|
Indian 10th Division
in the Battle for Chaamb, 1971 Ravi Rikhye
51st and 58th Battalions BSF were in the 10th Division
sector. While we do not know the latter's position, 51st BSF was
in the Chaamb sector and pulled back to defend the Division administrative
area. Withdrawal of BSF units on opening of hostilities was standard
operating procedure. It was thought that these paramilitary battalions could
not serve in combat. It is a pity no thought was given to employing them to
better effect and the neccessary training imparted. 191st Brigade
could have used every additional help. We assume 58th BSF
Battalion was covering the Hill sector northwest of Chaamb-Jaurian, in the 28th
Brigade area. Concerning the artillery, 39th
and 216th Medium regiments were located well forward of Akhnur,
behind 191st Brigade, because the division was supposed to begin
an offensive on the night of 3/4th December. The cancellation of
the offensive created a big problem because the guns were so far forward they
were overrun by Pakistan, and the 191st Brigade sector was not
mined – the brigade was to lead the division offensive. This allowed Pakistan
to overrun the brigade, particularly because it defensive sector was open on
three sides and of excessive length for 4 battalions. We have no information, however,
where 10th Artillery Brigade’s other regiments were positioned. Battalions highlighted in yellow
are given in Gill’s history but not in the official history. The former at
many points is more detailed than the latter. Gill makes no mention of the
artillery. We need to be clear that Chaamb
was impossible to hold defensively. The 1965 plan for a fighting withdrawal
across the Tawi was sound procedure. Similarly, the planned 1971 offensive
using Chaamb was also sound procedure. But holding terrain open from three
sides with widely dispersed battalions and no local reserves was a bad idea –
68th Brigade was further back, and in any case, waiting till the enemy
has the initiative and then rushing to plug threatened spots devours reserves
in terribly inefficient fashion. Which is what eventually happened, with two
brigades scattered over the battlefield. General K.P. Candeth’s Plan The key to what happened at Chaamb
is Western Army Commander General K.P. Candeth’s plan. We will have to ignore
the inherent unworkability of one commander controlling an Area of
Responsbility stretching from Demchok in southeast Askai Chin through the
Karakoram Pass, Kargil, Northern Gullies, Tithwal, Uri, Poonch, Rajouri,
Hill, Chaamb, Chicken Neck, Jammu, Samba, Pathankot, Gurdaspur, Amritser,
Ferozepore, Fazilka and Sri Ganganager sectors – to say nothing of the armor
strike reserve to be used for the decisive battle. The Jammu and Kashmir
sectors alone ran to about 750-km, the length of the entire Inner German
Border! Today three separate armies cover the same AOR. Few people realize to this day that
the 1971 Indian War plan had 3 objectives. Liberation of Bangladesh was one. Attacking,
engaging, and destroying the Pakistan Army in the west was a second. And
disarming Pakistan so that it would not arise as a threat for 50 years was a
third. In accordance with this, as far as
Chaamb was concerned, General Candeth planned to launch 10th
Division at the major Pakistan base of Gujrat, from where it could have
turned north, unpinning the Pakistani defense of West Kashmir in conjunction
with frontal attacks by 19th and 25th Divisions, or
turned south, to assist 26th Division’s offensive from Jammu to
Sialkot, but outflanking the Sialkot defenses. The plan bold as it already was,
had an even bolder component: 3rd Independent Armored Brigade was
to be rafted across the Tawi after 191st Brigade – already west of
the Tawi made the initial penetration into Pakistani defenses. We don’t know
if 68th Brigade would have passed through 191st before
the armor or after, but essentially India would have had one armored and two
infantry brigades sitting inside Pakistan’s first line of defenses. The appearance of these forces, in
essence behind Pakistani lines, would have had the potential of unlocking the
front, which had remained immovable since 1948. A.H. Amin, the Pakistani military
historian, derides the Candeth plan as a fantasy. As the general made no
mention of it in his memoir written after the war, we have no defense of the
plan from his side. We don’t know, for example, if it was seriously
rehearsed. What we do know is at the last
minute, on December 1, 1971, attacks by both 10th and 26th
Division’s were called off, sending the latter’s GOC, at least, into a fury
of angry remonstrance. The circumstances of cancellation
are not known. In likelihood, two factors were paramount: §
Mrs. Indira
Gandhi was increasingly worried India was going to be branded the aggressor
for its Eastern Theatre offensive, begun on November 21/22nd – and
indeed, that did happen at the UN. Perhaps she didn’t want to appear the
aggressor even more by initiating hostilities in the west. §
India learned
Pakistan was preparing an offensive in the west. Its purposes were very badly
thought out. They included relieving pressure on the East, which was all but
lost anyway because of India’s air and sea blockade, and a bull-headed
belief, in the worst tradition of unthinking generals, that Pakistan must do
something, anything. At this point India committed a
major mistake, which has not, to be best of our knowledge, ever been
discussed or explained. 10th Division
remained in an offensive posture though its mission had changed to defense. When the protection of a
thinly-manned front is required and no good obstacles exist, obstacles have
to be created. Mine belts are a standard obstacle. 191st Brigade’s
area had been cleared of mines because of the attack plan – obviously you don’t
want your own troops running into your own minefield. Pakistan did not know
this, and all its attacks were slowed by the fear that approaches to the Tawi
and behind remained mined. They were particularly worried about a minefield
in the 5 Assam area which, when they learned was only a dummy, led them to
press through and overrun the defenders, breaching the defense. Which in any
case was never designed to hold for the 72 hours it did, thanks in the main
to the staunch defense put up by 5 Sikhs. From our researches, we have
concluded that the Indian mistake was not failure to relay the minefield. Engineer
troops have always been at a premium in the Indian and Pakistan armies, and
the process of bringing mines from stores to the front and planting them is,
with the technology of the day, which is largely still so today, a tedious
and very dangerous business. Modern day means available to advanced countries
such as mechanized mine-layers, and air-, artillery- and helicopter-laid
fields where hundreds and thousands of mines can be laid within hours were
not available to India in 1971. It is likely relaying the minefield in
48-hours was out of the question. What was not out of the question
was reverting to the 1965 plan: telling 191st Brigade to delay a
Pakistani offensive for 24-48 hours and then fall back intact. The object
being to buy time for an counterattack by 68th Brigade at a point
Pakistani spearheads would not have had the opportunity to consolidate their
hold on the battlefield and would have been most vulnerable. Instead 10th
Division issued the standard “last man, last round” order and 191st
Brigade was annihilated following it. India lost more men at Chaamb than
anywhere else in the war. And to what point? No effective counterattack was
mounted before the war ended.
10th Infantry Division [Maj. Gen. Jaswant Singh] -
9th
Horse [divisional T-54 regiment][Lt. Col. H.N. Hoon, later Lt.-Gen.] -
39th
Medium Regiment [Lt. Col.
Gowri Shanker, later Lt.-Gen.] -
216th
Medium Regiment -
Company, 9th
Parachute Commando -
51st
BSF Battalion [Col.
Harwant Singh, MC] withdrawn from 191st Bde AOR to
Akhnur, to defend Division Maintenance Area 10th Division
Artillery Brigade 3rd (I) Armored Brigade [Brig.B.S. Irani] -
72nd
Armored Regiment [T-55] Note: This may not be correct. The
brigade HQ may have been sitting without any troops as the rest of its units
had been sent to 26th Division. In which case 72nd Armd
Regt would have been under direct command of the division. The question of
why brigade HQ did not go with the bulk of its units to 26th
Division is one we are unable to answer. 191st Infantry
Brigade [Brig. R.K. Jasbir Singh. Later Lt.-Gen.] Deployed west of the Tawi River - 4/1st Gorkha Rifles - 5th Sikhs [Lt. Col. P.K. Khanna, MVC] -
5th Assam [Lt.
Col. A.S. Malhi] - 10th Garhwal [Lt. Col. Onkar Singh, KIA] 28th Infantry
Brigade Deployed in the
Hill Subsector, NW of Chaamb [Brig. M.V. Natu] - 5th Rajput - 2nd J & K Rifles - 7th J & K Rifles -
8th J & K Militia [Lt. Col. J.P.S. Randhawa, Vr.C.] -
863rd Light Battery/86th Light Regiment 52nd Infantry
Brigade Deployed at and
forward of Akhnur -
16th
Punjab [Lt. Col.
Raghubir Singh] - 7th Garhwal 68th Infantry
Brigade [Brig. R.T. Morlin]
Deployed east of the Tawi River -
5/9th
Gorkha Rifles -
3/4th
Gorkha Rifles (ex-52nd Brigade) -
7th
Kumaon -
9th
Jats [Lt. Col. Jagjit Singh] |