for the unpleasant task of
internal security duty. In modern world, internal security operations can not be viewed in isolation. Some covert
operations are best done in total secrecy and information is shared only
among a limited group. However, in case of deployment of troops in
troubled areas or Lal Masjid type operations,
government has to take local community leaders, political parties and media
into confidence. Those involved in the decision making process of the
operation have to do the homework to prepare their case and present it as a
necessary measure to get consent of the majority of the society. In the
absence of that such operation though necessary to maintain law and order
will not get the desired results. Recently, federal government deployed paramilitary soldiers
and regular troops in Swat but provincial government demanded removal of
these troops. Such chaotic decision making process will only bring
grief and merely add more confusion to a very complicated and dangerous
situation. Prolonged deployment of soldiers under these trying
circumstances for internal security duty can put enormous pressure on
officers and soldiers and there is a clear danger that a number of them may
refuse to perform such tasks. Pakistan army is a disciplined force but
fissiparous tendencies in the society will invariably seep into the army.
No
government can tackle the very difficult and complex problem of religious
extremism with its attendant violence alone. Civil society dialogue
about the threat of extremism and effective measures to counter it is
desperately needed to build a consensus. Apathy among general
population is not helping in this regard. They have a simplistic and
naive view of the whole saga. They want government to be responsible
for law and order and do not want gun totting militants in their neighborhoods.
However, when government decides to take action, they blame it for the crisis
and want negotiation with extremists. In case of Lal
Masjid, general public opinion was in favor of action against militants
entrenched in the mosque. However, when action became messy, then
public quickly back paddled and many even started to espouse the cause of
those who had challenged the writ of the government. Legitimacy crisis
of government is coupled with the lack of trust. A mix of denial, anger
and frustration is severely hampering the efforts to understand a dangerous
trend. These basic issues need to be addressed above party politics
and narrow interests. It is up to Pakistanis to decide what kind of
government they want but regardless of the shape and form of the government,
the fundamental issues facing the nation need to be addressed. Majority
of Pakistanis want to live a stable and peaceful life. Economic and
social problems take precedence over all other problems. Most
Pakistanis are connected to the outside world and get a variety of opinion
from local and international sources. However, as far as the issue of
religious extremism is concerned, the attitude of a large number of
Pakistanis is a mix of fear, anger, frustration and denial. Even well
informed Pakistanis are either unaware of the dynamics of violence generated
by religious extremists which was linked to Pakistan’s national security
agenda defined by Pakistani security establishment for over two decades or
prefer to completely ignore the relevance of that phenomenon.
There are no quick and easy solutions to the complex security dimension
in the context of religious extremism. There is no easy pick on the
table and Pakistani society has to make some tough decisions about benefits
and risks of various approaches. Current judicial system is unable to
handle the rapidly rising menace of extremism and there is an urgent need for
frank and informed debate about special antiterrorism court set up with
adequate individual protections to try these cases. Pakistan’s recent
experience should be an eye opener. Judges
have been reluctant to sit on benches which try
extremists. No witness is willing to come forward to record the
statement against the culprits for fear of his own life. Even lawyers and judges have been assassinated, making normal
judicial process unworkable. Under such trying circumstances what kind
of justice can be delivered is anybody’s guess. Some mechanism needs to
be worked out where terrorism cases are processed through judicial system
giving reasonably fair trial to the accused. In
the absence of a holistic approach, it is likely that crimes committed by
extremists under religious banner will get a similar response. On part
of government, it will be very tempting to embark on extra-judicial
killings. The argument in favor of this approach will be that normal
criminal and judicial principles do not apply to extremists and after appropriate
intelligence these criminals should be put to sleep quietly without any
fanfare. On the other end of the spectrum, if state is unable to
control law and order, then it is likely that some will take law in their own
hands. We may see emergence of small groups who may take the page from
the book of religious extremists and start to assassinate leaders and rank and file of extremist groups. It will be very
tempting for the government to support such groups to avoid using large
number of security forces. Few months ago, in South Waziristan, a
local group under the leadership of Mullah Nazir
Ahmad killed large number of Uzbek militants. Recently, some Afghan
Taliban commanders and foreign militants crossing
over from Afghanistan into Pakistan have been killed by unidentified gunmen
in Baluchistan province. There will be increase in such killings of rank and file and leaders of militant groups. Those
who decide to take arms against militants in tribal areas will link with
Pakistani authorities and build relationship across the border with Afghan
government and U.S. military and intelligence assets. It is also inevitable
that militant groups will fracture on issues of ideology, resources and
operations. These internecine battles will dramatically increase the
scope of violence and further add to the complexity. Recent example of
arrest of suicide operators sent from Bajawar to
Waziristan to assassinate Mullah Nazir Ahmad point
towards this phenomenon. The culprits are held by Nazir’s
followers and being interrogated. In earlier battles between
local militants loyal to Mullah Nazir and Uzbeks,
some local small armed bands sided with Nazir while
others with Uzbeks. However when the tide turned in favor of Nazir, many of them abandoned Uzbeks. These small
commanders are now in reconciliation process with Nazir.
In coming years, especially in tribal areas, the one who will carry the
longest knife and fattest purse will turn the tide in his favor. A
number of religio-political parties such as Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam (JUI) and Jamiat-e-Ulema Pakistan (JUP)
participate in political process of the country, contesting elections and
serving in provincial and federal assemblies and cabinets. They use
these positions for political and economic gains. It is likely that the
clash between these religio-political parties and
militant groups will follow the Afghanistan and Iraq patterns. The gulf
between orthodox clerics of various denominations and extremist militant
fringe will widen. The fight over control of disciples, mosques, madrassahs and economic resources will not
be non-violent. Recently, the house of leader of his own faction
of JUI Maulana Fazlur Rahman in Dera Ismail Khan was
attacked and enraged students of Lal Masjid threw
out the JI delegation not allowing them even to pray in the mosque. These are early signs of the coming conflict between orthodox
clerics and neo-Taliban. Religio-political
parties will also see fragmentation of their own ranks where more radical
elements will break ranks and link up with militant groups. Second and
third tier leadership of these parties will try to increase their influence
by playing on both sides of the fence. Recently, wanted militant
Abdullah Mahsud was killed in the house of local
JUI leader Shaikh Ayub Mandokhel in the city of Zhob
in Baluchistan. This event has led to internal blame game among the
provincial leadership of JUI. We may see more of this cycle of suspicion,
accusation and blame in coming days. Militant outfits are seething with
anger against clerics who are benefiting from present arrangement. If
extremists decide to strike against religio-political
parties then their first target will be Fazlur Rahman group of JUI followed by Barelvi
outfit JUP. The
most damaging long term effect from the incident was a sense of fear and
helplessness among general population. Pakistanis are now openly
questioning the very viability of the state and the danger of anarchy,
fragmentation and civil war is clear and present. Rise of religious
extremism has unnerved every Pakistani but the most damaging effect has been
on minorities and Muslim sects who are not part of the majority. This
has severely weakened the national bond and smaller units of identity based
on sect are on the rise. Militants involved in sectarian conflict
rotate through various Jihadi organizations to avoid capture. If law
and order situation is not controlled in a reasonable time
period, it is inevitable that non-Muslims, Shia and other Sunni groups
such as Barelvi school of thought will decide to
arm themselves for self protection. There is a real threat of emergence of these sect based
militias and geographic shifts in communities all around the country.
In such an atmosphere, even a small incident can ignite large scale
violence. Kurram and Orakzai tribal
agencies have seen such kind of sectarian violence. If religiously
motivated violence escalates, then other groups such as tribes and ethnic
groups will also arm themselves and violence will become multi-faceted.
This is what exactly happened in Afghanistan about two
decades ago and now happening in front of our eyes in Iraq. In
the regional and international context, large scale violence in the heart of
the country’s capital alarmed everyone interested in Pakistan. So far,
Washington’s interest in Pakistan’s border region has been limited to its
relevance in the context of Afghanistan. However, recent intelligence
reports from U.S. raised the fear of possibility of attacks on U.S. soil from
extremists entrenched along Pakistan-Afghanistan border and this has added
another element to the dynamics of relations between Pakistan and U.S.
In efforts against non-state actors, despite differences it is the
cooperation between countries which will counter the
threat effectively. Blaming each other causes more friction and less
cooperation between security agencies thus allowing more room of
maneuverability for the non-state actors. Surely, many policies of U.S.
have simply added fuel to the fire of extremism but Pakistan has no control
over how others will act. It needs to act to secure its national
interests and every sane Pakistani agrees that ‘loose canons’ of any kind
pursuing their own agendas at the expense of the country are a recipe for
disaster. It is clear that any direct action by U.S. on Pakistani
soil will exacerbate the situation but if Washington concludes that
extremists are gaining strength and their links with al-Qaeda are growing
then Pakistan should prepare itself for direct overt or covert action by U.S.
from its Afghanistan bases. In action against non-state actors, best
results are achieved by cooperation of states. These battles will be
won only by invisible forces and by actions which
will never be publicized. Traditional military tactics and beating of
war drums will not curtail this trend. If such crucial decisions become
hostage to political rhetoric then nation states: big and small will pay a
heavy price. The
mosque incident may be just an aberration and may not have any long term
negative effects but the message it sent to the outside world was
shocking. It affected Pakistan on both the security and economic
front. On security front, world is now paying close attention to the
nuclear and missile arsenal of Pakistan in the context of internal
conflict. On economic front, many foreign entities cancelled projects
and a number of foreign experts including citizens of Pakistan’s close ally
China left the country. This will have a negative impact on future
direct and indirect investments in Pakistan. Pakistanis were busy in
the blame game and trying to get political mileage from a sad situation and
nobody cared to send a reassuring signal to the outside world. The
result of this utter lack of responsible and mature attitude is that even
Pakistan’s genuine friends are now worried about ‘loose nukes and long range
missiles’ slipping out of Pakistan. In the context of previous
allegations of nuclear proliferation and rise of religious extremism with its
attendant death cults, now even Pakistan’s friends are thinking about
contingency plans of securing Pakistan’s ‘crown jewels’. Whether right or wrong, the credibility of Pakistan as a
nation state is very low on all international forums and sending a Lieutenant
Colonel from Strategic Planning Division (the department of Pakistan army
controlling nuclear and missile forces) to assure the world that Pakistan’s
nuclear weapons are in safe hands is simply not cutting the ice.
Pakistan may not care what others think or may consider their views biased
but they have to do some soul searching. They need to make decisions which they think are best for their
country. However, they should be prepared to face the consequences of
their decisions. No country can live in isolation and regional and
international competition and conflicts impact on
what choices one makes. The
violent incident in Islamabad mosque resulted in deaths of many including
soldiers of Pakistani security forces. Whatever is the ideology and
motives of the people who have embarked on a violent ‘internal Jihad’, the
irony is that no adversary could have done what they have achieved by shaking
the very foundations of the state of Pakistan and setting the stage for a
possible civil war. It is prudent for Pakistanis to remember that the
civil war of Afghanistan after the departure of Soviet troops was fought
under the name of religion and Jihad. All groups had the word ‘Islami’ in their titles and they killed and maimed their
own so called brothers and sisters of religious fraternity in a methodical
way without any moral ambiguity. The blowback of Jihad for Pakistan has
been a nightmare and now reached a stage where it is truly threatening the
viability of the state itself. Those who think that the threat is
exaggerated; they only need to look at Afghanistan and Iraq and draw their own conclusions. Internal conflicts don’t pop up overnight. They evolve through various
stages and internal and external factors impact on
what direction a particular conflict takes. Up to a certain stage,
fault lines can be bridged but after crossing a certain threshold,
reconciliation and peaceful coexistence can be very difficult if not
impossible. Pakistan’s own experience of separation of eastern wing in
1971 provides some insight into such painful scenarios. The crisis and
its immediate aftermath of a string of suicide bombings against security
forces and ordinary citizens have raised some serious questions about the
nature of internal conflict in the country. There are some difficult
times ahead for Pakistan and some tough choices need to be made.
Government, political parties, clerics, religious institutions,
intelligentsia and civil society in general need to
seriously look at core issues threatening the viability of the
state. Minimum consensus about how to tackle religious extremism in a
holistic way is the need of the hour. Pakistanis will need patience,
tolerance and wisdom to come out of the current crisis with minimum damage to
the society. Vol 6 Number 3 June 11, 2007 Chris Raggio Pace is leaving ahead of schedule.
His replacement is an interesting choice. As part of his role as
chief of naval operations Adm
Mullen has been studying swarm tactics and new developments in cruise
missiles. Blitzer:
If it came down to a preemptive US strike against Iran's nuclear facility, if
necessary would you authorize as president the use of tactical nuclear
weapons? Hunter:
I would authorize the use of tactical nuclear
weapons if there was no other way to preempt those particular centrifuges. Blitzer
then turned to former New York mayor Rudolph Giuliani, who currently leads in
opinion polls of prospective Republican primary voters. Blitzer:
What do you think, Mayor? Do you think if you were president of the United
States and it came down to Iran having a nuclear bomb, which you say is
unacceptable, you would authorize the use of tactical nuclear weapons? Giuliani:
Part of the premise of talking to Iran has to be that they have to know very
clearly that it is unacceptable to the United States that they have nuclear
power. I think it could be done with conventional weapons, but you can't rule out anything and you shouldn't take any option
off the table. Vol 6 Number 2 May 23, 2007 Letter
from Chris Raggio It
seems that we narrowly avoided major conflict with Iran just three months
ago. There were multiple reasons but Admiral Fallon's
refusal to request a 3rd aircraft carrier to facilitate offensive operations
seems to be major sticking point. Vol 6 Number 1 April 8, 2007 Feisal
Khan Orbat.com's Change
Of Position On Iraq War I
am glad to see that you've come around to realizing
the absolute folly of the Iraq War. I was opposed to
the Iraq War from the very beginning, not because of the usually wishy-washy
liberal reasons ("illegal, no UN authorization, imperialism, etc") but because of what the late Molly Ivins (the woman who called Pres. Bush "shrub,
because he is not half the bush his father was") said it was going to
be, "a very easy war and the peace from Hell." Vol 5. Number 13 August 15, 2006 K.G.
Widmerpool US-Israeli Coordination in the 2006 Lebanon
War According
to an article by Seymour Hersh in this week's -New
Yorker-,
Vol 5. Number 12 August 14, 2006 Todd
Croft August Military Briefing
Vol.5, Number 11 June 13, 2006 Bill
Roggio With the Canadians in Afghanistan [With permission of the author.] [While
Mr. Roggio's piece is reportage rather than
analysis, we thought readers might find it of interest. Mr. Roggio used to run the blog The Fourth Rail [www.billroggio.com] and has now
joined forces with the Counterterrorism Foundation [http://counterterrorismblog.org].
I've embedded with 7 Platoon, Charlie
Company of the 1st Battalion of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light
Infantry Regiment. This is a proud group of soldiers who
bristle at the common perception in Canada that their primary mission is
peacekeeping. "We're not peace keepers, we're soldiers," the
soldiers freely told me during numerous casual
conversations. Afghanistan is far from a peacekeeping operation. The Canadian
soldiers are actively fighting the Taliban insurgency in Kandahar province. Charlie
Company is the battalion's maneuver company, which means they are the unit
designated to engage Taliban formations as they appear, as well as provide
manpower for other security tasks when needed. Their latest round of combat
occurred during the last two weeks of May, when Charlie Company fought several
hundred Taliban in Panjwai District. Well over two
hundred Taliban are estimated to have been killed. Captain Nicola Goddard was
killed during this engagement, and five soldiers were wounded during the four
skirmishes in the Panjwai district. The soldiers
expect to return to Panjwai, as this is a hub for
Taliban activity in the region. The
company packs a lethal punch, with the LAV III as the main fighting vehicle,
and augmented with the Nyala (RG-31) and G-Wagon.
The troops rave about the LAV IIIs for the firepower, maneuverability and
survivability. The LAV IIIs are ideally suited for the low intensity combat
here in Afghanistan. Armed with a 25mm cannon which is stabilized and can be
fired on the move, a 7.62 coax gun, an M240MG mounted on the turret, and a
section (or squad) of infantry, the Canadians can bring superior firepower
down on the Taliban. The LAV III can
also can take a hit. The vehicles have been struck
with RPGs (rocket propelled grenades) and roadside bombs, and have survived
the engagements. The headquarters section's LAV was struck by an RPG
during an ambush in the fighting in Panjwai. The
RPG penetrated the soft diesel gerry cans mounted
on the side, yet failed to make a dent in the armor. When the troops move
forward, the LAVs become their homes, with speaker systems for the MP3 and
DVD players, coffee makers, and even microwaves to soften the rough edge of
the field. Christmas lights are hung during the holiday season, and several
of the LAVs are adorned with the troop's pinups of choice. Charlie
Company rolled out of Kandahar Airfield at noon on Friday to conduct
Operation Tabar. For the operation, Charlie Company
is being deployed to Forward Operating Base (FOB) Martello, which will be a
joint Afghan National Army and Dutch Army controlled base. The base sits
along the Kandahar-Tarin Kot
road, a winding, well paved two lane asphalt road and a vital supply link
between Kandahar and Uruzgan provinces. The road
cuts through the Shah Wali Kot
district of Kandahar, a rocky, mountainous desert region dotted with small
oasis of sparsely populated farming villages nestled in the valleys. The trip
was uneventful, as only the most foolish of Taliban would attack Charlie
company as it rolls out in full strength. While the roadside bomb threat
exists here in Afghanistan, the threat is no where
near the intensity as it is in Iraq. As
part of Operation Tabar, Charlie Company provided
additional security at Forward Operating Base Martello, where a ceremony to officially open the base was held today. FOB Martello will expand Afghan government's presence in the Shah
Wali Kot district, and
will be manned by Dutch and Afghan National Army forces. The ceremony
was attended by local, provincial and national government and military
officials, as well as Coalition military commanders. Intelligence indicated
the Taliban planned on disrupting the event, but the
Taliban was silent this day. By
evening, the mission had changed and Charlie Company packed up and headed
south towards the Panjwai region. The company
deployed to a Afghan
National Police (ANP) compound and prepped for yet another operation in the
Taliban infested region west of Kandahar City. Prior to moving to the ANP
compound, the LAVs of Charlie company stopped for a show of force, and
unleashed it guns on Forward Operating Base Tiger, an abandoned American base
just south of FOB Martello. Vol. 5, Number 10 May
10, 2006 Luke
Graysmith Al-Qaeda's Quest For An N-Device: Points To
Think About
Vol. 5, Number 9 April
23, 2006 Bill
Roggio Taleban
Consolidate Power in Pakistan Tribal Zone [Note:
some Pakistani tribals have taken the name "Taliban", the same as the Pakistan-created and trained Afghan militia. They
deny Afghan insurgents are amongst them, but say if the Afghans were to ask
for shelter they would provide it. As such their denials are pointless. It is
difficult for outsiders to tell who are the Pakistani Taliban and who are the
Afghan; its not clear the
distinction has any significance, as they espouse identical values. Editor] Yesterday's
rocket attack on the U.S. Embassy and NATO's International Security
Assistance Force compound in Kabul, Afghanistan highlights the increased
level of violence throughout the country. Coalition and Afghan troop have
seen a marked increase in suicide bombings, IED (roadside bombing) attacks
and platoon and company-sized attacks from Taliban fighters over the past
year. The Taliban's latest springtime offensive is now in full swing. In
the latest attempt to stem the violence, Coalition and Afghan troops launched
Operation Mountain Lion
in the Pech River Valley in Kunar
Province, which borders Pakistan's Bajaur agency.
Over forty Taliban were killed during the operation. The Pakistani Army
reportedly has deployed paramilitary troops "along the border stretching
from Dir Lower to Dir
Upper and Chitral districts" to halt the flow
of Taliban across the border during the operation. The Bajaur
tribal agency hosts al-Qaeda and Taliban infiltration routes into
Afghanistan. The agency is also the scene of air strikes in the village of Damadola, where U.S. Predator drones struck at a meeting
of al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders. Ayman al-Zawahiri
was thought to be in attendance but missed the
dinner. Five senior commanders, including Abu Khabab
al-Masri, the head of al-Qaeda WMD committee are
believed to have been killed in the strike. A
segment of the violence can be attributed to Coalition and Afghan Army's push
into previously uncharted territories within Kandahar, Urguzan,
Kunar and Helmand Provinces. The Coalition and
Afghan forces are now making contact with the enemy. The Taliban are
attempting to fracture the Coalition, and believe they can run up the body
count and force the Canadians to withdraw. "We think that when we kill
enough Canadians, they will quit war and return home," said Taliban
spokesman Qari Yuosaf Ahmedi. The narcotics trade is also a major source of
conflict, as Robert Charles noted last January. The drug lords are finding
common cause with the Taliban as the Coalition and Afghan government seek to
eradicate the poppy crops. But
the increased violence and regeneration of the Taliban in Afghanistan cannot
be viewed as a strictly Afghan problem. The Taliban is reconstituting in
Pakistan's lawless North West Frontier Province. The Taliban have been
massing in large formations and have essentially taken control of the North
and South Waziristan agencies, while consolidating power in the Tank, Khyber
and Peshawar agencies. The Pakistani Army is essentially confined to the two
garrisons in Miranshah (North Waziristan) and Wana (South Waziristan). The Taliban has openly declared Shariah law in North and South Waziristan and usurped
power from the local tribes. Two tribesmen have been beheaded, Zarqawi-style,
for "working as US spies." Eight Pakistani paramilitary troops were
killed and twenty-two wounded in an ambush near Miranshah,
and eight 'miscreants' [Taliban/al-Qaeda] were killed in the ensuing
firefight. The
Pakistani Army has been conducting air strikes against al-Qaeda and Taliban
camps, and has claimed the Taliban and al-Qaeda have taken heavy casualties.
While these accounts are likely true, Pakistan has gone to great lengths to
hide their own casualties. Pakistan's Daily
Times indicates "Taliban forces have so far killed 150
pro-government tribal Maliks in the North and South
Waziristan Agencies and are openly challenging the writ of the government by
engaging a number of security forces personnel in the area." A source
supposedly privy to a high level Cabinet meeting also indicates "the Talibnisation of Waziristan was damaging other parts of
the NWFP and that the local Maliks and political
administration had been limited to their houses and offices..." The
Taliban's sphere of influence has expanded to [the tribal agencies of] DI
Khan [Dera Ismail Khan], Tank and the Khyber
Agency, where clerks of the area have started to join them. There has been a
sharp increase in attacks on heavily-defended military targets in these areas
as well, according to Pakistani Interior Minister Aftab
Khan Sherpao. Steven
Emerson aptly explained the status of Pakistan in the Global War on Terror,
"[Pakistan] is both an ally and it's an "anti-ally," so to
speak. It has been helpful. It's also been detrimental." The Taliban's
consolidation of power in the tribal belt is a major detriment, and a problem
the Musharraf government can no longer ignore. April
19, 2006 A.H.
Amin Pakistan Army Promotions Last week three corps commander of
the Pakistan Army retired and two directors-general of the Inter Services Intelligence were replaced, presumably
because they had reached retirement age. Six major generals were promoted to
3-star rank. These were: Major-General Ahsan Azhar Hayat, Maj-Gen Nadeem Ahmed, Maj-Gen Sajjad Akram, Maj-Gen Mohammad Zaki, Maj-Gen Sikander Afzal and Maj-Gen Ijaz Ahmed Bakhshi. Maj-Gen Ahsan
Azhar Hayat has been promoted and appointed as the
Corps Commander, Karachi. He belongs to Hayat Family of Wah
famous or infamous for services to British from 1849 till 1947
. This makes him a good US son . Westernized , anti Mullah ,
commissioned in 19 Lancers and commanded 5 Corps Reserve Karachi. Ambitious
man who will send Musharraf packing if he is made Vice Chief after present
VCOAS Ahsan Saleem Hayat
retires in 2007 . Could be on JK list as brother
armored corps officer for replacement of Musharraf constituted in Washington D.C . Will be good US tactical garbage collector in
Pakistan and a useful auxiliary as dog catcher of USA. A man of strong dislikes
and likes , extremely ambitious, with a very
oversized ego . Extremely driving and tough in his command. As a platoon
commander he was known to be obsessed with a cadet and his platoon
. A chronic bachelor till he married the
daughter of Col Khattak a Saghri Pashtun from Chhab village in Attock.
Commissioned in the crack regiment 11 Baloch which
was complemented for outstanding valor by Gen Von Lettow
Vorbeck in First World War in East Africa, the old
129 Balochis, and the Victor of Pandu
in 1947-48 Kashmir War , Sajjad
Akram is no ordinary general. How he survived the
pedantic system is hard to decipher, but he did . Extremely ambitious and " President Material" Sajjad
may be an ideal choice to replace Musharraf . If I have to choose a capable
army chief for the Punjabi Pakistan Army , I would
cast my vote for Sajjad , although as a cadet at
the military academy I was at loggerheads with him while he was a platoon
commander .Bad for Balochistan and fine political
crisis Sajjad is rash and a bit arbitrary at times.
Must be the top notch candidate for VCOAS unless JK favors his brother
cavalry officer Ahsan Azhar
Hayat, the more flashy, show piece type soldier.
It may be noted
that Lt Gen Syed Amjad was not promoted to VCOAS in
2004 because despite being the finest professional in Pakistan Army he was a
Shia by sect. April
18, 2006 Bill Roggio
Iraq Update
The
political process remains a major front in the war in Iraq and the disparate
political parties struggle to form a unity government. Omar
at Iraq the Model
fears the current political haggling and possible appointment of two Dawa Party candidates for Prime Minister would delay the
formation even longer, as they are even less
desirable than Jaafari. Omar warns of
the deterioration of the security situation in Baghdad, and explains
'neighborhood watches' are forming at the neighborhood level. But it is the politicians who are now seen as the problem;
"Baghdad's residents are managing their daily life with great difficulty
and each delay in forming the government makes the situation even tenser and
people more worried and people of course have different attitudes; there are
always those who expect the worst to come and there are those who still have
hope that this mess must reach an end, however they all agree that the
situation now is bad by all standards and the accusation fingers mostly point
at politicians who are being blamed for this exacerbating crisis." The
situation Omar describes is the prime reason that several weeks ago we
recommended for an increased security presence in Baghdad. The politicians
need breathing space as the insurgency and al-Qaeda continues to focus their
efforts in Baghdad. Operation Scales of Justice is designed to alleviate some
of the pressure in the city, but based on the reports from Iraqi bloggers and
those in the media, the effects of this operation are marginal. Today,
the London Times
reports the U.S. military is planning on a
new liberation of Baghdad which would be carried
out after the appointment of the new Iraqi government. This operation would
provide "one of the few ways in which a fresh Iraqi government could
bind the new national army and prove its mettle." The operation would be
Iraqi-led, with U.S. forces serving in a supporting/advisory role, and the
Marines' "three block war" and the targeting of the militias are
the centerpieces of the campaign:
While
we speculate on the possible re-liberation of Baghdad, Iraqi, Coalition and
insurgent operations continue to focus on the regions in and around Baghdad. Five
terrorists were killed, including a "wanted al Qaeda terrorist... whose
name is currently being withheld, was involved in the planning and execution
of improvised explosive device attacks and allegedly was associated with al
Qaeda foreign fighter operations," and five detained after Coalition
forces struck at a safe house in Yusifiyah. Three
of those killed were wearing suicide vests, and further vests and bomb-making
materials were discovered. Near Hawijah, two
insurgents were killed while placing roadside bombs. The soldiers from the
Iraqi Army's 2nd Battalion, 4th Brigade, 8th Iraqi
Army Division recently led Operation
Cobra Strike, which targeted a bomb-making cell in the area of Haswah and Iskandariyah. A
forgery ring, which produced government IDs, was broken up in Samarra, and a
massive oil smuggling operation was dismantled in the northern town of Rabiah. [Washington Post said 1200 trucks were impounded.
Editor] Late
last week, the insurgency scored two successful attacks on the Iraqi police
and the U.S. Marines. On Wednesday, an eight vehicle convoy of about one
hundred police was ambushed on the way to Najaf. Over ten police were killed
and dozens missing. Six insurgents were captured and one killed. Curiously, the
insurgents passed on attacking a U.S. military convoy, just minutes before,
indicating the insurgents has specific intelligence on this unit. The Iraqi
police and Army are prime targets of the insurgency. The destination of the
police - Najaf - also raises some red flags (more below). In
Anbar province, two Marines were killed and twenty-two wounded in unspecified
'combat operations'. The location of the fighting has yet to be disclosed,
but the Marines killed and wounded
belong to 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, which was last known to be operating in
Fallujah. Asharq Alawsat
reports "fierce fighting" between the Iraqi Army and insurgent
forces. Another three Marines were reported to have been killed in a separate
battle, and again the location of the Marines in Anbar is unspecified. The
Marines appear to have been "cheating" closer towards Baghdad of
late, and have been seen operating as close as Abu Ghraib. The recent DEBKA
report (which must be read with the required helpings of salt) of Marine
units being rushed to Najaf & Karbala does seem more interesting in that
light. Najaf is a seat of power for the Shiites and Sistani, and the
insurgency and Sadr would make a play in the city in any bid to seize power
or disrupt the political process. This article first appeared in Mr. Roggio's blog The
Fourth Rail and is reprinted with permission. April
17, 2006 Ravi
Rikhye Show Iran the Money
That is the argument made separately by William Arkin and Paul Danish: we have to make sure that Iran understands that the US has many military options against Iran and that it will not be deterred by Teheran’s threats of retaliation. A recent statement by the chief of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps leaves unfortunate room for doubt that Teheran understands what it is up again. The chief said, with a “grin” that Iran has US forces in Iraq under “complete surveillance”, implying with no subtlety that Iran will retaliate against those forces should it be attacked. The doubt arises because does the IIRC head actually believe what he is saying – which would be bad, or is he saying it for domestic consumption – which would be fine. If he believes the former, he may believe his threat will deter the US. Which it will not, for the simple reason Iran is already doing its best to target US forces in Iraq. And in any case the stakes are too high for the US to worry about losing a few hundred soldiers to more suicide attacks and similar tactics. A single nuclear bomb would cause hundreds of thousands of Israeli or European casualties; ten could cause millions. Danish’s solution to the “show me the money” problem in this high-stakes poker game is simple, easily executed, designed for maximum impact on Iran, and the one likely to have the severest global diplomatic repercussions for the US. Danish would explode, with two hours warning, a SLBM delivered warhead or warheads over an empty area of Iran to show the country America means business. Before our readers react in horror, Danish’s point is precisely that the shot will show Teheran the US will stop at nothing, no matter what the world thinks, and no matter what the repercussions. Had a demonstration to Japan’s war leaders been possible in 1945, argues Danish, the need to actually incinerate Hiroshima and Nagasaki might have been averted. To us this assertion is the one we need to debate, not “what will the world think”. It has been argued that a demonstration would have changed nothing in 1945: the Japanese war leaders were not sufficiently impressed after the two A-bombings to sue for peace. They wanted to continue, because surrender was not the way of the samurai. They had no way of knowing America had only two bombs. For all they knew America had more, and if all Japan had to die for their code of honor, the war leaders weren’t going to shirk. This thesis says it was Japan’s emperor who overruled the warlords for the sake of his people. Iran’s war leaders could shrug off the demonstration. Additionally, they could find comfort in the undeniable reality that the US will not N-bomb Iranian civilians, and thus not be deterred at all. Arkin’s thesis is that instead of keeping contingency plans a secret, the US needs to clearly show Iran its cards, lest Iran think the US has only bad options. The issue here is not that Iran’s was leaders don’t understand what the US military machine can do to them. After the US destroyed the Taliban armies with the loss of perhaps two Americans, at least one of whom was killed by friendly fire, even the Iranians cannot be foolish enough to believe their military forces can withstand American attack. What the Iranians may well believe is that the US cannot tolerate $100/barrel oil and suicide attacks. Unlike Arkin, I believe the US should clearly explain to Iran that it can, and will, accept $100/barrel oil if push comes to shove. We have argued elsewhere that Iran cannot close the Strait of Hormuz; if we are wrong and it manages, it can keep the Strait closed only for weeks, not for months or years. One way of showing Iran the US does not care is to build up serious inventories in preparation for US: we have shown elsewhere the US can sustain even 1-2 years of loss of Gulf oil, which in any case will be partially and not totally lost, but the Iranians may not understand this. But how can the US show Iran it doesn’t care if the latter does its worst in the matter of suicide attacks? How to convince Iran the US is not Spain, which was frightened out of Iraq by a handful of terrorist-inflicted deaths? Most people understand this: after all, the threat of more 9/11s has not deterred the US from anything. Indeed, the effect has been the opposite: it has energized the US in a way the US was not getting energized before 9/11. Incidentally, suicide bombing is not just a matter of finding a volunteer. It requires training and organization. Western nations have been on alert for many years against such attacks. It is by no means clear the Iranians can push tens or hundreds of such bombers into the west when the feel like it. As for attacking US military targets in Iraq with suicide bombers, all we can say is "Good luck." Those may be hardest of all targets Iran can come up with. This is not so simple a proposition. The world has a history of underestimating America. Hitler did, and so did Mao. Ho Chi Minh and Giap took years to understand what they were up against. To give them credit, by 1972 they had learned, and they “tricked” the US with America’s full consent. They agreed to talks, the US withdrew, the Vietnamese came back for final victory in 1975 and few in America particularly cared. But the Vietnamese could have saved themselves untold trouble had they offered the same deal after Tet 1968. Saddam didn’t understand, and neither did Bin Laden. Zarqawi and Company may still be clueless – we say may because there is evidence he may have figured out he’s going to lose in Iraq. The Soviet generals did understand: when they looked into the eyes of their American counterparts, they saw the same cold, ruthless determination that they believed was their prerogative. They understood the Americans were fanatics, ready to die for their “religion”. And they knew full well that they, the Soviets were not ready to die for theirs unless attacked first. But then the Soviet generals and war leaders were men who had first hand seen what Hitler’s cruel war had done to their country. Soviet generals understood that if they failed, they would be executed the same way as their men who ran away from the battlefield. They knew the meaning of all or nothing. What have Iran’s revolutionary leaders suffered? Very little, and nothing since the Shah was overthrown. Making them understand the consequences of their actions may not be easy. Vol. 5, Number 8 April
16, 2006 Ravi
Rikhye Resigning As A Way of Protest In The US
Military: A Comment In theory, if a general or admiral does not agree with the Secretary of Defense, he is free to resign. In practice, this is not so easily done. The American military have a tradition of obeying orders and acting to carry them out whether they approve of them or not. There is no tradition of dissent, and this is not just in the military, but in most American organizations. If you’re not playing on the team, you get kicked off the team. This may lead to greater executive efficiency, but it is also the road to disaster because without constructive dissent there is no check on what the top person does. The head of a corporation is ultimately responsible to his shareholders – in theory at least. The head of the corporation called the Pentagon is responsible to no one but the President and this president values loyalty to himself, not efficiency, as the number attribute in his “employees”. Add to this the military mentality. It’s a can do outlook: no matter how hopeless your chances for success, you throw yourself into your mission planning to win, or if you can’t win, go down trying. This mentality is absolutely critical for soldiers, it is a necessary virtue, not a vice. Add to the above the intense patriotism and respect for civil control American generals have, you have a system in which dissent is not just discouraged, the people who could dissent feel its disloyal and unpatriotic to do so. Then there is money. We doubt figures exist on how many generals and admirals depend on their salaries. But these are men/women who have been earning civil service salaries since age 18. How much money can they have saved up? Successful corporate types get to put away considerably larger sums of money at each stage: bonuses and stock options supplement large salaries. It’s hard to resign when you need your salary to live on. About the first factor, nothing can be done. Only generals and admirals can decide the question of how far loyalty should go. The German generals faced this dilemma repeatedly after the great victories of 1941 turned to defeats. Ultimately they decided they had to keep quiet. And of course, if Hitler needed a general, he wouldn’t let the officer resign. We should parenthetically note that under the Germanic tradition of “equality before the king”, the German generals had an astonishing right to talk back to the leader if they did not agree. The fights that Guderain, for example, had with Hitler leave us with mouths agape. About the second factor, something can be done. Senior military officers – and senior bureaucrats – should be paid sufficiently that they can resign if the need arises. |
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