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Costa
Rica p. 3
In the
early days of its existence, as intended, the CIVIL GUARD had only
very limited military potential. Over the years it has however
developed in both size and capabilities. Since the mid 1970s there
has been an increasing reversion towards a conventional military
role. Although it still lacks any substantial armored element or any
artillery whatsoever, it must be reckoned, within its largely
self-imposed limitations, as one of the most effective military
forces in the region.
Chain of Command
The
command structure of the security forces is diffuse and designed to
frustrate any attempts to use them for political purposes. Although
the President is Commander-in-Chief of all public security forces,
the Civil Guard comes under the administrative jurisdiction of the
Minister of Public Security but receives its budgetary allocation of
funds from the Minister of Finance, via estimates prepared by the
Minister of the Interior, whilst its training establishments come
under the jurisdiction of the Minister of the Presidency. There is a
civilian Director General of Public Forces, who controls operations
on a day-to-day basis whilst the senior officer of the Civil Guard
holds the Title of Director, with the rank of colonel. The Director
of the Civil Guard is the operational commander of all its units
other than the Presidential Guard and reports to the Minister of
Security. The Presidential Guard reports directly to the Minister of
Security.
Organization
Although still ostensibly a national police force, the GUARDIA CIVIL is increasingly taking on the characteristics of a conventional Army. It is organized on military lines and basically deploys a Company in each of the seven provinces of the Republic, plus a number of special units. About 40% of its total effectives are located at San José, the capital. These include the PRESIDENTIAL GUARD, which is an elite unit of approximately battalion strength, and another battalion strength unit, which combines the 1st and 2nd Companies. The so-called “3rd Company”, which functions both as a strategic reserve, a depot and a training unit, also approaches battalion strength. Problems on the frontier with Nicaragua during the Marxist Sandinista regime in that country led to the formation of three counter-insurgency battalions, trained by U.S. Special Forces.
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