Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka
v.1.1 September 8, 2002

Dave Sandhu

HQ Southern Command, Pune,  Lt. Gen. Depinder Singh

HQ IPKF, Madras,  Lt. Gen. A.S. Kalkat

Regiments/battalions that were a part of IPKF in Sri Lanka

Infantry

Assam                              4,5,7

Bihar                                4,7,9,15

Dogra                               9,10,13,15

Garhwal Rifles                 4,5,11,12,13,16,18

1 Gorkha Rifles                1,4,5

5 Gorkha Rifles                1,3,4

8 Gorkha Rifles                6,7

11 Gorkha Rifles              1,3

Grenadiers                        12,18,19

Guards                              13,16

Jammu & Kashmir LI      1,11

Jammu & Kashmir Rifles 2

Jat                                     4,12,14,15

Kumaon                           7,9,11,16,18

Madras                             2,5,7,11,12,19,25

Mahar                              4,8,19

Maratha LI                      1,5,8,17

Mechanised Infantry       3,6,13,15,16,19

Parachute                        3,4,5,7

Para- Special Forces       1,9,10

Punjab                             3,19,21,26

Rajputana Rifles              5,7,11,16,19

Rajput                              4,5,6,17,25

Sikh                                 7,16,17,22

Sikh LI                            1,4,7,13,14

Engineer Regiments

3,4,8,16,51,53,110,115,270

Armored Corps

65^th Armored Regiment

Mechanized infantry were usually used in dismounted role.

IPKF HQ dealt with Army HQ directly regarding operational matters.

Southern Command was responsible for logistic support, discipline and welfare

A Note on Indian Army Operations in Sri Lanka

54th Infantry Division was the first division sent in followed by the 36th Infantry Divisions. Neither was trained for jungle warfare. Later 57th Mountain Div and 4th Infantry Division were also inducted. The 57th had jungle and CI training, the 4th, like the first two divisions, was oriented for conventional large-scale operations on the Western front.

The IPKF generally was treated as a peacetime posting by army HQ. In approximately two and half years the divisions went through ten commanding officers. More than 40 Brigadiers also served, as brigade commanders of deputy divisional commanders. Some of them stayed for as little as 3 or 4 months and the left to attend long courses (a typical peace time posting and handling).

Some of the causes for the Indian failure can be attributed to:

• The political aim was uncertain and wavering
• Troops were inducted into Sri Lanka piece-meal, untrained, improperly equipped and without proper logistics. (This is more true for 54 and 36 Divisions)
• There were too many masters giving orders to IPKF HQ. Was the Prime Minister issuing directions, was the Army Chief issusing orders or was the Director Military Operations issuing orders? Also the PM's office, Defence Ministry and Army HQ did not know if to accept the GOC Southern Commands assessments or listen to the Indian High Commissioner in Colombo regarding IPKF operations.
• The IPKF soldiers knew they were fighting Tamil insurgents, the same insurgents who were getting trained and supplied with large quantities of arms and equipment from Tamil Nadu. This had a deleterious effect on the troop morale.
• The intellegence agency RAW was more keen on helping the insurgents than supplying any decent intelligence to the IPKF formations.