Operation Attleboro, Vietnam 1966

v.1.0 February 24, 2002

Sources:

·        http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/BOOKS/Vietnam/90-23/90-23ae.htm On Mike Force

·        http://www.multied.com/Vietnam/attleboro.html

·        www.frankandtepo.com/attleboro/

This is only a preliminary and sketchy account of Operation Attleboro, which was at that time the largest US operation in Vietnam.  Starting off as a brigade operation it became a division operation, and by its close, was commanded by IInd  Field Force, one of the two corps HQs in Vietnam. Readers are requested to keep in mind accounts differ in detail. because of the World Wide Web, for the first time in history any participant in a battle can put, before the public, her or his account of events. Discrepancies are bound to occur.  We will note them, but are not in a position to pass judgment on them.

We invite readers to contribute to this page. 

Background  I  [Gordon A. MacKinlay] 

Attleboro began when units of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade ran into a

major enemy force south of the Sui Da Special Forces camp on 19 Oct 1966.  4

SFs Mobile Strike Force companies were inserted into landing zones north and

east of the camp, but they became heavily engaged and were eventually

overrun.  General Westmorland responded by committing the 1st Infantry

Division, a brigade each from the 4th and 25th Infantry Divisions and the

173rd Airborne Brigade (21 infantry battalions plus numerous other units) in all 22,000

men committed on the ground to the battle, this then being the war's

largest.  When it ended on 24 Nov some 1,100 bodies had been recovered and

huge quantities of munitions and food captured (there were 470 Chinook lifts

of rice alone).  The VC 9th Div was not seen until late the next year after

rehabilitation in Cambodia.

Background II  [Published sources]

The operation was fought in two phases.  Phase I started on September 2, 1966, and Phase II started about November 6, lasting to November 24. The purpose of the operation was to deny the Viet Cong strategic positions 80 km north of Saigon. The area was in War Zone C, also known as the ARVN III Corps area, adjacent to the Cambodian border, near Tay Ninh, and called Dau Tieng. Some of the operation took place inside the infamous Iron Triangle, a communist sanctuary in Vietnam. US fighter aircraft flew 1571 sorties, while B-52 Arc Light sorties numbered 26. US casualties were 155 KIA and 494 wounded.

While the 9th VC Division was knocked out for several months, the ultimate futility of the war becomes apparent when we consider that the division merely retreated to Cambodia and was reconsitututed. Vietnam for the Americans was like bailing a leaky boat, with the leak never fixed.

A Note on Helicopter Operations [Gordon A. MacKinlay]

An Aviation Battalion (Helicopter Assault) of which eight were involved in

the battle, plus many other aviation unit, had four helicopter assault

companies the norm being 8 UH-1B/Cs and 23 UH-1Ds.  The average number of

Army aviation missions per day was 3,800, peaking at 4,500, and the least

being 2,000.  The average duration of a air assault lift was FIVE minutes.

Huey's in SVN were used like trucks in the WWII.  Ac would come in, pick a

coy and move them 1500 meters or so, these were the normal missions, with

rifle companies doing between 3 and 8 such lifts per day.  To which must be

added medevac, C&C, logistic, air cav recce, aerial artillery and air

cavalry missions.

Mr. MacKinlay, an Australian,  adds: when flying as an attached medic with the US Army from Long Binh in 1971 in a 16-day period the crew I was attached to flew 115 medevac missions, and 42 general support missions. If I was allowed to accept them I

would have been entitled to 15 Air Medals.

Order of Battle

US Army

Units 

Comments

HQ IInd Field Force

1st Infantry Division

8 battalions engaged

1/5th Infantry

2/18th Infantry

2/22nd Infantry (Mechanized)

1/4th Armored Cavalry

Divisional reconnaissance battalion

25th Infantry Division

3 battalions engaged

2/14th Infantry

1/27th Infantry

2/27th Infantry

4th Infantry Division

3rd Brigade

2/12th Infantry

173rd Airborne Brigade

2 battalions engaged

196th Light Infantry Brigade

1? to 4? battalions engaged

G/75th Infantry

Long range patrol company

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

Independent

Artillery

2/32nd Artillery

175mm/8”, part of 23rd Artillery Group

ARVN

III Corps Mike Force

530 Nung mercenaries, 8 US SF

1st Company

2nd Company

3rd Company

Two Ranger Battalions

35th ARVN Battalion

Aviation

8 Aviation Companies Identified

145th Combat Aviation Battalion

118th Assault Helicopter Company

68th Assault Helicopter Company

71st Assault Helicopter Company

25th Aviation Battalion

25th Infantry Division?

Company A

Company B

11th Combat Aviation Battalion

116th Assault Helicopter Company

13th Combat Aviation Battalion

175th Assault Helicopter Company

US Air Force

4133th Bomb Wing (Provisional)

Aircraft from 91, 306 BW and 919 ARS

Viet Cong/PAVN Units

9th VC Division

271st VC Regiment

272nd VC Regiment

273rd VC Regiment

320th  Regiment

PAVN?

70th Regiment

PAVN?

101st PAVN Regiment

Comment on Attleboro, by Col. Charles K. Nulsen (Retired)

Source: http://www.gorilla.net/~118ahc/Attleboro.htm

COL. Charles K. Nulsen in his referenced article concluded:

"Operation Attleboro exposed the lack of clear understanding by some senior commanders of how to best use American troops to fight an elusive and determined guerrilla force in the jungle. Complicated maneuvers by company-size units in the heavy underbrush of the jungle were not successful. Radio and ground communications between commanders were neither well planned nor properly tested. Piecemeal commitments of forces were made seemingly without rhyme or reason. The principle of span of control was violated by giving one battalion commander command over a brigade-size force of 11 rifle companies on an ad hoc basis. And finally, the American units lacked adequate, timely intelligence on the VC and NVA units in the area of operation".

http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/BOOKS/Vietnam/90-23/90-23ae.htm On Mike Force

http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/reference/vncmp.htm named campaigns

Source: http://www.gorilla.net/~118ahc/Attleboro.htm

21 November 1966

 Extraction

 Extraction

Attleboro saw few helicopter casualties because the communists were trying to avoid detection for most of the campaign and refrained from giving away their positions by firing on helicopters.