Vol. 5, Number 6

March 31, 2006

Iraq Situation: Belmont Club & Bill Roggio Discussion

[Forwarded by Mike Thompson]

The Belmont Club is a blog run by US diplomats present and past. Mr. Roggio is known to our readers, we often carry his work on Iraq. Editor.

People here are still urging politicians to get done with the negotiations and form a government and although they have given up the high hopes they had once of a government that can get all things right, they still hope that forming the permanent government can at least stop the deterioration in some critical aspects of life and prepare for putting things back on the right track again after the last few months that have been the roughest for Iraqis since Saddam was toppled.

Most of the debate in Baghdad today was about the alleged message from Bush to al-Hakeem telling him to replace Jafari with another candidate. The simple people I meet at work have made a simplified version o their own of this story that goes like this "Bush told the government that if they don't agree on a president, I will appoint that I choose"! This is followed by a "whatever, maybe this can put an end for this mess" which reminds me that we still believe in firm and direct orders from a boss thinking that one shout or frown from him would be enough to solve the dispute while negotiations seem boring and taking forever, something not unexpected with all the stress and frustration Iraqis have to deal with.

On the other hand the local media was more interested in yesterday's negotiations that were resumed after being suspended for one day after the raid on Sadr's militia. Anyway, the latest sessions seem to coincide with a call from Sistani to the leaders of the UIA to go back to the table and accelerate the process.

Bill Roggio writes in an email to Belmont Club to say:

Your post is pretty fair assessment of the situation in Baghdad and the political situation in general. If you've seen my post on the UIA [please see ANALYSIS March 29- Editor], I think you'll see there is much we agree on. We are definitely at a 'crisis point' and the crisis is more political than military in nature. The attempt to remove or marginalize the Sadrs from the political process is now underway and the outcome is by no means certain.

The player to watch here is SCIRI (the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq). Muqtada al-Sadr has threatened Hakim, SCIRI's leader, as well as other members of the United Iraqi Alliance if Jaafari was not chosen as Prime Minister. It appears there is a real break between SCIRI's political wing and Iran (which is why Iran is throwing its weight behind Sadr.) SCIRI's Badr Brigades are said to be Iranian controlled, and may very well be, but the political party itself is not. They support Sistani, who leads the leads the Najaf school of Shia Islam, and opposes the Qom school which is based out of Iran. This is a major schism in Shiite Islam. Sistani opposes the Khoemeist brand of governance. SCIRI does not back Sadr, and will be the kingmaker here. SCIRI can cross the lines (and Fadihla will likely follow) and create the unity government. My opinion is the Army will back the unity government. The Iraqi Army has acted as an apolitical organization to date, and there is no indication this will change.

My estimation is the Iraqi Army should not be considered a militia or firmly under the political control of one party. I saw no evidence of this while in Iraq, and no convincing evidence of this from afar. I am of the mind the worst 'sectarian attacks' are being conducted by Sadr's Mahdi Army, al-Qaeda/insurgents, and rogue elements within the police force. al-Qaeda and the insurgency has a vested interest in discrediting the security services, and are conducting attacks that are designed to destroy the credibility of the institutions of the police and Army. We've found army/police ID cards & uniforms far too many times on raids for it to be a coincidence. The Army units are either partnered with US forces or have MITTs embedded, and it would be difficult for them to conduct sectarian attacks without U.S. forces being aware of their actions. I have no doubt there are rogue elements of the police forces (and bringing in some militia units into the police en masse was a big mistake.) The U.S. needs to get the equivalent of MITTs into the police forces ASAP.

On the operations north & west of Baghdad - one small correction, there have been 7 operations in 10 days. I do not think these were make-work operations to keep the Iraqi Army from conducting mischief in Baghdad, but legitimate counterinsurgency operations. The Iraqi forces have been working closely with Coalition units for some time now and are now putting their training to work and are beginning to take the initiative and lead in fighting the insurgency.

The center of gravity is definitely in Baghdad - the politicians, the militias, the Coalition, the media, are all concentrating their forces in the Capitol (for different reasons). As I stated last winter, the insurgency is moving back to the heartland of Iraq. This is not to say the insurgency isn't still being fought in provinces such as Anbar, but the insurgency realizes fighting in the sticks (or sands) is not having an impact on the political process. Outside of Baghdad the U.S. and Iraqi forces are essentially routing the insurgency. While the insurgents may still be able to plan roadside bombs or conduct sporadic small scale assaults, they are unable to prevent the rise of the influence of the Iraqi Security Forces and the establishment of local government and police forces. There have been no claims of "Islamic Republics" or "no-go zones" for some time, and cities such as Mosul, Tal Afar, Husaybah, Haditha and even Ramadi have made real progress in the past six months. The security and services in these cities are not perfect, but are a far cry from where they were one year ago.

Baghdad itself is a mess. I believe the rise in kidnappings and mass-murders in Baghdad is directly related to the insurgency relocating back to Baghdad. They are making a push to destroy the political process. The insurgency recognizes the police are the weak point (politically and physically) and are trying to exploit this. Sadr's actions are feeding into the destabilization of the security situation. For this reason he is being targeted.

You are correct: going after Sadr (and by default Iran) is a far thornier problem than dealing with the Sunni insurgency and al-Qaeda.

March 30, 2006

US First Wave Precision Strike Capability - II

Ravi Rikhye

The following is a simple, back-of-envelope calculation to determine how many targets the US can attack in a first wave precision strike. We conclude the figure is about 500.

In allotting resources, the US will plan cautiously and allow for one other major contingency. In this case it would be DPRK or a problem created by China. Therefore, we assume only a small fraction of cruise missiles is used and that several naval and air force fighter wings are excluded from the offensive.

The portion in yellow approximates stealthy or extended stand-off aircraft. In green are conventional aircraft that could carry the fire-and-forget Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile, which has a range of at least 400-km, and allows relatively immunity even on a densely protected battlefield. This would be particularly true once the air defense radars were neutralized. The blue portion lists aircraft that can carry the Joint Direct Attack Monition with a 75-km range. We cannot tell if the USAF/USN will want to use these aircraft until after verification that the air defense network is down; but the option exists to use them from the onset.

1. We’ve assumed two precision weapons to a target, though in some cases it could be just one, and in others 4.
2. We assume about 12-15 B-52s will be sued for the cruise missiles. Once cruise missiles and stealth aircraft have opened lanes for non-stealth, non-standoff aircraft, the B-52 can be used with relative impunity. But to avoid overestimating we've relegated the B-52 to subsequent waves.
3. B-1s participating in the first wave are limited to the number of JASSM the US is willing to expend. For discussion we’ve assumed it to be no more than 20% of the inventory. The missile has a 1000-lb warhead.
4. Six USN carrier groups = 48 x 6, plus US Marine F-18s.
5. We are arbitrarily assuming USAF assigns 6 F-15 wings to the operation.
6. We are arbitrarily assuming USAF assigns 6 F-16 wings to the operation

While a large number of cruise missiles are available, we can assume the first wave will not be heavier than that launched for Desert Storm. About 300 missiles were fired in that conflict; we've assumed 100-150 for the first wave.

We have reckoned that as the B-52 is not a stealth aircraft, it will not be employed until the air defenses have been degraded; it is therefore assigned to a standoff role.

The above gives us about 400 targets that could be attacked in a first wave including many underground targets. Subsequently, a rate of about 1000 sorties a day can be sustained.

We have deliberately excluded Allied aircraft: the political permutations and combinations of potential allies make an analysis unnecessarily murky.

Nonetheless, it is likely the US can attack key N-program targets as well as cripple Iran’s air defenses, airfields, air attack capability, SSM units, command and communication nodes, and naval bases in the first wave.

March 29, 2006

Bill Roggio

Inside the UIA: The Story Behind The Iraq/US Raid On Al-Sadr's Forces

More reports of possible divisions between SCIRI and Jaafari's Dawa party, and the greater game with Iran

On March 2, MEMRI's Dr. Nimrod Raphaeli looked at MEMRI: The Difficulties of Forming the New Government in Iraq and  provided details on the divisions between the individual parties that make up the UIA, as well as background information on the Kurdish, Sunni and secular Shiite parties. Dr. Raphaeli notes "Al-Sadr has two potent opponents - the Kurds and Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, the leader of SCIRI. If these two political groups should join forces with Allawi and the Sunnis, an entirely new political situation could emerge."

There is further ancillary evidence of a split in the UIA between SCIRI and the Sadr/Dawa alliance. Reuters notes "Publicly, SCIRI officials say they continue to back Jaafari..." and SCIRI's Hakim "has publicly criticized what he has called U.S. interference and specifically Khalilzad's role in Iraq, where political leaders see him as a key player in negotiations... But there are indications Shi'ite rivals are ready to try to drop Jaafari to break the impasse. Iraqi political sources have also said Washington does not want Jaafari to continue."

She'at [Shiite] sources confirmed to Al-Watan that "Al-Hakeem complained to Sistani that he's being under pressure from Iran and has been receiving threats from the Sadr trend of inciting chaos and violence in case Ja'fari was replaced by Adil Abdil Mehdi" Clarifying that "Sadr made direct threats through a phone call to Al-Hakeem that he would kill all women members in the UIA and leaders in the SCIRI if Abdil Mehdi replaced Ja'fari". According to the same sources "Iran replaced it's strategic alliance with Al-Hakeem by one with Sadr who visited it last month" Announcing "His militias' readiness to defend Iran in case it was attacked by the US" and pointed out that " His supporters started intimidating acts against the British forces in Basra provoked by the Revolutionary Guard intelligence stationed in the city who finance and supervise those militias".

In a conversation with Peter Paraschos, an analyst based in Washington, DC, he noted Iran's desire to maintain a united UIA and highlighted the strategy unfolding on the poltical front:

On the 24th, Khalilzad essentially read the Iranians the Riot Act, highlighting their support of the Mehdi Army and Ansar Al Sunnah. Brilliant. That ought to cause further dissension within the UIA, but so far, no outright schism. Iran is probably working overtime behind the scenes to keep the Shiite bloc united. And the Shiites themselves are probably scared that any show of disunity could really hurt them at the hands of their traditional oppressors. From Tehran's perspective, if the UIA comes unglued, and a true national unity government forms, then Iran's golden opportunity to assert its control over the Iraqi government will have passed.

Sadr, and by default Iran's influence in Iraq, is now being targeted for. Again, the strike against Sadr's militia in Hayy Ur should be viewed as an opening act to defang the militias, cleave off support of Sadr's faction within the UIA, and check Iran’s influence within Iraq.

Mr. Paraschos' statements, combined with the reports from Ali, Reuters and Dr. Raphaeli, also puts Hakim's public support of Sadr in context, as well as the virtual silence of SCIRI and Fadhila on the attack on Sadr's Mahdi Army. Silence is not support. Fence-sitting is an age old political posture, particularly in the Middle East and in Iraq, where Saddam had a way of making examples of those who boldly took a position. Some members of the UIA are now waiting for the strong horse to emerge.

March 28, 2006

Bill Roggio

Raid on Sadr Militia

The political maneuvering has begun in the aftermath of the raid on the Mahdi Army headquarters in the Hayy Ur neighborhood. Jawad al-Maliki, an ally of Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari and spokesman for the United Iraqi Alliance, has called "for a rapid restoration of (control of) security matters to the Iraqi government," according to Reuters. Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty reports "Iraqi Interior Minister Bayan Jabr today described the killing as 'unjustified.' Baghdad provincial Governor Husayn al-Tahan said he has suspended cooperation with U.S. forces until an independent investigation can be carried out."

Reuters also reports Abd al-Karim al-Enzi, minister of state for national security, has decried the attack as a crime, inflated the casualties and basically equated the operation to that of a death squad; "At evening prayers, American soldiers accompanied by Iraqi troops raided the Mustafa mosque and killed 37 people...They were all unarmed. Nobody fired a single shot at them (the troops). They went in, tied up the people and shot them all. They did not leave any wounded behind." The United Iraqi Alliance has canceled Monday's talks on the formation of the Iraqi government.

Multinational Forces - Iraq continues to dispute claims such as those made by al-Enzi, and has photographs which demonstrate the "husseiniya" (again, which can be a mosque, a prayer room or just "a place of Hussein") did contain weapons, and that Iraqi troops were indeed involved in the operation. Omar at Iraq The Model provides further evidence the Sadr militia was in the room, and not innocent 'worshippers'; ; "However, the best evidence that proves that members of Mehdi army were inside the building came from a prominent Sdarist parliamentarian and spokesman of the Sdar trend; Baha' al-Aaraji told al-Hurra this evening that 'worshippers from inside the besieged husseiniya talked to us in person on the phone and asked for help…'. So I wonder why would 'innocent ordinary worshippers' have the personal phone numbers of parliament members and Sadr office officials?"

It should be noted that the Iraqi politicians condemning the raid in Hayy Ur are allies of Jaafari and Muqtada al-Sadr, and the various other political groups (the Kurdish alliance, the Sunni groups, Allawi's secular party and even SCIRI) have remained silent on this issue.

The raid on Sadr's milita should not be viewed as an isolated event, but as part of the continuing struggle to form the Iraqi government. The issue of the militias, and particularly Sadr's Mahdi Army, as well as Sadr's influence in the government, has come to a head. Last week, we discussed the creation of the Security Council, as well as a potential split between SCIRI and the United Iraqi Alliance over the selection of Jaafari as prime minister:

The Iraqi Security Forces continue to take on more of the security responsibility. And in an encouraging sign of political progress, the Iraqi politicians have agreed on the creation of a Security Council designed to give each of the country's main political factions a voice in making security and economic policies for a new government...and is expected to set policies governing the army and police, the counter-insurgency campaign in Sunni Muslim Arab areas and the disarmament of Shiite Muslim militias accused of sectarian killings.

Also, there is talk that SCIRI may break with the United Iraqi Alliance and join with Kurdish, secular Shiite and Sunni parties to nominate Abdel Mahdi as prime minister. This would override the UIA's appointment of Jaafari, and reduce the influence of the radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, whose Mahdi Army militia is thought to be behind much of the Shiite-led sectarian violence. While this has not been confirmed, it certainly demonstrates the various parties are willing to discuss options, despite political or sectarian differences.

The initial reaction of Sadr and Jaafari's allies in the Iraqi government are likely a ploy to wrest further control of the Security Council and ensure Jaafari's appointment as prime minister. The opposing political parties, including elements within the United Iraqi Alliance, may be horrified by the stature Sadr's thugs are being given. The United Iraqi Alliance is by no means a monolithic bloc, and Jaafari's nomination was approved by a slim 64-63 vote. The Hayy Ur raid may actually serve to break the deadlock which has settled over the formation of the new Iraqi government, one way or another. And one has to wonder if that wasn't by design. As we stated yesterday, the Coalition has been telegraphing this move for some time.

March 27, 2006

Ravi Rikhye

US First Wave Precision Strike Capability - I

Thanks to the Iran crisis, it is useful to be aware of US first wave precision strike capability. The normal strike cycle involves target identification, attack, post-attack reconnaissance, and if necessary, reattack.  Depending on many factors, the cycle can take several days, but if the need is urgent, it can be speeded up considerably. For example, if you need to keep a key air base suppressed, you can plan to attack it every 12 hours without waiting for post-strike reconnaissance.

The US Air Force and US Navy can sustain an offensive campaign of several months; the exact figure is not known but will be limited by the availability of precision munitions. While replacing a Tomahawk could take 12-24 months, again depending on assumptions; manufacturing more JDAM kits could begin in a few weeks. Presumably production will be “ramped-up”, to use a favorite American phrase before the start of a campaign like Iraq, where long planning times are available. The availability of bunker-busters might be more problematical. Without knowing the exact state of manufacturing capability, however, we can only make guesses, and this sort of information, while not impossible to come by, is not easily available.

As a generalization we can say obviously the US will run out of targets months before it runs out of missiles and bombs.  Most of the figures below, for strategic range weapons,  are from www.globalsecurity.org. One can quibble with individual figures – the site is so large it is not always updated in timely fashion – but for our purposes it is sufficiently accurate.

Precision Bomb Inventory

Strategic

• Navy Tomahawk                                      3400
• Air Force Tomahawk                                ~300
• Joint Air Surface Standoff Missile              ~1000 (under production 360/year)

Anti-radar

• HARM                                                   19,000

Tactical

• Harpoon (100-km)                                  6000
• Joint Stand Off Weapon (75-km)             ~12,000 (by end 2006)

Stand-off  precision bombs, laser guided

• GBU-28 (4000-lb bunker buster)              300
• GBU-27 (2000-lb bunker buster)              3000
• Paveway series (2000-lb class)               24000

Stand-off precision bombs, GPS guided

• 30,000-lb bunker buster                          In development, 2008 deployment
• GBU-28 (4000-lb bunker buster)               350

• GBU-15 (2000-lb bunker buster)              ~1500?
• GBU-36 (2000-lb bunker buster)              128 (B-2 bomber)
• GBU-37 (4000-lb bunker buster)              100 (B-2 bomber)
• JDAM 2000-lb class                               Several thousand
• JDAM 1000-lb class                               ~40,000
• JDAM 250-lb class                                 ~110,000

Bunker Busters

Given reports that Iran has/is deep-burying facilities, the 4000-lb bunker buster inventory is of interest. There are 750 available, but in a first wave attack only the 100 GBU-37 carried by the B-2 count. It would seem logical the US is bulking up on the 4000-pounders in general, but we have no information.

One important aspect of precision munitions that must be kept in mind: because the aim-point error is small, even the 2000-lb bombs can cause enormous damage. Many of the above not specifically identified as bunker-buster have penetrating warheads.

There is  30,000-lb bunker buster under development.  As of 2002, flight tests were planned for 2006, tests for 2007, and presumably deployment for 2008. Unless plans have been accelerated, we must count the bomb out. But – and this is interesting – the USAF is known to have ordered 3 for urgent delivery in 2003.

The bomb is designed to attack 5000 psi hardened targets with a penetrating depth of 60 meters, up to 10,000 psi hardened targets at a depth of 8 meters. These are blast effects in the past associated with nuclear weapons.

If conditions were right, the US could use the MOAB 21,000-lb against a few selected targets until the MOP became available. MOAB is lighter than MOP, but because of its shape can be dropped only by C-130. Air supremacy would be required before this could be done. On the other hand, a deeply buried underground target is going nowhere and can be attacked at will.

Vol. 5, Number 5

March 25, 2006

Ravi Rikhye

The Iranian Air Force versus the Americans

Opinions on the Iranian Air Force range from the dismissive to “US will underestimate Iranian Air Force at its risk”. Both opinions, we are sorry to say, off the mark.

The figures are fairly straightforward. Tom Cooper of www.acig.org tells us that due to years of diligent scrounging worldwide, Iran has a surprising number of aircraft in flying condition. This includes the F-14, which one would have thought would by now not be flying at all, given its been 25 years since cooperation with the US ended. Parts for the F-4 and F-5 are available because these aircraft served worldwide in large numbers. There is no shortage of parts for Russian and Chinese origin aircraft. Ex-Iraqi Mirages – originally flown to Iran for safekeeping in 1991 and “retained” by Iraq – are also flying.

We can quibble about exact numbers, but something like the Air Order of Battle below is probably reasonable.

• F-14: 15-20

• Mirage F-1: 15-20

• F-4:  30

• F-5: 30

• MiG-29: 30

• Su-24: 15

• J-7: 30

• J-6: 15

• Su-20/22: 30

The air defense includes 4 squadrons of SA-5s, 10 of Chinese SA-2, and 10+ of US Hawks. Several hundred SA-16 and equivalents are available. There are about 900 air defense guns. The radar network may not be showy, but it works.

The question is that while the process of accounting may be satisfying to enthusiasts and orbat professionals, and while it can provide the opportunity for endless debate, what does it mean? The answer is: very little.

The trouble with assessing opposition to the US  began in 1991 when the allies flew 116,000 combat sorties (fixed-wing and helicopters) for a combat loss of 42 aircraft and helicopters, or the absurdly low figure of 1 loss per 2600 sorties. This set a new bar for performance and losses. The new bar then became the expected standard after the 1999 and 2003 air campaigns.

Correspondingly, the bar for other air forces was lowered to the point the loss of a couple of US aircraft over Serbia in 1999 is treated with the same reverence as a major setback: “the US lost an F-117!” and “Serbian air defense forced the allies to bomb from up high!”

If people are to insist that anything greater than a zero loss means the US will not have things its way, then indeed, we do ignore the Iranian Air Force at our peril. The US may lose 5, or even 10 aircraft due simply to bad luck, and some could even be advanced types like the B-2, F-22, or F-117. No one has ever claimed these top-of-the-line aircraft are 100% invulnerable. The Iranians are not idiots. For example, the Iranians could refuse to turn on radars and fire SAMs until the conditions were optimum. If – say – the Hawk missiles have new ECM that the US is unaware of, then it could lose a couple of aircraft before it figured out how to neutralize the new ECM. Incidentally, readers should be clear we are not saying this is going to happen; we’re simply giving a hypothetical possibility here. Our point is that we should be prepared for losses.

War involves surprises no matter how great your margin of superiority. The thing to understand about the US is its military does not believe in being dismissive of even a fourth-rate adversary.  It prepares for war as if it was facing the best, and a cocky attitude on any level is not permitted. It overprepares and overinsures. The Americans are not satisfied with a 2-1 or a 3-1 superiority. They want a 10-1 superiority, and when they have that, they aim for a 20-1 superiority.

In conclusion: Neither is there any danger of the US underestimating the Iranians, nor is there any likelihood the Iranian Air Force can influence the outcome of a US assault.

March 24, 2005

Todd Croft

March 23, 2006

Bill Roggio

Iraq Update

A day after insurgents successfully overran a police station in Miqdadiyah, another attempt was made in the town of Madain, which sits at the tip of the "Triangle of Death", a region of insurgent activity which lies south of Baghdad and is demarked by the towns of Yusufiyah, Latifiyah and Mahmudiyah. The assault was beaten back by a joint U.S. and Iraqi rapid reaction team. The insurgents took a staggering 83% attrition rate during the strike in Madain. The Associated Press provides the details:

Sixty gunmen, firing rocket-propelled grenades and automatic rifles, attacked the Madain police station before dawn, police Lt. Col. Falah al-Mohammadawi said. U.S. troops and a special Iraqi police unit responded, capturing 50 of the insurgents, including a Syrian, al-Mohammadawi said. Four policemen, including one commander, were killed and five were wounded, he said. None of the attackers was killed.

Al-Qaeda's front organization in Iraq, the Mujahideen Shura Council, has claimed responsibility for the attack in Miqdadiyah. There are also accusations the Miqdadiyah assault was aided from inside the police force; " The governor of Diyala province, which has a volatile ethnic and sectarian mix and has seen many al Qaeda attacks in recent months, had the police commander and other officers arrested. He suspected them of complicity in the dawn raid..."

The Madian assault, at first glance appears to be a similarly organized operation. While no group has yet to claim responsibility for the Madain attack, there are indications this may have been another al-Qaeda operation. First, al-Qaeda tends to conducted high-profile strikes within the same timeframe to magnify the propaganda effects. Both assaults struck at identical targets, consisted of a massed strike force and used similar tactics (coordinated attack; opening salvos with RPGs, mortars and small arms fire).

Al-Qaeda has attempted two large scale assaults such is this in the past; the attacks on Camp Gannon in Husaybah and on Abu Ghraib prison in the spring of 2005. Both of these attacks were fended off by U.S. forces with heavy casualties inflicted on the assault force. But the two latest attacks did not involve suicide car bombs, which is certainly an interesting development. With the successful attack in Miqdadniyah and the failure in Madain, al-Qaeda overall success rate is 1 for 4 from a military standpoint, but the propaganda value of these strikes are incalculable. It should be noted that after the al-Qaeda failures at Camp Gannon and Abu Ghraib, al-Qaeda halted large scale assaults on armed compounds. While these operations may have produced good propaganda, it is likely the operations took a toll on resources, morale and manpower. It has taken almost one year for al-Qaeda to reinitiate such operations.

Coalition and Iraqi forces initiated an offensive of (their) own in Babil province. A combined Iraqi and U.S. strike force comprised of elements 2nd Battalion, 4th Brigade, 8th Iraqi Army Division, and 2nd Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division conducted Operation Iron Strike a cordon & search operation in the town of Sammara, which also lies in the Triangle of Death. Eleven insurgents were detained and a weapons cache was uncovered. This was a night air assault operation, with U.S. and Iraqi troops being ferried in by Blackhawks.

Iron Strike follows a similar operation which was aimed at Sadr-Yusufiyah, where Coalition and Iraqi forces established a battle position to patrol the region. Coalition forces are increasingly using air assaults, which is an indication that there is little concern the insurgency possesses shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles. Air assaults also add the element of surprise and allow Coalition forces to bypass the threat of roadside bombs.

[Bill Roggio runs the blog The Fourth Rail. He is an independent reporter on Iraq, and has previously served in the US armed forces. This article has appeared in his blog.]

March 22, 2006

Ravi Rikhye

Mining/Clearing the Straits of Hormuz

That Iran will mine the Straits of Hormuz in case it is attacked over its N-program and that this will cause major pain to the oil consuming nations is taken as an article of faith. While the first part may well come about, its useful to look at some details concerning the second. We had, earlier, noted that the world has sufficient reserves of oil for several months should 10-million bbl/day be lost through Hormuz. It will not be 15-million bbl/day because of the Saudi Yanabu pipeline, built specifically for such a contingency.

Because the US knows exactly what Iran intends in case of an attack, its reasonable to assume the US will preempt Iran on the latter’s retaliation. The preemption will begin at the same time as the N-attack.

One option the US has to prevent Iranian mining of Hormuz is to start operations by itself offensively mining Iranian waters. Combined with air and missile attacks on all naval installations and ships/boats, this will limit what the Iranians can do. That does not mean the Iranians will not get mines out, including simply releasing them along their coast to drift. Normally no one likes to do this because the danger to your own ships becomes as great as that to of your adversaries. But if you have nothing to lose – and Iran will not – this is a viable tactic.

It’s being said the West has run down its minesweeping capabilities after the end of the Cold War and this will affect the ability to clear Hormuz. This is a perfect example of a 100% correct fact, interpreted 100% wrong. With the Soviet threat gone, obviously the west does not need the same level of sweep capability. But there still remains a vast capability, not least because if Hormuz is imperiled, the whole world will have to pitch in to clear the Straits, else it will suffer.

The US alone deploys, with warning, 26 counter-mine ships and 20 helicopters. That’s a lot of capability for the small area we’re talking about. Count the local navies and NATO, we’re looking at double the number of ships.

Mine clearance is a difficult activity. But so is just about every military activity. “Difficult” does not mean it cannot, or will not be done.

There are three major mine clearance activities in modern times, one of which is actually an analog for mine clearance because it involved ordnance dropped by NATO fighters in the Adriatic during the operations against Yugoslavia in 1999. Clearing bombs from the sea bottom is quite a bit harder in many respects than clearing mines. NATO deployed 11 clearance ships and took 73 days to clear 1041 square miles. Readers are free to slice and dice as they want, but that could equate to an area 3 miles by 350 miles. Twice as many ships does not, of course, mean twice as much area cleared in the same time; nonetheless, it is likely in 90 days tanker traffic could resume in safety.

That operation involved 98 pieces of ordnance. Iran might be able to get hundreds of mines into the water as a worst case. Thousands is out of the question, because the US is not going to give Iran time to do the job: it will have to do the job under every form of air/missile attack and be hemmed in by US minefields at that.

So lets consider the clearance of North Vietnamese ports in 1973. Operation End Sweep, as it was called, lasted six months and employed 10 ocean minesweepers, 9 amphibious ships, 6 fleet tugs, and 3 salvage ships at various times. The amphibious ships were present to support helicopter sweep operations, a first for the time. Operations were suspended for political reasons for two of the six months. So that operation took 4 months.

Readers will say: “But since the US planted the mines, it knew where to find them, making it a simple operation.” As with everything to do with the military, yes and no. First, the mines were planted not just in harbors and approaches to harbors, they were also used in rivers and inland waterways. These things work themselves loose. Still, we’d have to agree: knowing where the mines were dropped was at least half the battle. But consider the numbers: over 11,000 mines were cleared.

Another campaign was against the 2500 mines that Saddam planted in 1991 to block the US invasion by sea. At time of writing we don’t have figures for how long it took to clear these; the Royal Navy alone accounted for 1000.

We haven’t mentioned the Tanker War affair during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. One reason is that it was more of a melee involving two quite incompetent combatants, Iran and Iraq, on one hand, and western navies, which had little experience of operation in Gulf waters on the other. Mines were used, but air attacks were the preferred method. Iran’s military capabilities/competencies have grown considerably since that time as have western/Gulf abilities to operate in the Gulf.

Iran attempting to block the shipping channels by sinking ships has been mentioned, and as usual, by the time the media gets through mangling what the experts say, the picture looks grim. Incidentally, for once we have to stand up for the media, in fairness. These days experts are so anxious to get on the media they will say anything. Not a Good Thing when discussing the complexities of any situation. Leave alone the military, where its very easy to get a superficial knowledge and convince oneself one is an expert.

If our readers are under the impression that all Iran has to do is to block two channels 1.5 km wide and Hormuz is closed, we cannot blame them. That’s what the media keeps saying again and again. In reality, the channels are each 4.5 km wide for safety. That’s still narrow enough to cause concern. But Hormuz is 50-km wide at its narrowest point. The Strait itself cannot be blocked by sinking ships – which assumes the US is going to let Iran have the time to get up sinking shenanigans in the first place. The channels are needed for ships such as the supertankers, which can have draughts of over 85-feet. Ships of lesser draught will still be able to get through. Unfortunately, we don’t have the resources to purchase the needed charts so we cannot be more specific or informative.

Now, clearly there’s going to be a problem if smaller tankers have to be used. But to assume all tanker traffic will be shut down would be wrong.

To sum up. Iran presents a huge threat to Gulf shipping. Which is why it will be preempted. Even then it could represent a major problem. The problem can be taken care of. We’ll pay more for our oil. Though we do need to note economists say there is a $15-20/bbl fear premium built into existing prices. And all the calculations about $100-120/bbl assumes the free market will still be operating, singing jolly songs all the way to the bank. Its not clear it will be allowed to operate for the duration.

Again, however, taking all that into account, there’s still going to be a problem. The decision whether the problem of an N-Iran overrides the oil problem is a political discussion.

Meantime, no one should assume that Iran blocking Hormuz is risk free for Iran. The US has ever incentive to limit its attack to the N-installations. If Iran is seen as escalating, then first the US, then the west, and last the world, is going to take its gloves off. Fighting for truth, democracy and the American way? That’s kid stuff compared to fighting for oil. People get very, very violent when you threaten their standard of life. Iran will get clobbered, very badly. Whether its N-program is worth the risk – well, that’s also a political decision, one Iran will have to make.

March 21, 2006

Bill Roggio

Operation Swarmer: Legit or Theater?

As soon as Operation Swarmer kicked off, the pundits rushed to assign political motivations to the operation. One author of this school of analysis is Richard Beeston, the Diplomatic Editor of the London Times, who claims the air assault is "politically opportune for both the Bush Administration and the fledgling Iraqi government in Baghdad," "a show of US strength" and a "demonstrate that that they [American and Iraqi commanders], in fact, are in charge."

Rubbish.

Such analysis highlights the shortcomings of the media in covering war, particularly the inability to track combat operations and provide meaningful analysis. Instead of looking at the big picture, a single combat operation is viewed as an isolated incident, and there is little attempt to provide the context for an operation. The perfect example of this was the media reporting on the operations in western Anbar province during the spring and summer of 2005. Instead of viewing the operations as part of an overall campaign to subdue the insurgency and establish a permanent presence in the region, the operations were viewed individually, and judged as failures based on some undefined set of metrics.

But by the time the December 15th election was conducted, every major city and town on the Euphrates, from Ramadi to Husaybah right on the Syrian border, had a presence of U.S. Marines and troops, and the Iraqi Army. Not once did the media ask how they misunderstood what happened in Anbar, and to this day still refer to the Qaim and Triad regions of Anbar as the most dangerous regions in Iraq. That just is not so.

The fact is Operation Swarmer is the latest in a series of air assault operations conducted by U.S. and Iraqi troops over the past few months. On November 21, a small Iraqi and U.S. force of about 100 men conducted an air assault, code name Operation Old Baldy, on a terrorist hideout on Bayji Island, on the Tigris River. On February 13th, the Iraqi Army, with a force of about 100 men, conducted its first nighttime air assault against a suspected terrorist training camp in the village of Bit Shaitin, near Salman Pak. On March 2, Coalition and Iraqi forces conducted a multi-battalion air assault on the town of Sadr-Yusufiyah during Operation Morning Glory. Two full battalions of U.S. and Iraqi troops conducted this assault, along with a full brigade of Iraqi troops on the ground. The 101st Airborne division is trained for air mobile / air assault missions, and they are training their Iraqi counterparts in this mode of operations as well (that the Iraqis do not have an air mobile unit, or organic equipment, yet are being trained to conduct air mobile operations is another interesting topic of discussion).

The planning, equipment, and training required to conduct an air assault is more sophisticated than conventional methods of assault. If the Iraqi Army and Coalition wished to conduct a show of strength, there are easier, safer and cheaper ways to do so. An armored assault immediately comes to mind, and the Iraqi Army possesses their own armored units, which would be an impressive and accurate show of the Iraqi flag as opposed to riding shotgun on U.S. Blackhawks. But claims the dog was wagged makes for far more entertaining reporting, and far shallower reporting, too.

[Bill Roggio runs the blog The Fourth Rail. He is an independent reporter on Iraq, and has previously served in the US armed forces. This article has appeared in his blog.]

Vol. 5. Number 4

March 18, 2006

Ravi Rikhye

Last we come to a reprise of Prof. Stephen Cohen’s point. To refresh, we said: To quote Prof. Stephen Cohen at the Brookings Institute (e-mail exchange): “(India) could reassure NSG (Nuclear Supplier Group) states and others by being more explicit about its nuclear ambitions and strategy and by doing more confidence building with regional (read Pakistan) and Asian (read China) rivals.”

Now, Prof. Cohen is one of the foremost experts on India, and though he occasionally gets into trouble with the Indians when he tries to be even-handed between the two rivals, he has a deep and abiding affection for India. But – and this should not be a surprise to anyone – Prof. Cohen is not Indian. He is American and ultimately he must give primacy to America’s interests.

Some of our readers knowledgeable about the nuclear industry may have at some point wondered: “But the US is no longer a world leader in the industry. The last US power reactor went on line ten years ago, and the US was already not top gun. Besides which, countries like France and Russia are willing to make deals on less-than-desirable terms for political purpose, because their industry is largely state-owned/controlled. The US has to deal strictly on a commercial basis, and it is not even clear it is cost competitive in the areas where it may excel. Why would India want to buy American?”

Exactly. And Washington does not care if India buys a single 40-watt light bulb for its next power plant. America’s aims are purely strategic: we’d mentioned yesterday managing uncertainty in of the greatest importance to the US. India is a black hole to the US on several critical aspects of N-weapons – and it is to India’s advantage it remain that way!

We have nothing to gain by reassuring anyone about our N-ambitions and strategy or by building N-confidence with our regional and Asian rivals.

It is time to face a big, and very uncomfortable truth about India’s N-weapons program. The truth is that deep down Indians believe N-weapons are immoral. They don’t want to threaten anyone, they don’t want to warfight with N-weapons, they don’t even want to get into internal discussions about first-strike, second-strike, gradual escalation and all that good stuff that has had generations of American strategists and academicians salivating for decades.

All they wanted was to have the capability to show themselves and the world that they were as good as anyone else. They didn’t even react much when Pakistan embarked on its N-weapons program. Its only when Pakistan started talking about using its N-weapons that Indians were forced to come up with a pseudo-doctrine, and from what we know, it’s a pretty half-hearted doctrine that is 100% defensive.

India does not believe China will use N-weapons against it, and it has seen no reason at all to build a weapons capability against China for all these years. Indians do not have it in them to loosen nuclear fire on their kin, the Pakistanis. If the Pakistanis would just stop talking about the matter and stop developing missiles which have but one target, India would be more than happy to let sleeping dogs lie. This is not to deny that from Pakistan’s viewpoint N-weapons (which it still does not have in militarily usable form) are a cheap and lazy way of protecting itself against India – with risks that far outweigh the benefits. We are not passing moral judgment on Pakistan, simply noting a fact.

The Indians really need to ask themselves just one question: Do they want America – and the whole world – to find out that we don’t have much of  an N-weapons program, very few warheads, and a quite understandable lack of interest in the mechanics of how/when/where they would be used?

Ambiguity has its uses. We are not saying the Indians have been deliberately ambiguous – that sort of thing requires too much intellectual rigor and tough decisions. But by default we have a policy of deep ambiguity. It is not to our advantage to clarify anything to anyone for any reason.

[Concluded]

March 17, 2005

Ravi Rikhye

Why the Indo-US Nuclear Deal is Bad for India - II

Yesterday we asserted that India has more to lose than gain from entering an N-agreement with the United States.

Before we continue, let’s frankly acknowledge that 30 years of N-isolation have definitely taken their toll with regard to India’s civil N-program. The technical details can be ignored, but the setbacks are admitted by India and the promise of ending the isolation is the primary one given as a reason to secure agreement with the US.

Though India is not an NPT signatory, and could not be punished for its 1974 test, it is blocked by the Nuclear Suppliers Group of 45 supplier nations which was subsequently created. The NSG will not supply technology/equipment/materials to anyone who has not put their N-program under international safeguard. As with all laws, the NSG ends up punishing countries like India that want to stay legal, but has less effect against countries like Pakistan and Iran that work to subvert its restrictions. Still, that is neither here nor there, as they say in Iowa.

On the surface, the above is a reasonable argument. But it ignores two critical matters.

First, there is no reason why India should not, in 30 years, have developed an independent, functioning N-power industry. This failure is not for lack of dedicated scientists or industrial base, it is because of bureaucratic ineptitude. If India puts its mind to it, it can have a vibrant and expanding N-power program even now. What the Indo-US agreement does is to reward the inept who let India down for 30 years, and once again destroy our efforts at self-reliance. We can easily agree that an independent Indian N-program will not be as good as one for which open international collaboration is available. Here we need to recall the great Admiral Gorshkov’s famous aphorism: “Better is the enemy of ‘good enough’”. All things being equal, it is clearly foolish of India to – say – develop an indigenous automobile industry. But where national security is involved, we are inhaling pixie dust if we think we can be a great power by relying on others instead of ourselves.

Second, one country has already made an end run around the NSG. Russia has been engaged for several years in helping India fund and construct two large civilian reactors at Kundankulam. The uranium fuel for these light water reactors will come from Russia; the fuel rods will not be returned. The reactors are under IAEA safeguard.

Russia’s argument in working with India is multifaceted. A detailed explanation can be given, oddly enough, quite simply. “One, we need the money. Two, we need the money. Three, we need the money”. No one has sanctioned Russia for working with India, and Russia has access to most of the latest N-technology. Indeed, because the US N-proliferation lobby is so fixated on the US as the center of the universe, the Indo-Russian deal is barely on anyone’s radar screen. The success of the joint venture – the reactors will come on line in 2007 and 2008 – has led to discussions for more reactors.

Now, sadly enough, our first reason was becoming a thing of the past. Since the mid-1990s, India’s notoriously inefficient N-reactor sector has picked up to the point that projects are actually being completed ahead of schedule. True this is only one aspect of the problem, but it is ironic India is seeking to destroy its independence at a time the effort was beginning to give results.

Supporters of the Indo-US agreement note another issue. India has long been shut out of international research and development such as the fusion reactor program. Ending that isolation is important.

Indeed it is. And it is not our case that the Indo-US agreement has no benefits. It has many. But our case is the benefits are outweighed by the disadvantages. We have noted the US gets to put its large, fat, and exquisitely sensitive nose under our nuclear tent. The potential for harm there alone should rule out the agreement.

Next, while in itself the separation between the civilian and weapons programs is not harmful because – contrary to the erotic dreams of the world’s non-proliferation lobbies – India does not use its civilian facilities for weapons programs, aside from giving the US access to all sorts of areas previously closed to it, the inevitable bait-and-switch is going to take place: the US is going to start pressing for limits on India’s weapons programs. It will be like the man who, to win the woman of his desire, will say anything and perhaps even do most everything, but once he has won her says: “Darling, we are so happy together; now if you could do just one teensy-weensy little thing more for me, our happiness could be complete”. It’s easier to say “no” when you’re just dating than after you’re married.

[To be concluded March 18, 2006]

March 16, 2005

Ravi Rikhye

Why the Indo-US Nuclear Deal is Bad for India - I

In case you ask, I have a longer list of credentials of being pro-American than just about any other Indian alive. So this is not another rant by some paranoid, constipated Indian “nationalist”, right, center, or left. This is an analysis from the “Martian Viewpoint”: if one lived on Mars and had no stake whatsoever in this deal, how would one assess it? Answer: good for the US, bad for India.

The US gain is easily understood. India’s N-weapons program is perhaps the one area of national security where the US has no significant intelligence penetration. Anything that gets the US closer to the program is an advance. Supporters of the deal will say: “we’ve carefully excluding the military part of the program from any agreement”

To make the point, consider the camel and the tent. Sam is a camel who can read. He knows there is a dairy in the middle of the tent. Previously, Sam could only walk around the tent from the outside. In part he’s responsible for his exclusion: once the US began sanctioning India directly and indirectly for its 1974 test, Sam was cutting off his contacts with the Indians on a wide variety of fronts, ranging from simple academic conferences to supplying technology and equipment.

Now, Sam has been in the cold for 32 years and he is understandably curious about what entries may have been made in the diary.  With the willing consent of the Indian government, Sam is now permitted to put his nose under the tent. Getting to the diary is still a long way off. But – the point – he has made a major start. Sam’s engagement with India’s civilian N-program is fully restored. Sam is bound to learn many, many things about the nuclear program too. I wont bore you with the details of how this process takes place, but anyone with just passing familiarity with how intelligence is collected knows what we are talking about.

When India first opening up to the United States in the 1980s, a theme I heard repeatedly from Indian military, diplomatic, and intelligence officers were: “We know how to handle the US.” Just as repeatedly I said: “No you don’t, because you make the fatal mistake of assuming Americans are stupid. You are falling for their act. Soon they will not just have you in bed, you’ll be paying them for sleeping with you.” This happened, in clubs, hearts, diamonds and spades in every field – except the N-weapons area. And in a perfect repeat of 20 years ago, except this time it’s the advocates of the N-deal, the Indians are saying: “We can handle the Americans.”

First we need to understand that the word “intelligence” is being used in a broader context than straightforward issues like: How many kilograms of weapons grade plutonium has India stockpiled (Sneak Peek: nowhere near what American non-proliferation types think), how many warhead assemblies exist, how much plutonium goes into each of the different weapons designs and so on. That’s the obvious hard capabilities stuff. What the US also needs to know is the soft intentions stuff: what is the N-chain of command, what internal safeguards exist against unauthorized release, what is the doctrine under each of several scenarios, where do each of scores of decision makers stand on use of N-weapons and so on.

The soft stuff is needed because for the US, managing global risks is absolutely critical to the smooth advance of its interests – which happen to center on extending the already considerable global hegemony America enjoys, which I enthusiastically support.

Well, where’s the harm in letting the Americans know about this sort of thing? To quote Prof. Stephen Cohen at the Brookings Institute (e-mail exchange): “(India) could reassure NSG (Nuclear Supplier Group) states and others by being more explicit about its nuclear ambitions and strategy and by doing more confidence building with regional (read Pakistan) and Asian (read China) rivals.” Doesn’t India want to be accepted a mature, responsible, sober equal in the World Powers Club, an objective of ours since independence? This club has many circles; we have already navigated several and are now being invited into the secret chamber. It costs us nothing; lifting of US opposition to supplying India with nuclear equipment and technology helps us not just with the US, but also other nuclear suppliers, and we are so smart, you wait and see, along with the civilian technology and equipment we’ll also get N-weapons stuff regardless of what the Americans intend. Because we’ll get our nose under their tent.

Our response to this seemingly sensible position? There we go again, trying to be so smart we mess ourselves up. On one level the argument is perfectly valid. Take missile technology, for example. A lot of what we want is under embargo. If the US/other NSG members help us with our satellite launchers, who’s to know when Drs. X, Y, and Z are quietly do work also for the military program, and those circuits which ensure reliable release of civilian payloads could help us in ensuring reliable release of nuclear payloads. Like the American non-proliferation types or hate them, they have a point: most civilian technology in the nuclear, launcher, and space fields has applicability to the military sector too.

But what we gain is going to be substantially offset by what we lose. We continue tomorrow.

March 15, 2006

Ravi Rikhye

Break Up Iraq

Why is it acceptable for the Former Republic of Yugoslavia to split into 5 different countries – soon perhaps 7 as Kosovo and Montenegro go their own way – but Iraq has to be kept united regardless of cost? Both FRY and Iraq arose out of the detritus of the First World War and both were artificial creations designed to serve the immediate interests of the victors.

The simplest solution to the Iraq problem is a 3-way partition which is going to happen anyway.  In FRY the US decided to manage the breakup keeping the country together   was never a consideration. It is best for everyone, not least the Iraqis, if the US takes the same position.

The Kurds want out. The Baghdad government’s writ does not run in Kurdistan. The We’ve seen reports saying over 97% of Kurds want independence.  Because they are grateful to the US for its protection, and because they don’t want to unnecessarily complicate their life vis-à-vis Turkey, the Kurds are not loudly pushing for independence. They believe it must and will happen, and if they have to wait a while longer for a formal declaration, no harm done.

The Shias don’t want to live with the Sunnis. They don’t care what the Sunnis do, but they want, like the Kurds, to be left alone.

The Sunnis alone don’t want partition because whereas the Shia and Kurd areas have oil, the Sunnis have nothing – or will have nothing as soon as they are kicked out of Kirkuk. The Sunnis are in Kirkuk because Saddam changed the population balance against the Kurds, whom he despised. In a process well documented even in the mainstream media, the Sunnis are being pushed out.

So, Serbia didn’t want FRY to breakup. But the Serbs were a minority and when the majority wants to say goodbye, you can’t let the minority rule. The same is obviously true of the Sunnis and Iraq.

This may seem an astonishing assertion, because assuming Americans are idiots is a global knee-jerk reaction born of envy, but the American foreign policy establishment is perfectly aware of the points we’re making. So that brings us back to our original question: why FRY and not Iraq?

 1. FRY was a client-state of Moscow; anything that brought Moscow down further after the disintegration of the FSU was a policy with great appeal in Washington.

2. The US is concerned that if Iraq breaks up on its watch, the entire world is going to say: “Look, look, we said America was going in for its imperial motives and to control the oil, not to bring democracy to Iraq, and now the Americans are busting Iraq apart.”

There is no third point. The above is it. That won't stop  the American foreign policy establishment from coming up with all sorts of other reasons – such as we have to keep the Sunni Arabs on our side because of the oil. These excuses should be disregarded.

Possibly the biggest obstacle in the American drive to world empire is – the Americans themselves. They don’t want to just rule the world, they want to be loved. This creates all sorts of impossible situations. For example, one reason the Americans were so horribly unprepared for events after the fall of Baghdad was they had convinced themselves they would be greeted with rose-petal dancers in the streets. So they did not do obvious things, such as declare martial law and issue shoot on sight orders if anyone was seen with a weapon. The Americans didn’t want people saying: “You say you came for democracy but you declare martial law?”

This is an absolutely absurd state of mind.  Anyone understands law and order are essential precursors of democracy, and sometimes draconian measures are required to restore the peace. If Americans are worried about what people say, stay home – because no matter what you do, people are going to criticize you at the start. And no matter what you do, they may never stop criticizing you.

America has been responsible for bringing democracy to almost every non-European democratic country in the world. It twice went to war to defend European democracy and then stood guard for 50 years, prepared to suffer nuclear annihilation at 30-minutes warning, till the Soviet Union fell. So the Europeans are really grateful to America? Of course they are. Not.

Are the Latins grateful that America from the 1970s on began reversing its ersatz colonialism and started pushing for democracy? Of course they are. President Chavez never goes to bed without thanking God and the US for his life – in earlier times he would merely have been shot. The South Koreans weep with feeling when they recount how the US helped give them everything they have, as opposed to starving to death as part of a unified communist Korea? Of course they do – if they happen to be over 60 years old. Anyone younger just wants the US to get the heck out of the peninsula.

But if you want to rule the world – the Americans already do that, so lets say if you want to remake the world in your own image – then you have to do the right thing regardless of what anyone says. Break up Iraq. Protect and aid the Sunnis. Protect and aid the Kurds. Have a respectful relationship with the Shias, let them know you are available to offset the Iranians – if the Shia ask, if they don’t, well, that’s fine too.

These are the right things to do. The violence will end – the foreigners will remain a problem till they are exterminated, a process that is taking place. The amount of money required will be about what the US spends in a year in Iraq. All but 40,000 troops can come home by year-end; and those 40,000 will be in Sunni and Kurd areas by invitation, not by occupation. And there is a bonus: President Bush may just save the Republicans from the inevitable defeat in November 2006, recover his prestige and authority, and be able to go on to dealing with Iran.

March 14, 2006

Mandeep S. Bajwa

Baluch Rebels Succeed In Shutting Iran-Pakistan Rail Link

Background

Last week Associated Press reported that because of insurgent attacks, rail service between Quetta in Pakistan and Zahedan in Iran was to be suspended. Other reports said that Pakistan had suspended traffic only for a week till the security situation improved; but there was confusion as whether it was goods or passenger traffic that was affected.

Trains were already restricted to daylight operations on the line because of frequent attacks. A rocket attack on March 4 that seriously injured an engine driver is said to have led Pakistan Railways staff to refuse to operate trains.

Analysis

Vol. 5, Number 3

March 11, 2006

Ravi Rikhye

The Dubai Ports Fiasco

Almost without exception, US business commentators have condemned the scuttling of the UAE ports deal. Rather than waste time – and embarrass President Bush – the UAE announced it would spin off the US ports component of the British P & O acquired by the Gulf state. We need to look at two issues.

First, if we assume that Congress is composed of intelligent and talented individuals, we have to accept that security is not an issue. Mr. Bush is the issue. That Democrats should seize on the deal is to be expected. That his own party should jump all over him, without warning  and without respect for him as head of state is not good.  Mr. Bush has long been in trouble with the American public as shown by poll after poll. But increasingly he is under attack by his own party on every conceivable issue. Unless he can pull himself together, he is already a lame duck president with almost three years to go in his term.

We believe that Congress understands that the UAE services more US Navy ships than any other country with nary a complaint. To say two of the 9/11 hijackers came from the UAE and that UAE banks were used for some of the transaction is to miss the point that many used Germany and European banks as a base. And it is to miss the point that one country not just provided safe shelter to the hijackers, it positively helped them by allowing them to learn to fly large commercial aircraft. That country is, of course, the US.

Moreover, 95% of cargo arrives without checking in US ports; so how is it okay for the same UAE holding company to load US-bound cargoes but not to unload them. And to top it off, a number of foreign companies operate US ports – including the same UAE company, through its subsidiary Inchcape. No one has uttered a word when Inchcape was acquired by Dubai Ports in January.

Second, how is this fiasco going to play out overseas? The background is starkly simple. Americans are averse to saving and to paying taxes. So the country runs mind-boggling trade and budget deficits. Both deficits are financed by thrifty foreigners. They are willing to lend money to the US, and to invest their surplus dollars in the US, because they consider the country politically stable and economically sound. What American corporate, financial, and economic persons are worried about is that the US government is interfering in the free functioning of the global economy for political purpose. That undercuts both US free trade objectives and the notion of stability, and makes the US less attractive to foreigners at a time it is monthly becoming more dependent on foreign capital.

For example, Americans are unwilling to upgrade the merchant marine/port infrastructure at a time US trade is predicted to double in 20 years. Local, state, and the federal governments are unwilling to raise taxes to pay for this investment. The US private sector long ago opted out of merchant shipping as unprofitable and more and more foreign companies are operating US ports. It is said the state of Virginia alone needs $10 billion to upgrade its ports. Where is this money going to come from if not from the Chinese and the Gulf Arabs?

Now, we don’t think that foreign investment is going to cease because of Dubai Ports, just as foreign investment in France is not going to stop because the government wont allow Mittal Steel – a company headed by an Indian-born, UK-based businessperson - to buy a French steelmaker.

At the same time, there is no denying Dubai Ports will have – using a favorite American phrase that has been beaten to death by overuse – “a chilling effect” on foreign investors.

Our concern is that the US cannot be the world’s superpower if more and more economic and financial decisions affecting America are made overseas. The US absolutely must stop running deficits, both trade and budgetary. Otherwise we will soon start seeing signs that there will be no Second Century to follow the first American Century.

March 10, 2006

Ravi Rikhye

As The Prospect Of Military Action Against Iran Nears

The issue concerning Iran is not a preemptive strike against its N-installations. Such an attack is conductable with relative ease. The contention that the Iranian weapon program is spread over 300 sites, many of which are underground and many undetected means little in practical terms, even if correct. Destruction of a few key installations can set Iran back many years.

Further, there is no evidence that such a strike is the only option or even the preferred option. A blockade, for example, can be imposed without firing a shot. Though slow, this tool is a sure way of strangling the target.

The immediate issue is: how will Iran retaliate.

A plan purportedly made by Iran in late 2005, 30 pages of which is supposedly available to the west, calls for Iran to shut down the Strait of Hormuz and to make very costly a US amphibious assault. Thus: sea minefields, missile and suicide boat attacks against merchant shipping with the aim of blocking the 3-km wide shipping channel, missile strikes against Saudi and other oil export terminals and so on are mentioned in the plan. We want to make clear that we are not, in any fashion, saying it is genuine. But insofar as many of the steps are logical, it doesn’t matter if the plan is genuine or simply Iranian or western disinformation.

The error most analysts are making is they assume that first will come a strike against the N-installations, then will come Iranian retaliation, then the west will have to figure out what to do to clear Hormuz, a process it is assumed Iran will make costly and difficult.

In reality, the N-strike will be paired with an attack on all Iranian naval assets. Indeed, it is possible the latter will be a much larger affair. Any vessel over 10 meters in length is unlikely to survive. There will be no merchant shipping for Iran to strike as the west will ensure there are no vessels in the choke points before operations are launched.  Western navies will not be taking the sea breeze in the Strait, waiting to be attacked by Iranian missiles, aircraft, and suicide boats. They will be in open water where Iran cannot reach them.

Neither the N-attack or the pre-emptive strike against Iranian naval assets will be a single shot affair. They will take place over days and may continue into weeks. During this time, Iran is sure to get some mines into the water. It may take some weeks to sweep, depending on how many mines there are.

But what about Iranian missile attacks against Gulf oil installations? The missiles will themselves be targets in the pre-emptive strikes. Undoubtedly many will survive, some will be launched, and a few may even hit something.

Consider this, however. The world holds about 5 billion barrels of oil as reserves. Half is in the OCED countries, this figure excludes strategic reserves. If Hormuz is blocked, Saudi’s Yanabu pipeline could transport one-third of the  ~15 million barrels of oil that leaves via Hormuz. About 15% of world product – 10 million barrels/day would be lost. Increasing production from other areas might make up some of the loss, perhaps 1-2 million barrels/day. Because the price of oil would go up, use would come down, accounting for – at a guess – another 2+ million barrels a day. Thus, the world would be essentially okay for oil for a period of between 18- and 24-months. That is plenty of time to take care of Iran and clear the Straits.

None of this implies that an attack against Iran is risk free. Any military action at any time is risky. It’s not for nothing the military originated the term: Situation Normal All Fouled Up.

Which is why it would seem prudent for the US to prepare for the worst.  Larger stocks are one option. Investing with Saudi to double Yanabu’s capacity is another. Ensuring that equipment is on hand to pump more oil in an emergency is yet another. US military planning is a model of meticulous and detailed work. Before attacking Iran, we’d like to see the same level of thought devoted to minimizing the impact if Hormuz is closed or severely disrupted.

March 8, 2006

Bill Roggio*

The Rise of Talibanistan

The Taliban and al-Qaeda provided an embarrassing scene for Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf as President George Bush visited the country last week. Eager to demonstrate Pakistan’s commitment to fighting the Taliban and al-Qaeda in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas on the border with Afghanistan, the Pakistani military launched an offensive against a terrorist camp in Danda Saidgai, North Waziristan. The Islamists responded by murdering a U.S. diplomat in a suicide strike outside the U.S. Consulate in Karachi, as well as launching a counteroffensive against the seat of government in Miranshah, North Waziristan.

The attack on the camp in Danda Saidgai and the fighting in Miranshah reveal much about the tenuous situation the Pakistani government faces in the lawless border regions, particularly in North and South Waziristan. Their is plenty of evidence the Pakistani government exerts very little influence outside of the government center in Miranshah and Wana, which have essentially become military garrisons inside hostile territory controlled by the Taliban.

The terrorist camp in Danda Saidgai wasn’t just a transient camp hastily assembled, but a “sprawling hideout “ and “military complex” which housed hundreds of foreign fighters and served as a training center. There were “eight residential quarters” which served as barracks for the terrorists. This camp has been in existence for some time, and it is believed there are several more like it spread throughout the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Northwest Frontier Provinces.

*Bill Roggio's blog is The Fourth Rail, where this analysis initially appeared.

March 7, 2005

Mandeep S. Bajwa

[Editor's Note: On May 2 we'd discussed how Indian bureaucrats are refusing to spend allotted weapons budgets for fear of being accused of taking bribes. If money is not used by the MOD, it is returned to the Treasury. We are waiting for figures on how much has remained unspent in recent years.]

March 6, 2005

A.H. Amin

Vol. 5, Number 2

March 4, 2005

March 3, 2006

 India Dispatches 300 Paramilitary Commandos to Afghanistan: Analysis

 Mandeep S. Bajwa

March 2, 2006

When Honesty Cripples National Defense

Ravi Rikhye

One global index of transparency rates India at 88th in the world (and the US at 17th). Apparently the index focuses on perceptions, which need not tally with the reality.

In one area, however, India has become so honest that the national defense is being crippled. That's in the procurement of major weapon systems, and the Air Force in particular has suffered.

In the good old days when most everything came from the USSR, the scope for corruption was limited. The Soviets used money from trade deals to fund local communist parties, but the sums were small. Also, officials and politicians in general were considerably less corrupt than in most countries. For example, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi received just $5-million for the Mirage 2000 deal of 40 aircraft, concluded in the late 1970s. And she put the entire amount into her party coffers. The biggest gain from corruption anyone could pin on her was a fur coat. She received that as a gift on an overseas visit, and did not hand it in to the Treasury as she should have.

Her son, Rajiv, was the one who introduced 3rd world style corruption to government. First, India now had money to buy some weapons from the west. Second, though Rajiv was a bit dim in the corruption department, his wife Sonia was an expert. Rajiv used to be happy to get $1250 to get you a private meeting with his mother - in dollar terms the money is about the same today as it was in the 1970s. Sonia straightened him out, and before you could say "Show me the money", every single deal seemed to involve a commission for Her Highness. Commissions now ran into tens and hundreds of million dollars.

Then one day the French got really annoyed with Her Highness. Sonia had the really dishonest habit of taking money from all sides and not returning it if you didn't get the contract. The French were to get the 155mm howitzer contract, and were popping the champagne, when the Ministry of Defense was ordered to buy Bofors. The French leaked documents, and Bofors, all by itself, ushered in a new era.

From then on, the loser in every deal started screaming "corruption". The press, bless its heart, had become freer as India opened up to the world in the 1980s, and by the 1990s had joined the hunt for ministers and military officers  and bureaucrats who might have been bribed.

Well, the bribes for the military officers and the bureaucrats had been pathetically small: party favors, really, because the politicians had the power - the military in India has always been under tight political control. The officers and bureaucrats decided the loss of their reputations wasn't worth the loose change they were getting. So they stopped clearing purchases, in effect telling the minister: "You give me a written order saying the award has to go to X, Y or Z, and I'll execute the order."

Ministers don't like to leave paper trails, and the entire defense purchase system ground almost to a halt.

The result is most dramatic in the Indian Air Force. Its fighter strength has declined by 25% under authorized, and frankly, a lot of what it has flying needs to be junked, starting with the MiG-21s and -27s. India's economy is booming, it is flush with money and foreign exchange reserves are so high that old timers like your editor have trouble comprehending the sums involved.

When you add the normally inefficiency of India's government industrial enterprises - and in all fairness, the complexity of modern arms production - you get a deadly situation. The IAF is limping along with a few upgraded MiG-21s and Su-30s entering service each year. The absolutely vital requirement for a light fighter has not been contracted. The indigenous Light Combat Aircraft is years behind schedule. There is something absurd about a major air force upgrading MiG-21s - it is like upgrading F-104s. A new solution is to buy more Jaguars. It is ridiculous India is having to resort to these stop-gaps.

Meantime, across the Himalayas, you have China, a country so corrupt that the armed forces are run like a business for private profit, but one that is modernizing its fighter force at warp speed compared to India. It is in the process of building up to 400 Su-27 family fighters and is deploying its 4th generation fighter, the F-10. The scary thing is that China actually accords a low priority for modernization of its armed forces. One hates to speculate on what could happen if China decides defense modernization is urgently needed.

The issue is not "is India going to fight China?". The issue is that military power is critical to the international standing of a country. The reason the USSR was a superpower was not its economy, but its military. Conversely, Japan is an economic superpower but a military midget. China aims to be a military and economic superpower. If India doesn't get its defense procurement sorted out, we're headed for more trouble than we are in already.

March 1, 2006

The Most Dangerous Man In Iraq

Ravi Rikhye

Perhaps surprisingly, he is not the terrorist Zarqawi. This gentleman's day is done. He overreached in Anbar Province when he began killing anti-government people who happened to resent his attempt to impose his version of Islam on them. He is a hunted, wanted man in Anbar: unless he has left, it is just a matter of time before he meets his end.

The most dangerous man in Iraq is an Iraqi born and bred. He is the terrorist Moqtada Sadr. If he is not taken down, he will take Iraq down.

Consistently, from the day Baghdad fell, everyone - the Iraqis, the Americans, and yes, even the Iranians who thought they owned him - has underestimated him. That's easy to do, because he is given to much raving and ranting of a grandiose nature.

He had begun his political life as the son of his murdered Shia cleric father, but there is no doubt that even under Saddam he built a following among the poor and the dispossessed who had been conveniently shoved across the river, out of sight of Saddam's Baghdad.

When Baghdad fell, and chaos erupted, Sadr was one of the few non-Baathists that had an organization ready to take advantage of Saddam's fall. Sadr  quickly armed his followers and established control of what is now called Sadr City. Nimble on his feet, he not only proclaimed he was going to get rid of the crusaders - the Americans - he told the hoary gray beards of Najaf that he would protect them from the Americans and the Sunnis.

Its not clear they needed protected: the clerics had the Badr Militia to do the job. But his anti-Americans played well; with large amounts of Iranian money and weapons he began extending his reach to the cities south of Baghdad, all the way to Basra. His populism and his youth have been his main assets in increasing his importance - aside from the Iranians.

The story of how he ran afoul of the Americans, stood up to them, was thoroughly beaten by them and driven into hiding is well known. Also, the Shia clerics were getting a bit tired of him. So he lay quiet, and then emerged as a reasonable politicians, ready to take part peacefully in the new Iraq.

That was a facade: his aim remained to seize power by force. His militiamen continued to kill Sunnis and he continued to maneuver to position himself as the most important man in Iraq. Yet because he wasn't shooting his mouth off as before, people continued not to take him seriously. That, in effect, was his protection.

And even then he could resist grandstanding: before the Samarra bombing, he had started to travel abroad, meeting foreign officials to tell them of his importance, acting as if he were head of Iraq, not President Jaffari.

But the moment the Samarra Mosque outrage occurred, Sadr's men began killing Sunnis - thus increasing his prestige with his followers. The Iraqi security forces were too busy trying to cope with the explosion of violence, in which Sadr was playing his part. Besides which, he has infiltrated his men unto the security forces. Before the Iraqi government could get itself together to go after Sadr, he very quickly shifted tack: he told the Sunnis he was the only person who could protect them, and began issuing statements saying Sunnis and Shias would together fight the foreigner who had brought Samarra Mosque to a ruin. In effect he has been saying: there is no solution to anything unless I, Moqtada Sadr, am involved.

The horror of the situation is he continues to kill Sunnis even as he claims to protect them. He is a major reason, if not the major reason, Baghdad is still racked by violence.

For the better part of the last two years, the Badr Militia has been wanting to get Sadr. The Badarites resent the manner in which Sadr has injected himself onto their turf in Najaf and Karbala. But the senior clerics have been holding the Militia back, fearing a civil war between Shias.

If Iraq is to have a chance for peace, Sadr has to be eliminated. Ideally, the Iraqi government should do the deed. The government is, however, nowhere near politically strong enough to put him down. Militarily such an undertaking would be complex, costly in casualties, and time consuming. All the while an anti-Sadr campaign was being waged, the fault-lines between Shia factions would keep widening.

The Americans are not going to take Sadr out. For one thing, after Mogidishu, they lack the political will. For another, the Americans are totally into the Benign Great Western Father bit. The Americans say - We don't like Sadr, but as long as he is not a threat to our soldiers, we must let the Iraqis decide.

The senile clerics in Najaf and Karbala have already shown they will temporize to any extent rather than solve the Sadr problem.

The Iranians are far from the point where Sadr becomes a problem for them: they are not fools, but right now Sadr is worth more to them alive then dead.

So while everyone waffles, Sadr's ability to grow stronger by using violence increases.

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