‘They are poor but brave… and although turbulent and difficult to
deal with, still have a great love of their country and cherish
their independence, possessing qualities that we admire ourselves,
and which deserve consideration and respect’.
John Ayde
Recently, the military operations against extremist foreign
militants and their tribal supporters in Waziristan area have made
national and international news headlines. People have expressed
their views about the pros and cons of such operations. Waziristan
is both geographically, economically and socially at the extreme
periphery of the Pakistani society. Therefore, it is not surprising
to notice that there is significant lack of information about the
region and its people. This article will look at the region and its
people. Recent historical factors which had helped shape the region
and the relationship of its people with the surrounding areas will
be elaborated in detail. The article will also look at the military
expeditions of past including the role of religious factor and
leaders in the disturbances which occurred in the area from time to
time. This background information will help a better understanding
of the region and its complex dynamics.
Background Geography
The area now called Waziristan is in the Suleiman Range with very
rough terrain. There is a chain of rugged mountains, ridges and
ravines which occupies the border area of Pakistan and Afghanistan.
The area has been historically independent of any central authority.
Afghan Amirs and rulers of India had no control over this area due
to inaccessibility of the region. On the north of Waziristan lies
the Kurram Agency, in east districts of Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail
Khan, on the west and north-west lies the Afghan districts of Birmal
and Khost while in south lies Zhob district of Balochistan. The land
is totally barren and only small tracts are suitable for subsistence
agriculture. For centuries the survival of the tribes of the area
depended on raids on caravans passing through their area (the nomad
tribes of Afghanistan used two passes; Tochi and Gomal in Waziristan
territory) and looting raids of villages and towns of the plains.
This was their main source of income and there was no stigma
attached to this activity. In fact a successful raid on a caravan or
robbing adventure was the desirable trait and much praised. In the
past, such harsh conditions had not allowed any significant increase
in the population. Among all the Pushtun tribes on frontier region,
the inhabitants of Waziristan are strongly independent to the extent
that sometimes their own tribal chiefs have limited influence over
them. The main tribes inhabiting the region are Wazir (also called
Darwesh Khel Wazir), Mahsud, Bhittani and Dawar.
People Wazir
Like other Pushtun tribes, Wazir are subdivided in clans and
sub-clans. The two major clans of Wazir are Ahmadzai (living around
Wana and Shakai) and Utmanzai (living in Tochi valley and Shawal).
Both clans are further subdivided into sub-clans. Utmanzai have
three sub-clans of Ibrahim Khel (further branched into Madda Khel,
Manzar Khel and Tori Khel), Wali Khel (further subdivided into Bakka
Khel, Jani Khel and Kabul Khel) and Mohmit Khel (further branched
into Bora Khel, Wuzi Khel, Hassan Khel and Khaddar Khel). Ahmadzai
have two main sub-clans of Kalu Khel and Sani Khel.1 A small number
of Wazir mainly Gurbaz Wazir live in Afghanistan near Khost. Wazir
brought their flocks to plains in search of fodder and came to Bannu
district for other legitimate occupations. After independence, large
sections of Wazirs have moved to Bannu and other settled districts.
Compared to other Pushtun tribes, Wazir were able to evolve a system
where internal feuds were dramatically reduced. Among most Pushtuns
a murder is to be avenged and the killing is not limited to actual
perpetrator of the crime. Even family or clan member of the culprit
could be killed in revenge which sets off a long standing blood feud
shattering many families. Among Wazirs, only the actual culprit is
to be punished and with this single rule they have been able to
eliminate the scourge of revenge and long standing blood feud among
the members of the tribe. This gives more cohesion to Wazirs as
compared to other tribes of the frontier. Overall, Wazir are
considered brave, tough in their own neighbourhood cherishing their
independence.
Mahsud
Mahsud are divided into three main clans; Bahlolzai, Alizai and
Shaman Khel. The two main centers of Mahsud concentration during
British time were Kaniguram and Makin. Mahsud controlled two main
passes of the area; Gomal Pass and Tank Zam which was the main route
used by nomadic powindahs. Raiding of these caravans provided Mahsud
a lucrative source of income. Regular raiding and plunder attacks of
Mahsud on settled villages irritated British administrators and
since 1855 there were several recommendations to send an expedition
against them. However, the events of 1857 didn’t allow any such
venture. Finally in March 1860, the day of reckoning came when about
3,000 Mahsuds recklessly attacked the main town of Tank. The town
was garrisoned by about 158 soldiers of 5th Punjab cavalry commanded
by a native officer Risaldar Saadat Khan. When the news of imminent
attack reached Tank, Saadat Khan attacked the swarm of Mahsud
outside the town. About 300 Mahsuds, including six leading maliks
were killed and the rest fled in total confusion.2 Since then there
were many skirmishes between Mahsuds and British Indian government.
Mahsud are very good marksmen and have the reputation of
trustworthy. Mahsud is the most independent of all the tribes. Even
their own maliks have a very limited control over these independent
spirits. However, since independence, Mahsuds have been increasingly
integrated with the Pakistani society.
Bhittani
Bhittanis (they claim descent from Baitan) are small in numbers and
their territory is hills bordering Tank and Bannu. There are three
clans of Bhittanis; Dhann, Tatta and Uraspan. Due to their small
numbers they were never able to mount large attacks but served as
guides and spies for their neighbours. However, later they allied
with British as their lands were close to settled districts and they
could be punished more easily. They mainly kept herds and traded
with border villages. Later, they gradually moved to settled areas
especially Dera Ismail Khan and now own lands. Their organization is
looser and generally they do not recognize one chief.
Dawar
They are also small in numbers and centred in Tochi valley. Their
three main branches are Tappizad, Idak and Mallizad. They cultivated
lands in Tochi valley and were small traders in Miranshah bazaar.
However, like other tribes of the region they have also moved to
other areas.
The Romance – Waziristan during the British Rule
‘To be successful on this frontier, a man has to deal with the
hearts and minds of the people and not only with their fears’.
Robert Sandeman
After the annexation of Punjab in 1849, British came in direct
contact with many tribes of the region. The organization of district
government under British officers brought these officers in direct
contact with inhabitants of Waziristan. Officially, the area was
under Afghan suzerainty but actually no one had control over the
land. In 1892-93 agreement, Amir Abdur Rahman ceded the area to
British with the exception of Birmal. During this time an Ahmadzai
jirga came to Dera Ismail Khan to petition that British government
take over Wana and they might become British subjects.3 Throughout British direct or indirect rule, many
expeditions were carried in Waziristan area. The main object of
these expeditions was punishment for long continuance of crimes by
tribes in settled districts. The crimes were usually robbery, murder
or kidnapping in settled district or attack on civil caravan or
military convoys in tribal territory. The usual form of punishment
was blowing up defensive towers, cutting of crops and burning of
villages. When the tribe submitted, they were asked to pay a certain
amount of fine and surrender few rifles and the forces would be
withdrawn. Some frontier fighters of British army especially Sir
Charles Napier and Sir Colin Campbell had severely criticized the
collective punishment policy of the government. Some of the most
difficult and violent campaigns were carried against Wazirs and
Mahsuds. Many British military and civil officers made their name
during their service in the frontier and Waziristan. Robert Sandeman
came in contact with Wazir and Mahsud when he was appointed in
charge of Dera Ghazi Khan in 1866. R. I. Bruce and S. S. Thorburn
dealt with Wazir and Mahsud when they were in charge of Dera Ismail
Khan. Sir George Cunningham served as Political Agent of North
Waziristan in 1923-24 (later he was governor of NWFP). Sir Michael
O’Dwyer, Sir Neville Bowles Chamberlain, Lieutenant General Sir
William Stephen Alexander Lockhart (1841-1900), Harry B. Lumsden
(the father of famous Guides), Major Pierre Louis Napoleon Cavagnari
(later Resident at Kabul and Sir), Herbert Edwards (later
Commissioner of Peshawar), Captain H. R. James (later Commissioner
of Peshawar), Captain B. Henderson, Macaulay (he served as Deputy
Commissioner of Derajat for seventeen years), Evelyn Howell (he
served as Political Agent of Waziristan and later Sir), Sir Samuel
Brown (inventor of famous Sam Brown belt still worn by officers of
Indian and Pakistani armies), Lieutenant Colonel Wilde (he raised
Wild’s Rifles, later Brigadier), Lieutenant Colonel R. G. Taylor,
Captain J. Coke (he raised Coke’s Rifles, First Punjab Cavalry),
Lieutenant C. P. Keyes (of Ist Punjab Infantry, he had served his
whole life from Lieutenant to Brigadier at the frontier), Lieutenant
Colonel Richard Harman (commandant of South Waziristan Militia),
Lieutenant Hugh Pettigrew (South Waziristan Scouts) and many others
distinguished themselves in Waziristan.
Compared to other Pushtun tribes, the tribes of Waziristan were
fiercely independent to the verge of anarchy and even traditional
tribal elders (maliks) had limited control over Mahsud. In 1893, a
European overseer along with a trooper was murdered by Mahsud in
Zhob area. Bruce summoned the maliks and asked them to hand over the
five culprits. When the maliks brought the five men to Bruce, he
requested that the men should be tried by the tribal council
(jirga). The men were found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment.
Few weeks later, three of the leading maliks were murdered when they
returned to the hills.4 Most of the times the tribesmen who joined
the tribal militia raised by British remained steadfast but at other
times isolated violent incidents and desertions also occurred.
Charles Duke, Political Agent of North Waziristan was on a tour
along with his escort. Few shots were fired at the party by some
men. During the exchange of shouts, the commander of the escort,
Subedar Darim found out that his own son was among the group who had
fired at the party. Darim shouted to his son that ‘sahib is in my
charge and I shall shoot you unless you go home’. Darim shot his own
son during this encounter.5 On the other end of the spectrum, in
September 1904 a young Mahsud militiaman (Kabul Khan) murdered his
own Political Agent Bowring and in February 1905, another young
Mahsud recruit killed the Commandant of South Waziristan Militia,
Lieutenant Colonel Richard Harman.6
British officers who dealt with the tribesmen developed a bond with
them. Many of them would refer to tribesmen as ‘my people’ and ‘our
chaps’. Winston Churchill has very eloquently summarized the
relationship as he had served as a young lieutenant (he served with
Queen’s Hussars) with Malakand Field Force. He wrote about Sir
Harold Deane (first Chief Commissioner of NWFP) during the days in
Malakand Field Force. ‘We had with us a very brilliant political
officer, a Major Deane, who was most disliked because he always
stopped military operations… Apparently all these savage chiefs were
his old friends and almost his blood relations. Nothing disturbed
their friendship. In between fights, they talked as man to man and
as pal to pal’.7 Herbert Edwards wrote about the Ahmadzai Wazir
malik Sowan Khan with all praise describing him ‘an enormous man,
with a head like a lion, and a hand like a polar bear’ and ‘a more
splendid specimen of human nature in the rough I never saw’. Edwards
also admired the malik’s attitude as he never made a bow to
Edwards.8 In 1901-02 expedition against Mahsuds, a notorious robber
Sailgai was in action. During the negotiations with a British
officer, he talked to his mother about his plan to shoot the
officer. His mother stopped him telling him that ‘the sahib has
given you no cause. He has spoken to you fair.’ Later when Sailgai
died in action, O’Dwyer who watched the siege declared that ‘he was
a brave man and not without a sense of honour’.9 During 1860
expedition against Mahsuds, two Darwesh Khel Wazirs were mistakenly
wounded by rear-guard party. Once the mistake was recognized, the
two were brought to camp, treated and then sent back with presents.
In 1905, after the murder of Commandant Colonel Harman by a new
Mahsud recruit, Political Agent Howell disarmed the Mahsud members
of the Waziristan Militia. However, barely two months later, when he
went for a shooting excursion in mountains, his gun was carried by a
young
Mahsud.10
Respect was mutual and many British officers who dealt with frontier
tribes wanted an open and honest relationship. In 1877, just before
the outbreak of Second Afghan War, Viceroy Lord Lytton’s policy of
pushing the outposts close to Afghan border was based on contempt of
tribes and Afghans and confidential arrangements with Maharaja of
Kashmir (to establish a British agency at Gilgit). Old frontier
officials of administration strongly opposed this policy of secrecy
and advocated straightforwardness with tribes.11 Many of these
officers who spent years among the tribes had rare qualities of
courage, perseverance and patience. There was a bond between these
officers and tribesmen and the respect was mutual. Sir Olaf Caroe
has described these sentiments very clearly from British point of
view. He stated, ‘Who does not remember those farewell tea parties
when men who have made your life a burden for months and years all
at once crowd around with fervent hand-clasps, and, bidding you
God-speed – could it be with a tear in the eye – make you half
believe that after all the burden was worth carrying?’12
Controlling the Uncontrollable
It was during British rule that Waziristan came in contact with
settled areas on large scale. This had economic, social and
political effects on the tribal society. In the early part of
British rule (starting in 1849 after annexation of Punjab) the area
was totally independent of both British and Afghan authorities.
British Deputy Commissioners of settled districts dealt with the
tribes adjoining their districts. Deputy Commissioners of Bannu and
Derajat dealt with Waziristan tribes. This arrangement meant that a
strong personality which earned the respect of the tribes and could
communicate with them was more successful. Written agreements were
negotiated with tribes where the tribe would be responsible for the
security of their area and control raiders while government would
provide allowances (called muwajibs) to maliks. These intermediaries
were the key in this policy called closed border policy. In these
arrangements, the tribes were not subjects and the measures were
meant only to prevent looting raids on settled districts. There were
many military expeditions during this period but no permanent
occupation of strategic areas. During the Second Afghan War (1878)
the penetration of Baluch tribal areas was accompanied with
increased penetration of Waziristan, however the penetration of
Waziristan was never at the scale of Baluch territories. The area
remained no man land until the 1893 treaty with Afghanistan
negotiated by Sir Mortimer Durand. Waziristan with the exception of
Birmal came under British sphere of influence. The demarcation of
boundary was resisted by Wazir and the area saw heavy fighting. The
Tochi Valley and Wana were occupied and two agencies called North
and South Waziristan were
established.13 After the Third Afghan War (1919), Mahsud country
was penetrated extensively and roads and posts were built. When
maliks were seen as unable to deliver due to strong independent
nature of Mahsuds, for a brief period of time British tried to
introduce a new system where allowance was given to whole tribe
(called tuman). The Commissioner of Derajat, Merk also started to
deal with the whole tribe in mass assembly called ‘the great jirga’.
It was impossible to reach any reasonable agreement with an armed
crowd of 5000 Mahsuds and after Merk’s departure the system was
scrapped and maliks restored. However, collective benefits were
restructured through establishment of tribal police called
Khassadars.14 At the same time another irregular force composed of
tribes but with a significant non-local component called Scouts was
created. The local militia was named Frontier Corps headed by an
Inspector General with its headquarter in Peshawar. The South
Waziristan Scouts and Tochi Scouts for North Waziristan were
operating in Waziristan area.
When more penetration of Waziristan occurred then incentives
included recruitment in tribal militia with its economic benefits.
At the same time the punishment scope also increased. A system of
collective tribal responsibility for any outrage committed by any
member of the tribe was instituted. This included not only
termination of allowances but blockade of the culprit tribe (called
bandish). The tribe members would be prevented from grazing their
flocks in neighbouring districts and excluded from markets. Another
method was arrest of individuals and seizure of animals and property
of the culprit tribe in settled areas (called baramta). Last resort
would be a punitive expedition against the culprit tribe or clan
which was usually of a short duration. In 1872 Frontier Crimes
Regulation (FCR) was introduced in tribal areas which authorized
settlement of quarrels by customary methods conducted by the jirga.
FCR also gave Political Agent significant powers which could not be
challenged in any court. This system is still operative in tribal
areas with very little change and Political Agent with his
administrative staff and militia is the sole representative of the
central government in the area.
The Expeditions
‘Burning houses and destroying crops, necessary and justifiable as
such measures may be, unless followed by some form of authority or
jurisdiction, mean starvation for many women and children … and for
us a rich harvest of hatred and revenge’. Lord Fredrick Roberts
The strength of tribes in Waziristan lies in the inaccessibility of
their area. The tribesmen have used this to their full advantage.
Within a year of annexation of Punjab, British had to start military
operations in Waziristan. In January 1850, a large group of Wazir
and Mahsud attacked the post of Gumatti which was defended by Extra
Assistant Commissioner McMahon with 350 soldiers. This was followed
by minor skirmishes for over two years and finally Deputy
Commissioner of Bannu Major John Nicholson was given permission for
an expedition against these tribes. The force was divided into three
columns and some clans (Jani Khel and Bakka Khel) helped the force
as guides. First column consisted of 2nd Punjab Infantry (led by
Captain Johnston), second one consisted of Ist and 4th Punjab
Infantry (led by Captain Walsh) and third column consisted of 2nd
Punjab Cavalry and mounted police (led by Lieutenant Younghusband).
The nature of the conflict can be understood by looking at the
events closely (and the pattern has continued for more than a
century). In this whole expedition, British casualties were only two
men wounded. However, twenty one men who had straggled away from
main force were killed by Wazir.15 Brigadier Chamberlain led an expedition against Kabul
Khel Wazirs in 1859. The immediate cause was the murder of captain
Mecham (Commander of 3rd Punjab Light Field Battery) at Lattamar.
Chamberlain led a force of about 4,000 and the military and civilian
participants of this campaign consisted of the list of the who and
who of the frontier (Lumsden, Taylor, Henderson and James). After
this strong show of force, the tribes were offered a deal.
Commissioner of Bannu Lieutenant Colonel R. G. Taylor invited tribal
chiefs (maliks) to his camp and told them that they have to help him
in the capture of murderers of Captain Mecham. Ahmadzais formed a
tribal force (lashkar) which ventured far into the hills to capture
one of the killer Mohabat. He was delivered to Taylor and at the
very spot where the murder was committed, temporary gallows was
erected and he was hanged.16
In March 1860, a lashkar of Mahsud ignoring all odds, recklessly
attacked Tank defended by a native officer Risaldar Sadat Khan of
5th Punjab Cavalry. When the cavalry was finished with business more
than 300 Mahsuds were dead and many wounded.17 In 1860, Chamberlain
also led a force of about 5,000 in a campaign against Mahsuds and
his entire force was composed of native troops and tribal levies.18
During this expedition, Mahsud again gave a spectacular show of his
bravery when about 500 Mahsuds dashed with swords in their hands on
one of the camps (Palosin camp) killing 63 and wounding 166.19 It was during this campaign that British first occupied two
important towns of Mahsud country (Kaniguram and Makin). Later
Lockhart commanded the Waziristan expedition of 1894-95 while
1919-20 expedition was commanded by Major General Skeen.
The term expedition can be sometimes misleading. While sometimes
large scale violence was involved and large number of soldiers and
tribesmen killed and wounded but at others there were very few
casualties on either side. In 1860, only in forcing through the
Barari pass, 80 soldiers were killed and 86 wounded and in 1920,
more than 2,000 soldiers were killed and wounded in one encounter
with Mahsuds. On the other hand in the 1881 expedition against the
same Mahsud only 8 soldiers were killed and 24 wounded.20 In 1872
expedition against Dawars no one died on British side and only six
soldiers (Ist Sikh Infantry) were wounded.21
The interaction between Wazir and Mahsud and British was very
strange. Most of the time, even a small escort and supply convoy
would be attacked viciously while at other time almost no action was
mounted by the tribesmen. During the Second Afghan War of 1878-79, a
convoy route was opened between Tal and Bannu which was extensively
used by the Kurram Valley Field Force. Military movement along with
supplies and transport animals was a very attractive target for the
tribes but surprisingly for almost three years there was no major
event. The reason was very simple. The military employed Wazir
camels for the transport of supplies and for the protection of the
convoys escorts were enlisted from local clans of the Wazir. On
Bannu side clans of Ahmadzai (Khoja Khel, Sadda Khel, Sudan Khel)
while on Kohat side Kabul Khel and Malik Shahi protected British
convoys and supply lines. Personal allowances were also allotted to
many prominent maliks. When both maliks and common tribesman were
making money from helping the military convoys there was no
incentive to attack the convoys.
After the Third Afghan War, Kabul was alarmed at penetration of
British in tribal areas and tried to excite the tribesmen. An Afghan
officer Shah Daula visited Waziristan and very soon trouble started.
In April 1919, Afghan General Nadir Khan advanced to Tal. This
caused much excitement among the tribes and there were large scale
desertions from North Waziristan Militia. In the ensuing
hostilities, Wana was evacuated. The tribesmen captured brand new
1,200 rifles and one million rounds of ammunition. It was thus not
surprising that in the next six months over hundred raids were made
on settled districts. The most sanguine battle was fought at Ahnai
Tangi which raged for five days. The British force suffered 2,000
killed, wounded or missing including 43 officers. Mahsuds also
suffered heavily in this encounter.22 Many tribesmen watched
carefully for the British response before throwing their lot with
Afghan army. The Tal Relief Force (it consisted of five battalions
of infantry, a cavalry squadron and twelve pieces of artillery)
under the command of Brigadier Rex Dyer (Jalianwala Bagh fame) was
dispatched from Peshawar. To Dyer’s credit, the force reached their
destination in record time with forced marches with Dyer himself
marching at the head of his convoy. There was a brief encounter with
a 4,000 strong Afghan and Wazir lashkar (led by Malik Babrak) before
the lashkar melted away. The Afghan regular troops withdrew without
any
combat.23 The disgrace which Dyer suffered due to his action at
Jalianwala Bagh in Amritsar in 1919 completely overshadowed his
remarkable leadership in the relief of Tal. Due to excitement of the
tribes and drain on British Indian army during First World War, if
Tal had fallen, it was likely that Kohat would be next and there
could have been a general uprising all along the frontier. Dyer was
commanding about 2,000 young enlistee who were not properly trained
and only one British 1/25th London Regiment, a disgruntled
territorial unit eager to go back home after the great war rather
than chase tribesmen. It was Dyer’s superb command which saved the
day for British.
In early twenties, the modernization reforms of King Amanullah Khan
in Afghanistan roused the suspicions of tribes, including those
straddling the Durand Line. After Amanullah’s fall in 1928, a Tajik
Habibullah (known as Bacha-e- Saqao) became Amir in Kabul. Three
brothers (Nadir Khan, Hashim Khan and Shah Wali Khan) embarked on an
adventure to recover the throne for Muhammadzais. Theoretically,
they claimed that they were working to recover the throne for
Amanullah. In 1929, Nadir Khan attempted to recruit tribesmen to his
cause. After failing to recruit Afridis and Orakzais, he was able to
attract a number of other tribes to his banner with a promise of
loot. This tribal lashkar consisted of Darwesh Khel, Tota Khel and
Ahmadzai Wazir, Jaji, Mangal and Jadran. This lashkar was
instrumental in Nadir’s success to capture Kabul. Nadir had no money
to pay to Wazirs and Mahsuds therefore he was forced to allow them
to loot his own capital. Houses of wealthy people and government
buildings in Kabul were looted by the tribesmen.24 However, he could not allow all of them to take
everything and the result was that many who didn’t get enough loot
were disgruntled. In July 1930, when there was a revolt in Kohistan
(led by a Tajik Purdel), Nadir again used his tribal lashkar from
British side of Durand Line to crush the rebellion with severe
brutality. Nadir occupied the throne and declared himself Shah. The
partisans of Amanullah (he was in exile in Italy) got an idea to use
the same Wazir and Mahsud to get rid of Nadir and restore them to
the throne of Kabul. The tribesmen were told that they should repeat
their success of 1929, go again to Kabul and restore the rightful
King Amanullah and come back again to their homes once more laden
with loot. In 1933, tribesmen crossed the Durand Line and laid siege
to the Afghan town of Matun in Khost. King’s brother Sardar Shah
Mahmud defeated these tribesmen to end their menace.25 British
government used aircraft on its side to force the break up of the
lashkar.
The expeditions against the tribes were part law enforcement, part
political. The military expedition was always accompanied with a
political officer who would be involved in the negotiation process
with the tribal chiefs. In 1859 expedition led by Brigadier
Chamberlain, Commissioner of Peshawar Captain H. R. James
accompanied the force as political officer. In addition, Deputy
Commissioner of Kohat Captain B. Henderson was also accompanying
along with tribal levies under his command. In 1860 campaign against
Mahsud, Commissioner of Derajat Lieutenant Colonel R. G. Taylor and
Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan Captain H. W. Coxe
accompanied Chamberlain as political officers. Commissioner of
Derajat Major A. A. Munro and Deputy Commissioner of Bannu Captain
J. W. Johnston accompanied as political officers the expedition
against Dawars in 1872 led by Brigadier C. P. Keyes. In 1880
expedition against Malik Shahi Wazir led by Brigadier J. J. Gordon,
Major T.J. Plowden accompanied as political officer. Political Officers
often severely restricted military operations. Troops were moved
only in ‘proscribed areas’ in which they were not allowed to fire at
any group of less than ten men. Outside these areas, the patrol
could fire only if they came under fire. The negotiation process was
lengthy and the deal never lasted too long. Tribesmen are as good at
bargaining as they are with their rifles.
In early twentieth century, the British policy towards Waziristan
was summed up by Sir Denys Bray which recognized the importance of
Mahsud in the equation. He was of the view that Mahsud were in
strategic heart of Waziristan separated from British districts by
Bhittanis and from Afghanistan by Wazir which gave them strength due
to inaccessibility of both countries. He also outlined that military
occupation was not the answer and after the short operations, troops
would be replaced by local scouts and Khassadars. As a backup, the
domination of Mahsud country would be then through two posts (Razmak
and Wana) which lied outside Mahsud country and held by troops and
linked by a road. The British were however well aware that even the
‘peaceful penetration’ would not mean an end to hostilities with
tribes. They acknowledged the fact that as any change would be seen
by tribes as impinging on their way of life therefore ‘there would
be constant bubbling in the tribal cauldron, but that we should
never stir so strongly that the devil’s brew of tribal unrest would
boil over into widespread revolt’.26 In late 1930s, there was one
brigade stationed in Wana (South Waziristan) and Razmak (North
Waziristan).
Old Taliban
In 1878-80, Mullah Adkar had settled in Kadam in Khost. During the
Second Afghan War, he tried to encourage Wazir to attack British
convoys but Wazir had made an arrangement with the British and there
was no major unrest. In 1879, when British arrived in the Kadam
Valley, Adkar fled to upper Dawar area. He tried to encourage Dawar
to attack British lines but he was successful only in encouraging
some small scale raids and assassinations. Adkar had also many
religious students (Talibs) who participated in these raids. In
early 1880, a Turi (Shi’a tribe in Kurram Valley) caravan was
attacked near Tal by some Wazir and Dawar influenced by Mullah Adkar
and Turis lost a number of men. Few days later, a group of few
Talibs along with some Mahsud and Dawar tribesmen attacked the
Khattak labour camp on Tal-Kurram road. In May 1880, the military
post of Chapri (garrisoned by about 80 soldiers of 5th Native
Infantry and Ist Bengal Cavalry and commanded by Lieutenant W. H.
Cazalet) was attacked resulting in death of eleven men including
Lieutenant O. B. Wood.27 British responded by sending troops into
the area to subdue the culprit clans. Mullah Adkar remained a
nuisance for British for a while before disappearing from the stage.
In 1894, Mullah Powindah (he belonged to Shabi Khel sub-clan of
Alizai clan of Mahsud) emerged on the scene of the Waziristan. The
background of his rise was typical of the tribal society. Two of his
friends who had been jailed in 1886 swore to kill the incharge of
the jail, Allahdad Khan as he had insulted them. Surely, after their
release, they attacked Allahdad’s house killing him and taking away
all valuables. As they had connection was Powindah there was
suspicion of his complicity also, therefore Powindah fled to the
hills and took refuge in the village of Idak in Lower Dawar. He
became disciple of Mullah Gulab Din in the area and after the
latter’s death became prominent and took the title of
‘Badshah-e-Taliban’ (King of the religious students). He then
settled in Mahsud country near Makin. He made his own zone of
influence independent of traditional maliks. This brought him into
conflict with them. In addition, he got financial support from Kabul
(his patron was Amir’s brother Nasrullah Khan). At his instigation,
the maliks who had handed over the murderess of a British Public
Works Department officer Kelly to government were killed. He got
support from Mahsuds because handing over culprits was in sense
bowing to authority and infringement on their total freedom. The
tribal resentment was strong enough that in addition to the three
maliks who were killed, two others were hounded out of the country
and the rest kept low profile. Mullah Powindah was competing with
the authority of the maliks and wanted to deal directly with
British. He collected about 1,000 men and came near Wana. He then
sent a messenger to Bruce for negotiations. He was told that British
would deal only with maliks and he should disperse his followers and
go home. That night a daredevil attack by about 500 Mahsuds on Wana
camp resulted in death of 45 officers and men and seventy five wounded.28 During the jirga negotiations with British, Mullah also
arrived in Shakai. When the troops entered the area, he was on the
run. First, he went to Darrah Valley and then to Birmal (in
Afghanistan) which relieved pressure on Mahsuds. Later, Mullah
Powindah tried to incite tribes in Dawar and Khost but with no
success. He lay dormant for few years and in 1898-99, it was
suspected that some attacks were due to his influence in the area.
In February 1900, Political officer Watson met Mullah Powindah for
first time and listened to his grievances. To his credit, Mullah
Powindah refused to accept any allowance but wanted British to
address the grievances of his clan and tribe.29 However, Sir Olaf
Caroe states that he accepted the allowance but requested that it
should be kept secret and the amount given to him was three times
given to any other individual.30 Mullah was a nuisance for the
British authorities until his death in 1913.
Mirza Ali Khan was a Tori Khel Wazir whose career was astonishing in
the sense that from a labour at Public Works Department he became
the main source of discussion among the Political Agents, Governor
and Viceroy. He was to be later known as Faqir of Ipi. He first
settled in Dawar country and made fame when in 1936 he led their
lashkar to attack settled area of Bannu. Although there was no clash
but when more troops moved out of Bannu, he was able to embroil
Mahsuds in the affair. Later, he made his base in Shaktu Valley and
Tori Khel clan frankly told British that they could not expel him.
In March 1937, Assistant Political Agent Captain Beatty was murdered
and blockade of Shaktu Valley was attempted. In April, tribesmen
ambushed an army convoy of fifty lorries at Shahur Tangi killing
thirty four soldiers including seven British officers. In July, a
200 strong lashkar attacked the city of Bannu at night.31 For next several months there were many skirmishes
between tribesmen and troops. Although Faqir remained unmolested in
Shaktu Valley but he was not able to cause a major unrest as
debilitating losses of Mahsud and Wazir discouraged any large scale
violence. Even after independence, Faqir remained hostile to
Pakistan. In 1949, in a tribal meeting at Razmak, he was elected
President of ‘Pushtunistan’. He remained at loggerheads with
Pakistan government spending most of his life in the caves and died
in 1960.
In 1938, a Syrian named Said al-Jilani (known as Shami Pir) who
claimed spiritual lineage with great sufi Shaikh Abdul Qadir Jilani
emerged in Waziristan. He settled in Kaniguram and began preaching.
Soon his talks took the political overtones and he issued a
proclamation that King Zahir Shah was an usurper and his intention
was to restore exiled former King Amanullah to the throne. A large
lashkar of Wazir and Mahsud gathered around him. British were
alarmed with the possibility of large scale violence on frontier.
Governor Cunningham went to Razmak and met with Political Agent
Barnes. Barnes spent several days at Ladha taking oaths from maliks
and khassadars that they would not join the lashkar.32 Tribal maliks
were summoned and warned against joining the Shami Pir. In the
meantime, the Pir contacted political agent who met him at Wana
where terms of settlement were finalized. Shami Pir agreed to leave
India if paid 25,000 sterling pounds. After the money changed hands
(the check was drawn from Cunningham’s bank), the Pir ordered the
lashkar to disperse and was airlifted from India.33 The exact nature of this affair is not clear but Caroe is
of the view that on the eve of Second World War, this was an effort
by Hitler to tie up as many British troops on frontier by lighting
up a fire in tribal area and Afghanistan. In this he was helped by
mufti of Jerusalem Al-Hajj Amin al Hussaini and a network of Jilanis
in Middle East.34 Cunningham’s biographer is of the view that
Mussolini was supporting Amanullah’s partisans to embarrass the
British.35 The Shami Pir was from Syria and exiled King Amanullah’s
wife Queen Surraya’s mother was Syrian. Surraya’s father Mahmud Beg
Tarzi had married a Syrian girl during his exile in Damascus. There
is a possibility that there was a family connection between Pir and
Surraya’s maternal household. Another theory is that the Shami Pir
was none other than the famous Lawrence of Arabia who was used by
British for their game in Afghanistan (Lawrence was serving at a
remote Royal Air Force facility in Waziristan area).
In late 1960s, a Mullah migrated from the Bannu district and settled
among the Wazirs of South Waziristan. He built a mosque in Wana
along with a residential complex for religious students (Talibs). In
few years, he increased influence tremendously which encompassed
religious, social and economic arenas. First he incited the Wazirs
against Mahsud by declaring the latter unbeliever (kafir) and later
he clashed with the political authorities. Once he crossed this line
he was dealt with severely. Scouts and regular troops marched in
force. Wana bazaar was destroyed and Mullah was arrested thus ending
the
episode.36
The disturbances created by religiously oriented native or foreign
leaders were largely a localized affair; however it forced the
government to take them seriously. The reputation of these rebels
increased several folds when higher government officials spoke about
them. Mullah Powindah would gain more respect among his tribesmen
when the Viceroy Lord Curzon called him ‘a first class scoundrel’
and Commander-in-Chief General Horatio Herbert Kitchener called him
‘pestilential priest’. The popularity graph of these leaders rose
proportionately to the force used by the central authority.
Religious idioms were used by many smart tribal leaders to gather
the support of tribesmen and challenge the authority. This nuisance
value was used very cleverly by many to fulfill their ideological or
economic goals. Whenever Sahibzada Sir Abdul Qayyum Khan asked for
more responsible government for the frontier province, he was told
that it was too small compared to India for any advancement. To this
he very eloquently replied summarizing the frontier situation that
‘fleas were small too, but a nuisance in one’s trousers’.37
Post-Independence Era
After the partition of India in 1947, the successor state of
Pakistan decided to remove regular troops from the tribal areas. The
country’s founder Muhammad Ali Jinnah personally took this important
decision and the Brigade from Razmak was evacuated (the operation
was named Curzon). Since independence, many social, economic and
demographic changes have occurred in Waziristan. The Wazir have come
far down into the plains from their hills in adjoining settled
districts. Increasing education facilities have opened new avenues
and many of them enlist in army and militias. Similarly large number
of Mahsuds has also joined the mainstream Pakistani society. When
the Hindu traders of Tank left after the partition in 1947, most of
their shops were taken over by Mahsuds. Now Mahsuds are employed in
militia and regular army, state bureaucracy and involved in business
all around the country. Many of them are now living far away from
their native lands.
Immediately after independence, Wazirs and Mahsuds were part of the
tribal lashkar which entered Kashmir. They quickly reached the
outskirts of Srinagar defeating the Maharaja’s troops. However, when
the regular Indian army troops attacked the tribal lashkars on
November 7, the latter suffered heavy casualties and their
withdrawal started within two days.38 They were later blamed for
many excesses including murder and looting. By November lorry loads
of Wazir and Mahsuds started to arrive back with their loot from
Kashmir. The tribal involvement in Kashmir shows both the strength
and weakness of an operation performed by irregulars. In a sudden
‘blitzkrieg’ move, tribal lashkars can stun the enemy. The reason is
that the irregulars can move fast as they don’t have long line of
commissariat. Each tribesman carries his own food and ammunition.
The weakness of these irregulars is that they have no strict
discipline and command structure. Therefore, when the operation is
extended, the tribesman simply leaves the scene to head back home.
Similarly, when confronted by stiff resistance and regular army
operations, the irregulars can melt away very quickly. In an alien
territory, he cannot switch to his classic ‘hit and run’ mode.
However, Wazir and Mahsuds still cherish the memory of their great
‘Jihad’ in Kashmir even today.
Conclusion
The home of Wazir and Mahusd is an inhospitable mountainous terrain
bordering between Afghanistan and Pakistan. This location has given
them the flexibility to maintain some independence from central
authorities of both countries. Like all other tribes, Wazir and
Mahsud cherish their independence and are fully conscious of their
reputation of ‘honour’ and ‘bravery’. They use these qualities to
convey their ethnic superiority. Wazir and especially Mahsud efforts
to resist any penetration of their enclave was due to their intense
independent spirit which almost borders on anarchy. In this ‘the
Mahsud effort was inspired by a deep-seated instinct which drove the
tribe at all costs to resist subjection and to preserve their own
peculiar way of life’.39 Every Mahsud considers himself as an equal
to other Mahsud. The sentiment was well expressed by a Mahsud leader
Jaggar who told Evelyn Howell that ‘Let it be field’. Blow us all up
with cannon, or make all eighteen housand of us Nawabs’ suggesting
that all were equal.40
Gradual change has occurred in Waziristan due to increased
interaction of tribes with government and settled districts
adjoining them. The most significant experiment of British was
raising of Militias (later called Scouts) from the area. It gave the
tribesman an alternative to boring life of tending the fields. The
system has all the incentives which a tribesman can enjoy. He is
clothed, fed and given cash. He is given a good rifle, the prized
possession and he lives in his own hills with opportunities to use
his rifle. In last fifty years, the region has seen a dramatic
change where the tribal society is increasingly attached to the
settled area both economically and socially. This has limited some
of the independence which the tribesman’s forefathers enjoyed. If he
chooses to challenge the central authority, he has to suffer more
than his forefathers. On the other hand the government’s authority
to punish the whole tribe is also restricted to some extent due to
increased integration of tribesmen into settled districts. In modern
times, a more imaginative policy is needed to handle this delicate
situation.
‘They fight for the love of fighting, and though at the moment they
are contented and peaceful, they say openly that they must soon
relieve the monotony by having a rising’. Wife of Viceroy Lord Minto
after the visit to the frontier tribes April 1906 41
End Notes
-
For details of these tribes in early part of
20th Century, see Frontier and Overseas
Expeditions from India. North West frontier
Tribes between Kabul and Kabul Rivers. Volume
II. (Quetta: Nisa Traders, 1979, Reprint of 1910
Edition), p. 334-36 & James W. Spain. The Pathan
Borderland (The Hague: Mouton & Co, 1963), p.
50-53)
-
Frontier and Overseas Expeditions, p. 366-67
-
Frontier and Overseas Expeditions, p. 415
-
Philip Woodruff. The Men Who Ruled India: The Guardians (New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1954), p. 148-49
-
Woodruff. The Men Who Ruled India, p. 294
-
Sir Olaf Caroe. The Pathans. (Karachi: Oxford University Press,
1986 Edition), p. 393
-
Quoted in D. S. Richards. The Savage Frontier: A History of the
Anglo-Afghan Wars (London: Macmillan, 1990), p. 152
-
Quoted in Caroe. The Pathans, p. 336
-
Lawrence James. Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India
(London: Little Brown and Company, 1997), p. 410
-
Caroe. The Pathans, p. 393
-
P. E. Roberts. History of British India Under the Company and
the Crown (London: Oxford University Press, 1967. Reprint of
1921 Edition), p. 437
-
Caroe. The Pathans p. 409
-
Caroe. The Pathans, p. 383
-
Caroe. The Pathans, p. 401-3
-
Frontier and Overseas Expeditions, p. 337-40
-
Frontier and Overseas Expeditions, p. 350
-
W. H. Paget and A. H. Mason. Tribes of The North West Frontier
(Delhi: Gian Publishers, 1980, Reprint of 1884 Edition), p.
507-08
-
Byron Farwell. Queen Victoria’s Little Wars (New York & London.
W. W. Norton & Company, 1972), p. 148-49
-
Frontier and Overseas Expeditions, p. 373-74
-
Paget & Mason. Tribes. Appendix D, p. 556 & 560
-
Paget & Mason. Tribes, Appendix B, p. 577
-
Caroe. The Pathans, p. 405-6
-
Richards. The Savage Frontier, p. 166
-
Louis Dupree. Afghanistan (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1980 Edition), p. 459
-
W. K. Fraser-Tytler. Afghanistan: A Study of Political
Developments in Central and Southern Asia (London: Oxford
University Press, 1967, Third Edition), p. 265-66
-
Fraser-Tytler. Afghanistan, p. 260-61
-
Frontier and Overseas Expeditions, p. 3557-58
-
Frontier and Overseas Expeditions, p. 416-20
-
Frontier and Overseas Expeditions, p. 437
-
Caroe. The Pathans, p. 401
-
Richards. The Savage Frontier, p. 179 & 184
-
Norval Mitchell. Sir George Cunningham: A Memoir (Edinburgh &
London: William Blackwood, 1968), p. 68
-
Fraser-Tytler. Afghanistan, p. 266-67 & Mitchell. Cunningham, p.
68-69
-
Caroe. The Pathans, p. 408-9
-
Mitchell. Cunningham, p. 67
-
for details of this interesting episode see Akbar S. Ahmed.
Pakistan Society: Islam, Ethnicity and Leadership in South Asia
(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998 Edition), p. 77-83
-
quoted in Richards. The Savage Frontier, p. 174
-
Mitchell. Cunningham, p. 148
-
Caroe. The Pathans, p. 397
-
Caroe. The Pathans, p. 400
-
quoted in James. Raj, p. 415