6th Kumaon at the Battle for Walong, 1962

v.1.1 February 26, 2007

On the left is the regimental cap badge. On the left is a stamp honoring 4th Kumaon on its 150th anniversary in 1988.

We have made no progress with this narrative since it was originally published two years ago as no one, official or otherwise, has responded to our request for additional details/materials.

For some more details about the regiment, visit

 http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/Regiments/Kumaon.html

Ravi Rikhye

[Work in Progress]

In March 1962, 6^th Kumaon moved into the Lohit Frontier Division of the North East Frontier Agency, on routine deployment to replace 2^nd Rajput. This was the battalion’s second tour in the sector, and by April 21^st it was fully deployed.

Lohit FD, was divided by the military into three subsectors:

Prior to Operation Onkar in 1959, Lohit FD was the responsibility of  2^nd Assam Rifles with its three wings, each of 6 platoons. In line with routine practice, Army battalions took command of the Assam Rifles units lying within their Area of Responsbility.[1]

Responding to the PLA buildup across the McMahon Line, by end-September the Tactical HQ and two companies of 6^th Kumaon moved to Kibithoo from Walong. By October 8, 1962, 4^th Sikh was inducted into Walong, freeing all of 6^th Kumaon to concentrate at Kibithoo.

Topography

To our great regret, our copy of the official unpublished history of the 1962 conflict does not contain the maps that were drawn for inclusion. We have to rely on a “mind’s eye” view gained from the verbal description, and on a sketch map in Lt. Colonel Gurdip Singh Kler’s book. We do not know if the map is a copy of the official history’s map; we do know the author has quoted extensively, often verbatim, from the official history. He must have obtained a copy soon after the writing in 1993, as his book is copyrighted in 1995. The history itself became available around 2000 thanks to the Times of India. With the lapse of 40 years, we suppose even the most paranoid at Army HQ could not be bothered with suppressing what was, after, the very official and very sanitized history intended for release to the public some day.

Lohit FD lay to the extreme Northeast of NEFA, bordering Tibet and Burma. Later, along with other Frontier Divisions, Lohit was divided into two districts, Lohit (east) and Dibang (west). All action in the FD took place in today’s Lohit District.

From LTC Gurdip Singh Kler Unsung Battles of 1962 LANCER BOOKS, NEW DELHI 1995. ISBN 1897829094. We estimate that from Walong to the north edge of the map is about 10-12 km.

Communications

The Line of Communications was tenuous in the extreme. Tezu in the Bhramaputra Valley was 70-km from the railhead in Assam, and featured an airfield of sorts.  The road from the railhead to Tezu was unable to take any significant traffic, so Tezu was maintained by air.

From Tezu to Walong was a 160-km, 14-day foot-track journey. Though Walong had an airstrip, operations could take place only between daybreak and 1000, after which high winds made the airstrip unusable; worse, only the Canadian De Havilland Otter STOL, with a payload of 6 men or about half-ton cargo, could use the airstrip.

Two tracks, one on each side of the Lohit, ran from Walong to Kibithoo. The western track was accessible with difficulty to porters carrying heavy back-pack loads, but was inaccessible to pack animals. As an approximation, one mule can carry as much as 5 porters. This track passed over a series of steep climbs, which formed the “Ladders”.

The eastern track, was not even portable, and was used by locals to travel between 4 hamlets on the east bank of the river. This explains why no troops were located to the east of the Lohit, and why all action took place to the west of the River.

As nearly as we can tell, based on figures from today's tourist industry operators, the track between Walong and Kibithoo ran about 18-20 km, possibly less; the road now available runs 25 km. From Kibithoo to Dichang today is 5 km by road, and was perhaps 3 km along the 1962 track.

Ironically, the west bank track seems to have been constructed on the initiative of a Chinese general. Around the turn of the century he used local forced labor to make the “road” between Rima, the Tibetan village across the McMahon Line, which represented the terminus of the Chinese roadhead. After reaching Walong he was forced to turn back, abandoning the project. The unofficial 1962 War history does not explain what stopped the general. We may guess, however, that the completely desolate, heavily forested terrain was the cause. At that time there could hardly have been more than 1000 inhabitants of the entire region between Rima and Walong – if that; and after Walong was more desolation. For China there would have existed no economic, administrative, or military reason to cross the McMahon Line. Some trade undoubtedly took place between Rima and Tezu: the traders of yore were extraordinarily hardy souls, but it could not have been of any significance.

Within the Brigade AOR, divided by the Lohit, between Walong and Kibithoo a single steel ropeway bridge spanned the river, which ran 150-meters wide.

A Brief Note on Higher HQs

Operation Onkar in 1959 handed control of the India-Tibet border to the Army, consequent on which 4^th Infantry Division (ex-Ambala) was assigned to NEFA. The division’s 5^th Brigade took control of Lohit Frontier Division with its HQ at Tezu, and a battalion (2^nd Rajputs) at Walong.

6^th Kumaon replaced the Rajputs on normal rotation, and as the showdown became imminent, 4^th Sikhs from another brigade was sent to Walong. Yet, not until the first round of fighting was over, was a brigade HQ established at Walong. That too, first one brigade was assigned Walong, and theen, seemingly within hours or a couple of days, HQ 11^th Infantry Brigade ex Nagaland, with Brigadier N.C. Rawlley in command , was made responsible. Brigadier Rawlley arrived with his Rover Group (equivalent to mobile tactical HQ) at 1030 on October 31.

If this was not sufficiently ad hoc to please an army that has relied on ad hocism – in true old British style – to see it through, in November the three eastern frontier divisions of NEFA were split off from 4^th Division and put under a new HQ 2^nd Division at Tezu, raised on the fly.

Three points for the student

We give this lengthy background for the benefit of the student examining 6^th Kumaon’s actions, or indeed any aspect of the battle for Walong. S/he should keep three critical points in mind:

1. The logistics for an Indian infantry brigade faced with approximately five times its battalion strength depended on a ½ ton airstrip available for less than 3 hours a day. Correspondingly, the supply for  6^th Kumaon depended on man-pack via a difficult amd lengthy track. (We have not been able to determine the distance, but Kibithoo was at least 2-3 days march from Walong.) There were scarcely any porters to begin with, so the soldiers – as if they didn’t have enough problems already – had to serve as porters.

Please note that a single infantry battalion needs 10-tons a day without POL. To sustain this flow would have meant 20 Otter flights a day into Walong for 6^th Kumaon alone – a huge impossibility. From the airhead, 3000 porters would have been required for a 3-day round trip routine, with each porter going upstream carrying an effective net 20 kg.

Thus, the battalion had to rely almost entirely on pre-positioned stocks, which were exceedingly sparse to begin with.

2. The Command & Control arrangements for Walong were mind-bogglingly inadequate. And in any case in those days the Indian Army’s signals/wire nets would have been more suitable for battle circa 1930s. Communications were always breaking down, and inevitably, when needed the most, were not available at all. Add to this the almost total lack of reconnaissance capability with the exception of a few fighting patrols and the occasional air sortie, and the student will see 6^th Kumaon was fighting blind. Alas, its dreadful situation was the norm for those days, not an aberration: other battalions at the front had it as bad, if not worse.

3. Combat engineers, for practical purpose, were unavailable. So aside from whatever fortifications Indian troops could put up by themselves, 6^th Kumaon – like all other forward battalions – was fighting without entrenchment. Accounts of 7^th Brigade at the Namkachu tell how troops had to use their entrenching spades to try and cut trees for firewood and fortification – much to the tauntingly high amusement of the PLA troops, who were, of course, simply but adequately equipped with the needed tools.

We are not even going to take up the lack of fire-support and the Indian Army’s tactical training to fight static battles. Repeatedly, analysts have blamed – correctly – the political requirement to hold ground, precluding a mobile defense. In truth, however, tactical doctrine was woefully inadequate. For example, even if it had been free to fight a mobile defense, the Indian Army’s habit of piecemeal reinforcement – usually after the situation was lost – precluded the maintenance of sufficient reserves for the counterstroke that is the whole point of the mobile defense.

Deployments at the start of operations

So many gaps exist in the narrative as to make it near useless. The following is the best we can manage in the absence of the battalion War Diary and interviews.

A Wing, 2^nd Assam Rifles also deployed at Kibithoo subsector

The Assam Rifles platoons were deployed as observation posts on the north side of the ridge separating Kibithoo from the watershed and the McMahon Line. The deployment was political, as India, not wishing to aggravate the Chinese, kept its army regulars back of the McMahon Line. Four decades later, we are left to wonder what exactly was the point New Delhi was trying to make, considering a PLA regiment was openly preparing and offensive, for some weeks.

Preliminary Moves

October 18      Recon patrol to Hundred Hill sees movement on Tibet side

October 19      Returns to report; platoon 2^nd AR sent to occupy position

October 19      One platoon A Company sent to McMahon Ridge

October 21      Rest of A Company follows

October 21      One platoon sent up Diphu Chu Nallah to prevent PLA movement

                     down From Diphu La.

Battle

October 21/22

2345 PLA attack commences with MMG and artillery fire against McMahon Ridge; hits 2^nd Platoon. A Company with approximately 300 men; attacks second platoon on Madiha Top [NH 5302] with another 100 men; 1 battalion involved. 3” mortar detachment beats back attack. PLA regroups and attacks again, this time also against Lohit II [NH 5303] aand Laila [NH 5101] posts.

October 22

0400 By approximately PLA gets through Indian defenses.

0700 Battalion ordered back to Kibithoo. D Company [Lt. Bikram Singh] ordered to establish screen on Ashi Hill [NN 5484], reinforced with an MMG section, 3” and 107mm mortars.

1600 Battalion is ordered to withdraw to north of Walong, to establish a more compact defensive position, along with 4 Sikhs. Objective is to prevent enemy from establishing line-of-sight to Walong airfield. C Company is told to destroy stores and ammunition and cover battalion withdrawal.

2100 Kibithoo abandoned.

October 23

0300 PLA contacts D Company screen. Lt. Bikram Singh has weakened the plank bridge across Namti Nullah. The bridge breaks as PLA troops cross, trapping them  along a narrow, confined path. 200 PLA troops killed and wounded for loss of 3 Indian killed and 6 wounded.

0400 Screen ordered withdrawn.

1700 Battalion concentrated in Walong area.

October 25

1000  With battalion withdrawn, D Company departs Ashi Hill and by this time has taken up positions north of Walong.

November 6

PLA has by now advanced and taken Green Pimple Spur [NH 4983] overlooking brigade defenses at Walong.

0850  A Company [Captain Mathur] counterattacks. After hand-to-hand fighting he decides to pull back to defensive positions on a nearby height of about 11,000 feet: he is running out of ammunition, and appreciates even if he captures Green Pimple, he cannot hold it against PLA counterattack.

He is holding to prevent PLA advance along West Ridge. After 5 attacks, he is relieved by D Company [Lt. Bikram Singh]

November 12

It is now clear that PLA intends to attack Walong by rolling up western flank of the defenses. To foil this, an ad hoc company against Captain BN Singh secures Tri Junction clearing the way for the battalion to move there.

At some point this day, PLA also takes Yellow Pimple unopposed. Brigadier D.K. Palit, then Director Military Operations, implies in his notes from the time that 11^th Brigade had not ordered Yellow Pimple occupied, though given its dominating position, the need to do so was obvious.

November 13

Battalion minus 4 platoons concentrates at Trijunction after hard march. Lt. Bikram Singh’s 4 platoons are still holding West Ridge.

November 14

0800 Battalion commander orders attack against Yellow Pimple.

0930 the FUP is marked and secured., and two companies attack [Adhoc Company under Captain BN Singh and B under Major Sharma] up mountain. Fire support is ineffective; troops have only their 3” mortars. PLA brings down fire on the attackers, who nonetheless press on. Adhoc Company, on left, gets within 20 meters of the top.

Platoon leader Subedar Govind Singh single-handedly charges a bunker holding up the advance, is wounded by fire from a second bunker. He then charges this bunker, silencing it, and before dying silences the first bunker too.

Platoon leader Jamadar Trilok Singh also charges enemy ranks and falls to LMG fire a few feet from top.

Inspired by Ad Hoc Company, B Company advances to within 50 meters of top on right.

1530 Indian advance is halted approximately after 6 hours of fighting. Ad Hoc Company commander Captain BN Singh is wounded; 2/Lt Khatri takes over.

With darkness fallen, CO 6th Kumaon commits his last two platoons to reinforce Adhoc Company. Simultaneously, Brig. Rawlley orders the ground to be held, and for troops to infiltrate forward. Company of 4^th Dogras, which has just arrived at Walong, is ordered to reinforce.

2030 Unfortunately, PLA is still operating within Indian army’s decision cycle. It launches battalion-sized  counter-attack, surrounds the 2 Indian companies, forcing them  back. They are left  to inch their way to Tri Junction under fire. 2^nd Lt Khatri and 2/LT Jindal hande their companies in this withdrawal.

November 15

Only 90 men of 200 reach Trijunction where Bn HQ is located. One company, HHC, and medical platoon are all there is left.

0430 PLA attacks Trijunction.

 0630  PLA attack is stopped at little cost: 2 OR killed, but Captain Bhatia and Lt. Khatri are wounded.

PLA establishes an OP on a hide about 200 meters from Trijunction.

1800 PLA launches first of 4 attacks, all of which are held. 6^th Kumaon is waiting for Dogra reinforcements, but PLA has cut the route between Mortar Mound and Trijunction: only thirty-three Dogras (a platoon) get through, but they bring extra ammunition with them. Trijunction is at 13700 feet and bitterly cold, casualties keep building up through the night and ammunition again runs low.

November 16

0730 Yet another PLA attack commences, under cover of 120mm mortars. Communications with brigade HQ are cut off due to lost lines and damaged wireless sets, but this matters little as PLA brings up two more regiments who pour through Indian gaps. They cut road between Trijunction and Walong, and also outflank to reach outskirts of Walong.

0830, PLA attacks West Ridge, where Lt. Bikram Singh is still holding out with his 4 platoons.

1100 Lt. Bikram Singh has been surrounded on all sides: he orders retreat, but is killed during the breakout.

1100 PLA has broken through all Indian defenses, and is putting down mortar fire on the Walong airstrip.

1330 All communication between division – and therefore Corps, Command and Army HQ – and 11^th Brigade is lost.

November 17

1201 (approximately) Just after midnight 11^th Brigade is ordered to abandon Walong. 6^th Kumaon troops at Trijunction and Mortar Mound have a tough time pulling out due to enemy pressure.

Aftermath

Captain BK Mathur is the only officer left with the battalion and the responsibility of getting the remnants back to Tezu, 160 km by foot. Stragglers continue to arrive till December 4. Meanwhile, some outposts do not get withdrawal orders and are wiped out to the last man.

Gallantry Awards: Vir Chakra

Major Prem Nath  Bhatia                     IC-7077

Captain Ravi Kumar Mathur                 IC-10156

Captain Balbir Chand Chopra               MS-6455 (AMC)

2/Lt Amar Singh  Khatri                      IC-12970

Naik Bhadur Singh (P)                        4936362 KIA October 22: after his LMG

                                                    crew was killed he took over the gun

                                                    himself till he was killed.

Jamadar Man Singh                           (Mention in Dispatches)

Subedar J.D. Limbu and Rifleman P.B. Tamang of 2^nd Assam Rifles are also awarded Vir Chakras; their platoon affiliation is not identified, but they likely belong to A Wing.

L/Naik H.B. Gurnung and Sepoy Bajrang Thapa of 11th Assam Rifles also win Vir Chakras for Walong; we are unable to tell when this battalion entered the area and where it fought.

Casualties

6^th Kumaon suffers over 65% casualties among its fighting elements.